Draft:Centre Industriel de Stockage Géologique

Cigéo, acronym for Centre Industriel de Disposage Géologique (Industrial Geological Disposal Center), is a French project for the deep geological disposal of radioactive waste, also known as nuclear waste burial. It is designed to bury (store) high-level, long-lived radioactive waste produced by all French nuclear facilities, until their decommissioning, and by the processing of spent fuel used in nuclear power plants. After more than twenty years of research, most of which was carried out at the Bure laboratory, the Cigéo project plans to locate this site a few kilometers further north, on the border of the Meuse and Haute-Marne departments, on the borders of the communes of Ribeaucourt, Bure, Mandres-en-Barrois and Bonnet, in the Seine watershed, on the edge of the Meuse watershed.

The principle of deep disposal was adopted by French law in 2006. After a public debate held in 2013, the commission concluded that there was no urgent need to launch nuclear waste disposal and that the timetable needed to be revised. At the same time, the law defines alternative paths: long-term storage of radioactive waste, pending final disposal; or the separation-transmutation of nuclear waste into lower-activity or shorter-lived radioelements.

The project cost, whose estimate is still uncertain, varies between 15 and 36 billion euros. The financing of the project, which is theoretically the responsibility of the waste-producing companies, is partly covered by the State budget. Social acceptability is one of the major parameters of this project, and a billion euros has been spent to this end.

Two departmental public interest groups (GIPs) have been set up to support the installation of the project. The Haute-Marne GIP is chaired by Nicolas Lacroix, president of the Haute-Marne departmental council, and the Meuse GIP by Jérôme Dumont, president of the Meuse departmental council.

Since 1996, the project has given rise to controversy over funding, the reversibility of the process, uncertainties over the ability to guarantee the impermeability of the site over a 100,000-year period, the volume to be treated, and the illusory nature of the debate.

Disposal of long-lived nuclear waste

Models of standard containers for high-level (right) and medium-level (left) waste.

Storage objectives

Main articles: Nuclear reprocessing and Deep geological repository

The operation of nuclear power plants generates fission products, generally of very high activity, whose lifespan can be counted in tens of thousands of years. Added to this are actinides, which are less radioactive but have a half-life of millions of years, such as neptunium 237, which has a half-life of 2.1 million years, less active fission products such as iodine 129 (half-life 16 million years), and activation products such as chlorine 36 (half-life 300,000 years). These elements are non-reusable nuclear waste. In the processing of spent nuclear fuel, they are separated from the potentially reusable uranium and plutonium.

The strategy for managing HAVL radioactive waste (i.e. fission products PF and minor actinides AMin) is to isolate them in places inaccessible to humans for the time needed for their radiotoxicity to decay, the main long-term challenge being the facility's ability to contain radionuclides long enough using the various barriers interposed between the waste and surface ecosystems. One of the options currently being considered for achieving this isolation is to store the waste at depth (300 to 500 m) in tunnels dug into a stable, dense geological layer that is as watertight as possible (granite, volcanic tuff, or clay, as envisaged in France). The dangerousness of this radioactive waste will diminish over time as the radioactivity it contains decays naturally: the radiation from a large proportion of this high-level waste will be divided by a thousand in around a thousand years.

The dangers of irradiation are still poorly mapped for low doses of radiation, but according to international radiation protection authorities (UNSCEAR, ICRP), the effect is in any case negligible for irradiations of the order of magnitude of ambient natural radioactivity (which are of the order of micro-Sieverts per hour, or 5 mSv/year). On the other hand, for IRSN, “the radiological impact on humans and ecosystems will also have to be assessed in the short and very long term”. Underground storage enables very long-term containment of radioactivity: as water circulation is very low in an impermeable environment, only certain mobile radionuclides can migrate after several tens of thousands of years, and then potentially reach the surface in extremely small quantities.

Two recent doctoral dissertations on archaeological glass and obsidian suggest that the vitrification process used to fix HLL waste should be capable of confining the material for 10,000 years. However, to assess the performance of deep disposal, radioactive migration models do not include this artificial confinement (the containers); only natural rock is considered. The example of the Oklo natural nuclear reactor, where non-volatile fission products have moved only a few centimeters in nearly two billion years, was used in the preparatory work for Yucca Mountain to show that this containment is possible.

