163rd Rifle Division

163rd Rifle Division (August 1939 - June 4, 1940) 163rd Motorized Division (June 4, 1940 – September 15, 1941) 163rd Rifle Division (September 15, 1941 – 1945)
Active	1939–1945
Country	Soviet Union
Branch	Red Army
Type	Infantry, Motorized Infantry
Size	Division
Engagements	Winter War Battle of Suomussalmi Battle of Raate Road Leningrad strategic defensive Soltsy-Dno Offensive Demyansk Pocket Demyansk Offensive (1943) Battle of Kursk Battle of the Dnieper Battle of Kiev (1943) Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive Battle of Korsun–Cherkassy Uman–Botoșani offensive First Jassy–Kishinev offensive Second Jassy–Kishinev offensive Battle of Debrecen Budapest offensive Vienna offensive
Decorations	Order of Lenin  Order of the Red Banner  Order of Suvorov  Order of Kutuzov
Battle honours	Romny Kiev
Commanders
Notable commanders	Maj. Gen. Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov Maj. Gen. Ivan Mikhailovich Kuznetsov Col. Grigorii Petrovich Kotov Col. Mikhail Semyonovich Nazarov Col. Kuzma Andreevich Vasilev Maj. Gen. Fyodor Vasilevich Karlov

The 163rd Rifle Division was formed as an infantry division of the Red Army just before the Second World War began, in the Tula Oblast, based on the pre-September 13, 1939 shtat (table of organization and equipment). As a reinforced rifle division, it took part in the Winter War with Finland, where it was encircled at Suomussalmi. Despite a rescue attempt by the 44th Rifle Division from the Raate Road (which was also the route used by some of the 163rd's forces) the division was largely destroyed in one of the best-known Finnish victories of the war.

Formation

The division began forming in August 1939, in the Tula Oblast, based on a rifle regiment of the 84th Rifle Division. Col. Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov was appointed to command that month; he had been serving as commander of tank forces of 3rd Rifle Corps. He was promoted to the rank of Kombrig on November 4 and this would be modernized to major general on June 4, 1940, shortly before he left the division.

By September the 163rd was already being concentrated on the border with Latvia. In late October - early November it was moved to East Karelia, first as part of the Special Rifle Corps of 8th Army and then into the 47th Rifle Corps of 9th Army, which was under command of Komkor V. I. Chuikov. Over the next weeks it was heavily reinforced, until it comprised:

• 529th Rifle Regiment (from 54th Rifle Division)
• 662nd Rifle Regiment
• 759th Rifle Regiment
• 593rd Rifle Regiment (from 131st Rifle Division)
• 81st Mountain Rifle Regiment (from 54th Rifle Division)
• 365th Reconnaissance Regiment
• 365th Armored Car Battalion

These additional forces raised the personnel strength under Zelentsov to some 13,562 men.

Battle of Suomussalmi

The provincial town of Suomussalmi, with a population of some 4,000 inhabitants, was a target for the Red Army largely due its position on the east side of the narrow "waist" of Finland, sitting astride the shortest route to Oulu, at the head of the Gulf of Bothnia. The roads on the Finnish side of the border were fairly well-developed in this region. When the 163rd crossed the border on November 30 it was burdened with such extraneous frills as a brass band, printing presses, plus truckloads of propaganda leaflets and of good-will gifts for the local populace. Although the possibilities were greatly exaggerated by Soviet intelligence, it was true that voters in the region tended to vote for left-wing parties and policies in national elections. If the town could be taken, good roads led to the rail junction at Hyrynsalmi, from where Oulu was only 240km distant.

Chuikov had deployed his Army in three columns. 54th Division (less the regiments attached to the 163rd) took the southern route, with the objective of reaching the town of Kuhmo. The center column was made up of the 163rd and the 44th Rifle Division moving on two roads toward Suomussalmi. In the north the 122nd Rifle Division advanced on Salla in an effort to link up with 14th Army's 88th Rifle Division. In common with all the Red Army thrusts into the central and northern wildernesses the Finns were taken aback that the Soviets were even bothering to attack there, and in such massive strength. The 163rd pushed off from its base at Ukhta, on the Murmansk Railroad, along one of the many forest roads that had been secretly built to access the border.

Battle of Suomussalmi. Note positions of the 163rd.

Two roads led to Suomussalmi. The northern Juntusranta Road ran southwest before joining a main north-south route that led through the town and then by separate routes to Hyrynsalmi and to Peranka. The southern Raate Road intersected the Hyrynsalmi–Peranka route in the middle of Suomussalmi. Of the two, the Raate Road was the most improved, and the Finns were expecting it to be used if a Soviet attack came. Zelentsov, however, sent two of his regiments along the Juntusranta Road, gaining complete tactical surprise and overwhelming a 50-man company of border guards. The two regiments pressed on and reached the Palovaara junction overnight on December 5/6. Meanwhile, another regiment was moving into Suomussalmi itself via the Raate Road after overcoming the resistance of two platoons of border guards and a pair of improvised roadblocks by the end of December 1. Thereafter, it faced several reserve companies from Kajaani which slowed, but did not stop its progress. By the morning of December 7 all civilians had been evacuated from the town, and most of its buildings were set afire, but it was a hasty job and some were missed while others were saved by Zelentsov's men after they entered. Altogether there were enough to shelter several hundred men. Of the two regiments on the Juntusranta Road, one turned north toward Peranka and the other reached Suomussalmi later that day to link up with the regiment from the Raate Road.

