Draft:BRICS (China)

BRICS (China)

BRICS is an intergovernmental organization comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (Bhargav Acharya, 2023). The countries cover 26% of global territory, 42% of global population, and almost 30% of global GDP (Wang, Zhang and Xi, 2021). China was a founding member of BRICS and plays an important role in the organization’s economic policy, agenda-setting, and political influence.

History: China’s Role in the Founding and Development of BRICS

The alliance was first conceived in 2001 as the BRICs by Jim O'Neill, who coined the term in recognition of the growing influence of these countries on the global stage.Russian President Vladimir Putin formalized the alliance at their first summit in 2009, highlighting their shared mission to address democratic deficits in international affairs and promote a more multipolar world order (Menegazzi,2019). In 2011,South Africa officially joined BRICS. In 2017, China officially took over the presidency of BRICS. It established the concept of ‘BRICS+’ cooperation (Yu,2022). On 1 January 2024, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Iran, and Ethiopia became members of BRICS (BBC,2024). The BRICS platform is seen as a tool for China and Russia to counter Western hegemony and strengthen their negotiating position in global governance (Duggan and Azalia, 2020).

China's role in BRICS

As the world's second-largest economy, China's economic clout exceeds that of the other BRICS countries combined. “It is the world's largest trading nation, a major player in Foreign direct investment (FDI), finance and development assistance, it possesses nuclear weapons and is a permanent member of the UN Security Council” (Hooijmaaijers,2019). This prominence has enabled China to shape the BRICS agenda and make significant contributions to new development mechanisms designed to challenge Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Notably, the NDB was established by the BRICS under China's leadership, and is headquartered in Shanghai. China has also pursued its own initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (Hooijmaaijers,2019).

Conflicting interests

The political alliances within BRICS are not very solid, and the relationship between member countries and China is accompanied by friction. For example, India's need for infrastructure investment aligns with BRICS objectives but is accompanied by concerns about Chinese dominance (Duggan et al, 2021). India has sought to capitalize on the BRICS without becoming overly dependent on China, especially as ongoing territorial disputes have strained diplomatic relations.2020 Casualty clashes between the Indian and Chinese armies peaked in the Garhwal Valley—similarly, the competition between Russia, China, and India for influence over Central Asian resources (Heathershaw et al, 2019). Despite the Putin-Xi relationship, the relationship between Beijing and Moscow is unbalanced (Duggan et al, 2021). The BRICS countries are wary of jealously guarding against China's continued expansion of influence while cooperating with China.

Reasons for Joining and Objectives

Increasing influence in the international community

BRICS presents a platform through which China can challenge Western-doinated institutions and advocate for a multipolar world order with the support of other countries with similar interests. The BRICS are a diverse group of countries from different regions, but they are all emerging economic powers located in the Global South (Cheng, 2015). Their economic development in the last few decades has increased their prominence on the world stage, but international institutions, including the United Nations Security Council, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and World Bank, remain dominated by Western powers. The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which exposed deep-rooted problems in the international economic system, presented an opportunity for the BRICS states to advocate for greater inclusion of emerging powers in international institutions (Srinivas, 2022). They have had some success, for example at the IMF and World Bank Conferences in 2010 the distribution of voting rights and shares were reformed to give greater representation to developing countries (Cheng, 2015). However, the UN Security Council remains unchanged.

Nurturing relations with the Global South

China’s establishment of ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships’ with other BRICS members has brought about mutual development and influence in the Global South (Cheng, 2015). Both China and Russia seek to develop their border regions and strengthen bilateral trade. Similarly, China overtook the US as Brazil’s  main trading partner in 2010 (Bezerra and Lin, 2023). China is optimistic about the prospect of BRICS’s enlargement, allowing the achievements of the group to benefit other developing countries while increasing BRICS’s influence in global politics (Bezerra and Lin, 2023). While China’s involvement in the Global South, especially in African countries, has been accused of being neocolonial and exploitative, others argue that Sino-African relations are mutually beneficial (Masumbe, 2024).

Improving perceptions of China

Another one of China’s objectives as a member of BRICS is to improve international and domestic perceptions of China. Its rise on the world stage is often perceived as a threat to Western powers and the Liberal International Order. Historically, the west has been hesitant to work with China (Srinivas, 2022). Hu Jintao aimed to challenge this idea through involvement in international organizations, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS. He hoped to demonstrate China’s willingness to cooperate with other countries, work within diplomatic institutional frameworks, and to promote the idea that development of China will be beneficial for the whole world.

The past glory of Ancient China coupled with the humiliation of the decades after the Opium Wars have created a Chinese nationalism that the authorities must appease, especially in dealing with the US and Japan (Cheng, 2015). The legitimacy of the Chinese government hinges on its ability to respond to the demands of its citizens, and China’s influence in international affairs is a key issue in which they expect to see achievements. Therefore, foreign policy is an important aspect of the regime and BRICS presents an opportunity for China to challenge the western-dominated world order with the support of a bloc of other nations.