According to a researcher who, in 2017, defended a thesis on the history of science at the EHESS, Andra has gradually had to give up producing formal proof of the absolute safety of the repository on the model of a mathematical demonstration, and now relies instead on a “bundle of arguments” showing that the evolution of Cigéo is under control in the very long term.

Study of the Callovo-Oxfordian clay

Geological section of the Bure site.

The area proposed by Andra for the Cigéo repository is located in eastern France, on the border of the Meuse and Haute-Marne departments.

The long-term safety performance of such a repository depends, among other factors, on the characteristics of the host rock. The geological layer chosen for storage is the “Callovo-Oxfordian”. This is a layer of clayey rock around 160 million years old, located at a depth of around 500 m in the eastern Paris basin (between 420 and 555 m at the laboratory site). The Callovo-Oxfordian (Jurassic age) argilite (a mixture of clay and quartz) possess a priori physico-chemical characteristics that tend to limit radionuclide migration. The clay layer, over 130 m thick and at a depth of 500 m, has shown excellent containment qualities: stable for at least 100 million years, homogeneous over several hundred km2, the medium has very low permeability and therefore opposes the circulation of water (the main cause of package degradation and radioelement dissemination), and the clay has a high retention capacity (sorption capacity of radioactive elements).

For operational situations, Andra is aiming for a maximum permissible dose of 0.25 mSv/year for the public and 5 mSv/year for exposed workers, i.e. a quarter of that required by current regulations. For the long term, Andra's objective is for the committed dose at the outlet to remain below 0.25 mSv/year for the most exposed reference group. Modeling estimates that the dose at the outlet would be a maximum of 0.000 8 mSv/year after 500,000 years (dominated by iodine-129 and chlorine-36, both soluble); while remaining well below the objective, it would be higher (0.02 mSv/year) if EdF's CU1 and CU2 spent fuels were stored.

The purpose of the Meuse/Haute Marne Underground Research Laboratory was, therefore, to study the argillite layer, with a view to determining whether its characteristics are consistent with the safety objectives of a repository located within the transposition zone.

Andra's work has shown that the properties of the Callovo-Oxfordian argillite strongly reduce the mobility of minor actinides, and thus the associated activity flux leaving the host formation, by confining them in the near-field. However, the French nuclear safety authority stresses the need to take into account “residual uncertainties” concerning the homogeneity of the geological clay layer, which the France Nature Environment Association invokes to justify its opposition to the project.

Project description

General description

The planned facility comprises surface installations, notably to receive and prepare the waste packages, or to support the excavation and construction of underground structures. The waste is to be stored in underground installations, located at a depth of around 500 meters, in a layer of clay rock that must be impermeable and have containment properties over very long time scales. A funicular should be able to lower or raise the packages, its design and eventual construction, maintenance, and operation having been entrusted to the Grenoble-based company Poma (specializing in cable transport, ski lifts, and cable cars) at a total cost of €68 million, and possibly operational by 2025 (if the storage center is decided).

Having entered the pre-industrial phase in 2011, the Cigéo project could receive the first waste in 2025 following a series of stages and a timetable defined by law. Cigéo is designed to operate for at least 100 years. The underground storage facility, at a depth of 500 m, will be built progressively, as and when required. It will cover an area of around 15 km² after around 100 years.

The law requires the facility to be reversible for at least one hundred years, to give future generations the possibility of modifying or directing the storage process, for example by removing the stored packages if another “management method” is envisaged, or if the safety of the site is called into question. However, there is no provision for a financial reserve to cover all or part of the cost of such a retrieval operation.

Waste destined for Cigéo

Cigéo is designed to store high-level waste (HLW) and long-lived intermediate-level waste (ILW), which cannot be stored at surface or shallow depths, for reasons of nuclear safety or radiation protection. For high-level waste, which is the most radioactive, the radiation that would be received at one meter from an unprotected package is several sieverts (Sv) per hour.

