Tyranny of the majority

The phrase tyranny of the majority, used in discussing systems of democracy and majority rule, is a criticism of the scenario in which decisions made by a majority under that system would place that majority's interests so far above a dissenting individual's interest that the individual would be actively oppressed. The phrase also refers to tyrants and despots whose behavior causes similar oppression.

Term

Limits on the decisions that can be made by such majorities, such as constitutional limits on the powers of parliament and use of a bill of rights in a parliamentary system commonly meant to reduce the problem.

The idea goes back at least as far as Plato's Republic, while the phrase itself originated with Alexis de Tocqueville in his Democracy in America (1835, 1840) and was further popularized by John Stuart Mill, who cites de Tocqueville, in On Liberty (1859); the Federalist Papers frequently refer to the concept, though usually under the name of "the violence of majority faction," particularly in Federalist 10.

The concept itself was popular with Friedrich Nietzsche and the phrase (in translation) is used at least once in the first sequel to Human, All Too Human (1879). Ayn Rand, Objectivist novelist, wrote against the idea, saying that individual rights are not subject to a public vote, and that the political function of rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities (and that the smallest minority on earth is the individual). Similar arguments are made by a number of other philosophies that support individualism, including the Austrian movement, and libertarianism in general.

In 1994, legal scholar Lani Guinier used the phrase as the title for a collection of law review articles.

Public choice theory

The notion that, in a democracy, the greatest concern is that the majority will tyrannize and exploit diverse smaller interests, has been criticized by Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action, who argues instead that narrow and well organized minorities are more likely to assert their interests over those of the majority. Olson argues that when the benefit of political action (e.g. lobbying) are spread over fewer agents, there is a stronger individual incentive to contribute to that political activity. Narrow groups, especially those who can reward active participation to their group goals, might therefore be able to dominate or distort political process, a process studied in public choice theory.

Vote trading

Critics of public choice theory point out that vote trading, also known as logrolling, can protect minority interests from majorities in representative democratic bodies such as legislatures. Direct democracy, such as statewide propositions on ballots, does not offer such protections.

See also

• Argumentum ad populum
• Consensus
• Dictatorship of the proletariat
• Elective dictatorship
• General will
• Individual anarchism
• Majoritarianism
• Minority rights
• Ochlocracy (mob rule)
• Social anarchism
• Consociationalism
• Minoritarianism
• Utilitarianism

Examples

• State-sanctioned slavery
• Anti-miscegenation laws
• Minaret controversy in Switzerland
• Wikipedia

References

• Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (Free Press: 1994)
• Mancur Olson, The Logic Of Collective Action