Economic contributions

As of 2024, BRICS nations collectively account for around 30% of global GDP, with China contributing over 70% of BRICS' total GDP (Dimitrijević, Dželetović, and Đorđević, 2024). Chinese trade with BRICS countries increased 12% year-over-year from 2020 to 2023, with significant volumes in energy, agriculture, and technology, demonstrating China’s aims to establish a cooperative economic alliance that challenges the dominance of Western-led trade blocs (Wani, 2024). Investment has been a similarly critical component of their economic strategy, with Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in BRICS countries totalling approximately $100 billion as of 2024 (Conti & Diegues, 2022). A central focus of such, being infrastructure investment used as a means of improving trade connectivity and fostering economic integration (Conti & Diegues, 2022). These opportunities are underscored by projects such as The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013. BRI allows it to expand its influence through building infrastructure including railways, ports and energy sources, across countries that overlap with BRICS’s spheres of influence such as South Africa and Russia.

China has also contributed to the formation of new institutions such as the New Development Bank. Founded in 2015 and headquartered in Shanghai, since its inception, the NDB has approved over 100 projects, amounting to approximately $30 billion in loans as of 2024. Approximately 30% of the bank's loans have been disbursed in local currencies as a means of reducing reliance on Western financial systems and overcoming the constraints often imposed by dollar-denominated loans (Bresser-Pereira & Bechelaine, 2019). Investments span various sectors, including transportation, energy, water supply, and urban development. For example, the financing of renewable energy projects in India and Brazil, facilitating the transition towards sustainable energy sources within developing countries.

Asymmetries and concerns

Issues of asymmetrical trade-surplus’ and investment imbalances have raised concerns among other BRICS members of an economic dependency on China (Hooijmaaijers, 2021). For example, China has pursued several mercantilist trade deals with Brazil resulting in a trade surplus for China of about $15 billion. Additionally, bilateral energy cooperation between China and Russia reached approximately $140 billion last year, with Russia supplying around 40% of its natural gas needs. These countries may be limited in their diversification with an asymmetrical capacity for domestic manufacturing over raw exports, limiting their bargaining power and creating economic dependence (Junior, et al., 2021). China's relatively stable debt situation also allows it to continue investing in member nations, often leading to concerns about debt sustainability (Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch, 2019). While Brazil and South Africa have attracted substantial Chinese capital for infrastructure development. India has seen a decline in Chinese investments due to geopolitical tensions, potentially leading to slower growth than its counterparts. Whilst the NDB has aimed to overcome these limitations by funding infrastructure projects in nations like Zambia and Ethiopia. The effectiveness of these initiatives is often contingent on the political and economic stability of the recipient countries (Kurecic and Kokotovic, 2017) with reports indicating that several countries in Africa have struggled to repay loans from China.

Future Challenges and Opportunities

By dissecting Chinese foreign policy, it’s possible to individualize an evolution of the country’s trajectory in its external relations. Since its inception, PRC has demonstrated a not so incisive, if even marginal plan of action in the global order – from the 1950s to the 1970s –, an approach that will be maintained until the last decade of the 20th century. At the dawn of the 2000s, China commenced to lay its bedrock as a rising power (Srinivas, 2022, p. 116). Hu Jintao, in 2003, began to intensify relations with Russia through the “Rust Belt”, amidst many actions taken, in order to make itself a more reliable ally (Cheng, 2015). The combination of neoliberal policies and the perpetual presence of state control in economics determined China’s rising centrality as a power challenging the supremacy of western countries, remarkably through its establishment as a BRICS pioneer (Bukhari, Malik, Mahmood, 2024). This latter element finds foundation in certain events unveiling how China’s influence is preponderant and feared. After proposing the creation of the BRICS development bank, India even took into consideration to open up access as members to those countries that should be hindered by NDB’s constitution, to avoid excessive Chinese leverage in the management of the bank (Han and Papa, 2023). The PRC’s strategy is to make its goals common to the BRICS countries, which do not have the same targets or even fear Chinese interference. In 2011 China strongly upheld the formulation of a BRICS free trade agreement, a circumstance that provoked bitterness with the other partners. Nonetheless, it has revealed Beijing’s great capacity to affect (Han & Papa, 2023).

Chinese leadership has been consolidated not only through its leading role in the creation of BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanisms or the Master Agreement on Extending Credit Facility in Local Currency (Han and Papa, 2023) but also through the future challenges posed by Xi Jinping in the 13^th BRICS in 2021. The agenda provided:

-       Bolstering public health cooperation, in particular for what regards vaccines

-       Increasing cooperation in technology, innovation, trade and investments

-       Favoring the partnership the political and security sector

-       Supporting people-to-people exchanges (Srinivas, 2022, pp. 132-133)

The line taken under the Chinese guide has also led to an expansion of the organization, inaugurated by the “BRICS+” at the Xiamen Summit and Shanghai International Expo in 2018, the first held in China (Guo, Zhang, and Shi, 2019).

Another key aspect is the complementarity among the BRICS countries, notably in modeling the agricultural agenda. That is identifiable in analogies in the high levels of growth and poverty of the population, and common features in the agriculture sector (Guo, Zhang, and Shi, 2019).

PRC shrewd foreign policy – through the BRICS – begets significative results both in domestic politics and international relations, such as reinvigorating CCP legitimacy and keeping nationalists’ pressure under control, as well as compacting an alignment of emerging economies, in the interest of modifying the international order from within and not upsetting it (Cheng, 2015).

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