The waste is packaged by its producer and then placed in a storage container. The volumes of HA and MA-VL waste that could be stored in Cigéo are thus estimated at:

• around 10,000 m³ packaged for HA waste (around 60,000 packages), i.e. around 30,000 m³ of containers;
• around 70,000 m³ for MA-VL waste (around 180,000 packages), i.e. around 350,000 m³ of containers.

The inventory used by Andra for the design of the Cigéo project only takes into account nuclear facilities that have been or are about to be licensed as of December 31, 2010, with an operating life extended to 50 years. However, for waste from the current fleet of nuclear power plants, the reference inventory assumes complete recycling of all spent fuel (including MOX and URE, which are not yet recycled). Consequently, if the complete recycling of all spent fuel from the current fleet were to be called into question, this would have a major impact on the very nature of the waste to be stored, but only towards the end of the century. If it were ultimately proposed to store untreated spent fuel in Cigéo, the latter would have to be significantly adapted and its footprint would increase (from 15 to around 25 km²). In addition, in the event of a complete shutdown of nuclear power, separated plutonium (which could then no longer be considered a recyclable nuclear material) would increase the inventory to be taken into account. According to Reporterre's Hervé Kempf, reprocessing, which leads to the creation of 5 types of waste (minor actinides, plutonium, spent MOX, reprocessed uranium, and spent uranium fuel), needs to be reviewed, and the conditions for waste storage at the La Hague plant need to be rediscussed.

It would be possible to store waste from future facilities in Cigéo, provided that it is compatible with the authorization (in terms of volume, nature, and authorized waste activities). If the inventory to be taken into account exceeded the limits of the Cigéo authorization, the latter would have to be modified following a procedure to amend the authorization decree after a public inquiry. The volumes to be stored are closely dependent on the type of waste to be stored.

The volumes to be stored are closely dependent on energy policy, with an increase in volume in the event of the premature shutdown of certain power plants. Opponents of the debate are calling for it to be postponed until after the Energy Transition Programming Act, while the ASN is recommending that, given these uncertainties, “majority hypotheses” be used.

Reversibility of Storage

Concrete container intended for the storage of MAVL waste.

To provide future generations the opportunity to reconsider storage decisions, the program law on radioactive waste establishes the principle of reversible storage as a precautionary measure: “The deep geological storage of radioactive waste involves storing these substances in a specially designed underground facility, adhering to the principle of reversibility.”

The conditions for reversibility are not predetermined; they must be discussed during public debate. After this public debate, the government presents a bill setting these conditions, which then leads to a parliamentary debate. Only afterward can the authorization for creating the storage center be granted. This authorization specifies the minimum duration during which the storage's reversibility must be ensured, which cannot be less than one hundred years.

The concept of "reversibility" is relative: what is reversible or not depends on the ability to safely access the waste packages and on the price society is willing to pay for retrieval. In the distant future, even if buried several hundred meters deep in containers corroded over centuries, the waste might technically remain retrievable under acceptable safety conditions, but reopening a shaft and access galleries could entail prohibitive costs, making the operation economically risky. Thus, reversibility is designed in progressive stages, from routine gallery operations to the final closure of the center: packaging in waste containers, sealing of disposal cells, backfilling of galleries, and then the closure of the center. Each step, which involves necessary containment measures to ensure site safety, makes any potential retrieval increasingly difficult and costly.

Model of a storage container (2) intended for placing HAVL waste (1) in a tunnel. The skids (3) intended to facilitate possible extractions can be seen.

Reversibility must be considered from the design phase of the center and should enable the safe recovery of waste packages, despite the depth, as long as the decision to close the storage has not been finalized. To ensure this safe recovery:

• The containers and storage facilities must be constructed to remain durable for at least the entire operational period of the storage site, enabling easy access to the waste packages.
• The automated devices designed to place the waste containers in storage must also be durable and capable of retrieving these containers.

These systems and their maintenance naturally incur costs, which become even more significant as the requirements for reversibility increase. The funding for reversibility falls within the broader framework of intergenerational responsibility. The approach taken by the project stakeholders is to have the current generation finance the laboratory, construction, operation, and closure of Cigéo, as they are the ones choosing this storage method.