The Finnish command was responding to the situation by committing companies and battalions of reinforcements as they mobilized. The thrust on the Juntusranta Road appeared to be the more significant threat, and the independent infantry battalion ErP-16 began arriving at Peranka at 0100 hours on December 6. By noon the whole battalion had taken up good defensive ground near Lake Piispajarvi, in time to meet the probing attacks of the lead elements of the 662nd Rifle Regiment, which had orders to reach Peranka by nightfall. This led to 24 hours of skirmishing, during which the initiative gradually passed to the Finns, despite being outnumbered about two-to-one. By now, all the Finnish forces operating north of the Palovaara road junction were grouped into "Task Force Susi" under command of Lt. Col. Paavo Susitaival, and the force was able to contain the 662nd, led by Colonel Sharov, with relative ease. In part this was due to one of Zelentsov's first of many costly mistakes; he had retained one of Sharov's battalions as his divisional reserve. Sharov made his situation worse on December 11 by sending a radio message to the rear, soon deciphered by Finnish intelligence, in which he complained that his men lacked boots, snowsuits, and adequate food. Further communications revealed that one of the divisional political officers had been "fragged" by some of his men, and a transmission on December 13 reported 160 battle casualties and 48 frostbite cases in the regiment to date, some 10 percent of its active strength, all while skirmishing.

Sharov tried to regain the initiative on December 14-15 and managed to make a temporary advance from Haapavaara to Ketola, but this was halted by mortar and Maxim machine gun fire. The lead battalion suffered 150 casualties, which brought his cumulative casualties to roughly 20 percent. With his soldiers reaching the end of their physical strength, Sharov ordered them over to the defensive. Meanwhile, Zelentsov had concentrated two regiments and most of his heavy weapons in Suomussalmi and the immediate area, and the Finns expected a new drive to commence on Hyrynsalmi. Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim had already ordered the sole uncommitted regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, JR-27, under command of Col. Hjalmar Siilasvuo, to the area to deal with the threat. Under the operational plan, JR-27 was to form the core of an ad hoc task force of approximately brigade strength which was to destroy the 163rd. This was an ambitious objective as Zelentsov had attached tanks and organic artillery, as well as being numerically stronger in manpower. JR-27, on the other hand, had no heavy weapons at all, and lacked a full inventory of such basics as tents and snowsuits.

However, Siilasvuo's force had plenty of skis and men with experience in their use. Most were from small northern towns, many had worked as loggers, and they knew the forests well. Already there were over 30cm of snow on the ground. What the Finns lacked in firepower they could counter with mobility. Siilasvuo established his headquarters at Hyrynsalmi and concentrated his troops there, some 40km south of Suomussalmi. When elements of the 163rd advanced on that place on December 9 they were surprised to come under heavy machine gun fire just 1-2km from their jumping-off line.

Finnish Counterattack

By the end of December 10 Siilasvuo was beginning to formulate his counterattack plan. He had all three battalions of his JR-27 plus two composite battalions of covering troops who had been in action since November 30. In an effort to reassure these tired men he put a rumor about that his regiment was just the leading element of an entire division, and to back this up Mannerheim designated his command as the 9th Division on December 22. After examining the situation, Siilasvuo became convinced he could deal with Zelentsov, who had shown a lack of aggression and whose 662nd Regiment was almost entirely passive. The balance of the 163rd was by now strung out in a road column nearly 40km long from Piispajärvi back to east of Suomussalmi. In order to make sure he had the division "in the bag" Siilasvuo first moved to cut the Raate Road behind it to prevent any reinforcements from intervening. Overnight on December 10/11 he moved the bulk of JR-27 to an assembly area southeast of the town, some 8km south of the Raate Road. Meanwhile, his engineers built a network of ice roads to enhance the mobility of their few artillery pieces.

On the morning of December 12 Siilasvuo launched the first of many road-cutting operations that would be carried out over the coming weeks. By concentrating superior firepower on a selected sector of the road the Red Army soldiers were overwhelmed despite desperate resistance, after which reinforcements would widen the gap as combat engineers began to fortify each end of the gap, some 400m wide. Siilasvuo had chosen a natural choke point close to the eastern tail of the 163rd's column, which was a 1,500m-wide isthmus between Lake Kuivasjärvi and Lake Kuomasjärvi. Any Soviet forces that arrived to rescue the 163rd would have to attack across the frozen lakes in the face of machine gun fire to outflank the roadblock; just 350 men were left to hold it against the eventual relief attempt by 44th Rifle Division.

References

Bibliography

• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967a). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть I. 1920 - 1944 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part I. 1920–1944] (in Russian). Moscow.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. pp. 80, 204
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 183, 337

External links

• Andrei Ivanovich Zelentsov
• Ivan Mikhailovich Kuznetsov
• Grigorii Petrovich Kotov
• Mikhail Semyonovich Nazarov
• Fyodor Vasilevich Karlov