According to Andra, “The concept of the Cigéo project is flexible and adaptable. If necessary, it could accommodate non-reprocessed spent fuel. The first packages to be stored will be intermediate-level, long-lived waste (ILW-LL), with the question of definitively sealing the first disposal cell being addressed around 2045. The storage of the first vitrified high-level waste (HLW) packages will not begin before 2075.” For some, reversibility leads to undue complexity.

Deep Storage Costs and Funding Sources

The total cost evaluation of Cigéo must encompass all expenses over more than 100 years, including studies, construction of initial facilities (surface buildings, shafts, ramps), operation (personnel, maintenance, energy), progressive construction of underground structures, closure, monitoring, and more. A portion of these costs/investments, according to Andra, will involve the salaries of 1,500 to 2,000 people employed throughout the excavation and burial process, lasting at least a century.

• In 2003, Andra published its first cost evaluation based on 2002 technical concepts. Several scenarios were considered, with costs varying from €15.9 to €55 billion depending on options related to waste reprocessing.
• In 2009, Andra provided producers with a new design file and a revised cost estimate (known as "SI 2009"), which evaluated deep storage at €33.8 billion (2008 value), or €35.9 billion (2010 value). The 2009 file included an increased inventory for storage and technical adjustments to better address safety and reversibility requirements.
• In 2013, Andra undertook a new cost estimate. Based on a refined technical outline from early 2013 and an initial optimization exercise, the estimate at the end of 2013 stood at €28 billion (2013 value), excluding research, insurance, and taxes, representing a roughly stable amount at a constant scope. Further optimization opportunities between Andra and producers remained under review.
• In November 2013, Andra indicated during a public debate that this re-evaluation would be submitted to the government in 2014. After gathering feedback from waste producers and the opinion of the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), the Minister of Energy was tasked with finalizing and publicly releasing the cost evaluation.
• In January 2016, the cost was officially set at €25 billion by the Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development, responsible for energy.

This cost will theoretically be funded by waste producers (EDF, CEA, and Areva) through agreements with Andra, which will establish a "fund for financing the construction, operation, final shutdown, maintenance, and monitoring of storage facilities for high- and intermediate-level long-lived radioactive waste." For a new nuclear reactor throughout its operation, this cost represents approximately 1–2% of the total cost of electricity production.

ASN Expectations for Safety

In France, any entity planning to create or operate a basic nuclear facility must submit a "safety options dossier."

ASN issued a safety guide for geological disposal of radioactive waste in 2008 and has provided several opinions on the matter, including feedback before the 2013 public inquiry (concluded in early 2014).

Following the 2013 public debate, Andra announced plans to start storage operations in 2025, beginning with a "pilot industrial phase" lasting 5–10 years, preceding an extended operational phase. At this time, Andra also indicated it would submit a safety options dossier to ASN in 2015, as a prerequisite for the authorization to create the facility. This dossier would include "documents concerning the technical recoverability options, a draft specification for package acceptance, and a master plan for operations."

On January 20, 2015, ASN responded to Andra, outlining its expectations for the safety options dossier in a letter dated December 19, 2014:

• Comprehensive site coverage, including surface, underground, and surface-to-depth connection installations.
• Self-supporting structures for installations.
• Clear presentation of objectives, concepts, and principles adopted for safety (during operation and long-term) at all installation lifecycle stages: design, construction, operation, decommissioning, dismantling or closure, maintenance, and monitoring.
• Reversibility (in the broad OECD sense) with dual requirements:
  • a) Adaptability of the facility (to allow usage adjustments during construction or operation, enabling facility evolution).
  • b) Recoverability of waste "within a given period," addressing usual challenges of package inaccessibility (even after storage cell and gallery closures or in case of containment integrity loss), accounting for aging or structural damage.

ASN also stressed the importance of Andra's subcontracting policy and required a draft of the notice outlined in Article II of the November 2, 2007 decree. This notice should demonstrate Andra's technical capacity for constructing and operating the facility, as defined in Article 2.1.1 of the February 7, 2012 order. Additional requests were detailed in an annex to the letter.

ASN's opinion on the safety options dossier, published January 15, 2018, confirmed the project's satisfactory technological maturity. However, it echoed concerns raised in the summer of 2017 by the Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) regarding "bituminized" waste, which constitutes 16% of the volume and 18% of the packages Andra plans to store. This waste presents fire risks. Consequently, Andra has two options: treat the waste to render it inert, such as through pyrolysis, or modify Cigéo's design to prevent chain reactions in case of a packaged fire.

Problematic of Updating Costs and Stability of Funding

Under the 2006 law on nuclear waste, waste producers are legally required to estimate the long-term costs associated with their waste and balance these future expenses with dedicated assets locked in for this purpose. These costs are not recorded in "gross value" but are discounted: the dedicated assets are invested and generate financial interest. For example, with an interest rate of 3.04%, one euro invested today would theoretically yield €20 after a century (1.0304^100), thus accounting for an expense twenty times higher in one hundred years.

A concern raised by opponents of the project is that due to this discounting process, the provisions for costs set aside by waste producers only partially cover the future expenses of the storage center. High discounting rates (5% and/or 3%) for long-term costs allow operators to allocate only €5 billion for the Cigéo project, even though this project is expected to cost at least seven times more. As a result, there is a fear that if the producers' provisions prove insufficient, "Our children will inherit only the waste."

This objection hinges on the ability of financial investments to maintain long-term performance. However, the discount rate chosen by waste producers is not fixed but constrained: "It cannot exceed the expected return rate, anticipated with a high degree of confidence, of the coverage assets managed with sufficient security and liquidity to meet their purpose." This rate must undergo annual evaluation: if the financial return of the provisions falls below expectations, producers must reevaluate their costs (upward), which disrupts their cost balance sheets. In such cases, "the administrative authority identifies deficiencies or inadequacies in the evaluation of costs, the calculation of provisions, or their amount, and may prescribe the necessary measures to regularize the situation, specifying deadlines for implementation." Operators are then required to increase provisions to rebalance their long-term cost accounts.

The State has opted not to cover the CEA’s costs with its assets but will ensure funding through the budget. For operators with predominantly long-term costs, the deadline to comply with this coverage rule was extended from 2011 to 2014.

Historical Background

Law of December 30, 1991

The law of December 30, 1991, concerning research on radioactive waste management, organizes over 15 years of research on managing high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste. This research focuses on three potential methods:

• Separation and transmutation of long-lived radioactive elements in this waste;
• Reversible or irreversible storage in deep geological formations, notably through the creation of underground laboratories;
• Long-term surface conditioning and storage processes for this waste.

The law specifies that at the end of a period not exceeding fifteen years, the government will submit a comprehensive evaluation report to Parliament, accompanied by a bill authorizing, if applicable, the creation of a high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste storage facility.

Developments from 1992 to 2005

In 1992, a call for applications was launched to identify departments willing to host underground laboratories. About 30 applications from 11 departments were received. By late 1993, four departments were selected: Gard, Vienne, Meuse, and Haute-Marne.

In 1998, after geological investigations and public inquiries, the Lionel Jospin government opted for a single laboratory in Bure.

Between 1999 and 2004, the underground laboratory in Bure was built. In 2005, Andra published the "Argile 2005" report, summarizing 15 years of research complemented by experiments conducted in the underground laboratory. It concluded that storage in an argillaceous geological layer was feasible in principle, provided further complementary research was conducted.

In January 2006, the National Evaluation Commission on Radioactive Waste Management Research (CNE), created by the 1991 law, published a global report on the 15-year research findings to prepare a potential bill authorizing the creation of a high-activity, long-lived radioactive waste storage center. It recommended reversible storage in deep geological conditions as the "reference method" for ultimate waste disposal and further research in the Bure underground laboratory.

Law of June 28, 2006

The 2006 law subjected the authorization of Cigéo to:

1. A Public Debate
2. Opened on May 15, 2013, by the National Commission for Public Debate, with 15 public meetings announced between May 15 and October 15, 2013. These included contributions from various experts and allowed public input via a "participatory website." The debate aimed to:
   • Inform the public about Cigéo’s industrial design, safety, reversibility, location, and monitoring;
   • Gather opinions on the goals, modalities, characteristics, and impacts of Cigéo;
   • Advise the State on the decision to be made.
3. By mid-December, the commission would publish a debate summary, and Andra would have three months to provide a reasoned decision on the next steps for its project based on the public debate’s findings.
4. Authorization Request for Creation
5. Filed by the National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Andra) in 2015.
6. 2015–2018: Authorization Review
7. This period included evaluations by relevant authorities, input from local governments, a law on storage reversibility, a public inquiry, and potential authorization to proceed with storage based on prior results.

Andra’s proposed solutions are subject to independent oversight:

• The National Evaluation Commission (CNE) conducts scientific and technical reviews, ensuring the feasibility and performance of the storage method. It reports annually to Parliament and the government.
• The Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) ensures project compliance with regulatory requirements (radiation protection and safety), drawing on expertise from the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) and permanent expert groups.
• A Local Information and Monitoring Committee (CLIS) examines information and consultation processes concerning the storage site.

Finally, Parliament monitors project progress through the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices (OPECST). The application for Cigéo’s creation authorization, initially due to be submitted to the ASN in 2018, was postponed to mid-2019.

Debates and Controversies

At the beginning of 2013, the French National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP) prepared discussions on the proposed waste storage site. On February 4, 2013, Ecology Minister Delphine Batho visited the underground laboratory in Bure. Two days later, on February 6, she approved the dossier prepared by the French National Agency for Radioactive Waste Management (Andra) for presentation during the public debate, scheduled to take place from May 15 to July 31 and from August 31 to October 15, 2013.

According to Andra's director, "The decision to create a storage site in Meuse and Haute-Marne has not yet been made. [...] On one hand, we will need the green light from the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN). On the other hand, while the two departments have agreed to the underground laboratory, they have not yet given their approval for the storage site itself, and we are fully aware of this."

Debate Boycott

On May 15, 2013, approximately 40 organizations called for a boycott of the debate, including many local groups such as Bure Zone Libre, the national federation Friends of the Earth, and the Network for Nuclear Phase-out (Réseau Sortir du Nucléaire).

On May 23 and again on June 18, opponents disrupted the debates, claiming that decisions had already been made. Claude Bernet, president of the commission overseeing the debate, suspended the session after just 15 minutes. The CNDP regretted the incident, noting that "many participants were denied their right to information and expression regarding the project." Similarly, the High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Safety (HCTISN) condemned "these obstacles to the proper conduct of public meetings, which are organized under the laws of the Republic to ensure genuine democratic practice."

A survey conducted among residents of Meuse and Haute-Marne showed that 83% supported having project opponents participate in the public debate. However, 68% agreed with the statement, "The debate will be useless, as the conclusions are already predetermined," while still considering the discussions valuable for raising the level of public information.

Andra pointed out, however, that "no regulatory text requires the debate to take the form of public meetings. The CNDP has proposed alternative solutions, such as adversarial online forums or a citizen conference."

On February 12, 2014, CNDP president Christian Leyrit suggested phasing the creation of the Cigéo industrial geological storage facility, starting with a "significant milestone" in the form of "pilot storage."

2016 Law

In June 2015, the Constitutional Council struck down an article on reversibility included in the Macron Law. This provision was ultimately incorporated into the law defining the framework for the Cigéo project, which was adopted in July 2016.

On November 8, 2017, at Andra's request, the CNDP announced the appointment of two guarantors (Pierre Guinot-Delery and Jean-Michel Stievenard) to assist in informing and involving civil society in the project. Due to the complexity of the dossier and the resignation of one of the guarantors, the CNDP decided on June 6, 2018, to appoint three guarantors (Jean-Michel Stievenard, Marie-Line Meaux, and Jean-Daniel Vazelle).

National and local associations (including Greenpeace, Sortir du Nucléaire, Attac, Lorraine Nature Environnement, and CEDRA) challenged the constitutionality of the law. On October 27, 2023, the Constitutional Council confirmed that provisions on storage reversibility did not violate Article 1 of the Environmental Charter and were therefore constitutional.

Intensified Protests and Judicial Responses

Starting in 2016, the Lejuc woods in Mandres-en-Barrois, a potential site for Cigéo installations, became a symbol of resistance against the project. Activists occupied the site, and a secret ballot by the Mandres municipal council authorizing its transfer to Andra was challenged for procedural flaws. The decision was annulled on February 28, 2017, by the administrative court in Nancy, prompting the council to reconfirm its decision on May 18. Despite this, activists continued occupying the woods until they were expelled by police on February 22, 2018. Legal challenges regarding the transfer of the Lejuc woods persisted, and opponents' lawyers contested the legality of the eviction. In the following days, materials installed by activists to block access and facilitate occupation were removed.

Protests occasionally turned violent, including an attempted arson at a nearby hotel-restaurant, vandalism at the Bar-le-Duc courthouse, and threats against parliamentarians and journalists. Authorities launched investigations into several anti-nuclear activists residing in Bure and surrounding villages for "criminal conspiracy," employing advanced criminal analysis techniques. According to Reporterre and Mediapart, surveillance efforts amounted to a "massive intelligence operation against the anti-nuclear movement," reportedly costing nearly one million euros.

Preliminary Opinions, Authorizations, and Preparatory Work

The public inquiry dossier was submitted on August 3, 2020. On January 13, 2021, the Environmental Authority issued its opinion, recommending a detailed program of supplementary risk management and monitoring studies. The CNDP emphasized the need for extensive consultation regarding the rehabilitation of the Nançois-Tronville-Gondrecourt railway line. In February 2021, the General Secretariat for Investment expressed a favorable opinion on the Cigéo project, noting its "strong prudential and insurance value" but highlighting the "significant and serious risk of cost overruns."

The updated dossier incorporated these recommendations, and the inquiry took place from September 15 to October 23, 2021. On December 20, investigators issued a favorable opinion "without reservations" on declaring public utility and aligning urban planning documents with the project.

On July 8, 2022, a decree declared the public utility of the Cigéo project. This declaration allows for the adjustment of urban planning documents and enables Andra to acquire the necessary land through expropriation. The decree specifies that expropriations must occur by December 31, 2037, and those involving subsoil areas by December 31, 2050.

On January 17, 2023, Andra submitted its application for site authorization to the Ministry of Energy Transition. The Nuclear Safety Authority has five years to review the dossier and approve or reject the project.

On December 1, 2023, the Council of State reaffirmed the "public utility" of the radioactive waste storage project in Bure.

On June 10, 2024, the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) released the first of three required opinions, concluding that knowledge of waste packages, the site, and the rock intended to contain the radioactive waste was sufficient for a safety assessment. "Our opinion is broadly positive regarding Andra's compiled knowledge," it stated. However, the IRSN noted that the Cigéo facility's capacity is not designed to accommodate waste from a nuclear expansion beyond the six EPR2 reactors already planned. Additional reactors, such as eight additional EPR2 units, SMRs, or RNRs, would require a new authorization request or an entirely new project. The IRSN highlighted concerns regarding rapid metal component corrosion, rock homogeneity, and the design of sealing structures.

See also

Related articles

• Agence nationale pour la gestion des déchets radioactifs
• Geology of France
• Meuse/Haute Marne Underground Research Laboratory
• Long-term nuclear waste warning messages

External links

• Official website
• Cigéo Information and Resource Center
• Reversibility of decisions and recoverability of radioactive waste, Nuclear Energy Agency No. 7105, OECD 2012.
• Jean-Pierre Petit, "Nuclear waste, the planetary time bomb," Open forum on Fréquence évasion, September 25, 2016 (retrieved August 20, 2020)

Bibliography

• Bonneau, Pierre; d'Allens, Gaspard; Guillard, Cécile (2020). Cent mille ans. Bure ou le scandale enfoui des déchets nucléaires [One Hundred Thousand Years. Bure or the Buried Scandal of Nuclear Waste] (in French). Seuil. ISBN 978-2-02-145982-1.

This page will be placed in the following categories if it is moved to the article namespace.

Categories:

• Nuclear power in France