Talk:Stephen E. Ambrose/Archive 3

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Deletions

I wanted to explain a couple of things I took out of the article:

• "Early in his career, Ambrose was mentored by World War II historian Forrest Pogue."

That sentence has no source, and I couldn't find anything that supports it. In fact, what I found tends to contradict it. In this interview, Ambrose discusses Pogue, but never suggests he was mentored by him.

• "by Sally Richardson and others"

None of the sources cited in that paragraph mention "Sally Richardson." A Google search of "Sally Richardson" and "Stephen Ambrose" turned up only the WP article and lots of mirror sites, but nothing else. I'm not sure where that phrase came from, but there are no sources for it. I think that's why there had been a tag on it ([1], [2]). Perhaps the "Sally Richardson" was the result of an editing glitch or vandalism that crept into the article at one time. I'm surprised none of the Ambrose experts noticed it. 64.134.100.231 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 21:35, 20 June 2010 (UTC).

Anonymous user. Initially unexplained deletions (with blank edit summary). Then leaving an unsigned comment. Seems familiar. This [3] appears to locate the IP in the same broad geographic area (at a hotel within reasonable driving distance). Same dude? Who knows for sure. Don’t want to exclude people, but I wonder if the article should receive semi-protection.

Pogue and Ambrose. 1. They definitely worked together. 2. “Ambrose dedicated D-Day to his ‘model, guide, and inspiration,’ the late Forrest Pogue” AMBROSE INSTILLS NEW FAITH IN SOME OLD HEROES. Lexington Herald-Leader (KY), November 9, 1997, Author: Art Jester. 3. “Although some of Ambrose 's closest friends doubt Powell's chances, few question the historian's straight-ahead drive. Once Ambrose fixes his sights on a goal, they say, nothing much stands in his way. ‘He's a formidable opponent,’ said Forrest Pogue, a military historian and Ambrose mentor. ‘In other words, he doesn't let you knock him around.’” AMBROSE TO LEAVES HISTORIC LEGACY: UNO PROF IN COLIN POWELL'S CAMP. Times-Picayune, The (New Orleans, LA) , April 30, 1995, Author: GWENDOLYN THOMPKINS.

I think the “Sally Richardson” is an actual error. This might have originated from a reference to Brian Richardson, who wrote one of the articles about Ambrose's plagiarism. I noticed this earlier and have been planning to fix it and stick in some additional names and references.Eurytemora (talk) 03:52, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

Indefinite semi-protection seems to be an excellent idea for this article thus eliminating anonymous vandalism and limiting its editing to registered users with some demonstrated understanding of (and compliance with) WP policies and guidelines. In the light of this June 19th vandaliztion of the Talk page, the same might also be a good idea for this page as well for the time being. Centpacrr (talk) 09:35, 21 June 2010 (UTC)

An Outsider's Point of View

NOTE: Two full AN/I discussions of the well documented history of repeated patterns of disruptive editing,
sockpuppetry, and overt Wikiststalking by the subject anonymous multiple IP user can be found here. and here. Both resulted in this user and all of his/her sockpuppet accounts being Banned from Editing on Wikipedia.

Removed post completely instead of just collapsing --SarekOfVulcan (talk) 15:07, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

• FRAUDULENT POST NOTICE: This might be an interesting post if it were legitimate, however it is certainly NOT one made by an "outsider" but is clearly the handiwork of the self same anonymous IP User who has been disrupting and vandalizing this and several other articles (and their talk pages) for two months, and many, many others on WP for at least the last two years. To perpetuate his/her wikistalking, vandalism, and disruptive editing with this ham handed and transparent fraud, he/she has now registered as "Techwriter2B" as a ruse both to hide the location of the IP being used to post it (now that this technique has proved to be his undoing) and apparently also for the purpose of avoiding being blocked from accessing these pages in the event that they are soon protected. The first (and so far only) posting made as this user is the disingenuous screed above pretending to "objectively praise" all of his/her views posted over the last two months using a variety of anonymous IPs, and denigrating the views and page edits of all other editors. The "comments" above are nothing more than almost word-for-word recitations of those made in his/her previous postings. (I would not say his/her comments are plagiarized, however, as he/she is simply quoting him/herself.) Now that he/she has finally registered -- albeit only to again vandalize this page -- at least this matter can now finally been taken to AN/I. Centpacrr (talk) 21:20, 22 June 2010 (UTC)

Yes, this is obviously that IP. I don't see the problem as long as there is no pretense that this is two people. The personal back-and-forth belongs elsehwere. The substantive comments made by Techwriter2B should be taken into consideration. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 14:18, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

The problem is that there absolutely IS a pretense that this is two people. "Techwiter2B" is clearly NOT an "ouisider" to the article, is NOT a "writing student," is NOT "taking a course in research, writing, and using the Internet," does NOT have an "instructor (who) has talked about Wikipedia and everything that's wrong with it" who gave the "Stephen Ambrose article" to him/her "as an example," is NOT providing "the point of view of an outsider," and was NOT "supposed to write a review article for the class (he/she) is taking" with an "instructor (who) is going to look at this and grade (him/her) on it." This entire posting is an absolute fraud which is meant to deceive anyone who reads it, is part of the anon IPs year's long pattern of disruption, vandalism, and stalking on WP, and should be given absolutely NO CONSIDERATION as being legitimate whatsoever. NONE. Centpacrr (talk) 15:01, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I agree. This is a distraction and I'm tempted to suggest collapsing that post. Nomoskedasticity (talk) 15:03, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Three of he bullet points are substantive and should not be collapsed. All personal comments by both sides should be collapsed. Personal back-and-forth is disruptive whatever the source and must end now. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 15:17, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

• I would be delighted to only discuss content issues in here, but I am also not going to permit myself (or others) to be constantly hounded, slandered, or have my contributions and/or comments vandalized in here or elsewhere by the anon IP (who I see has already been indefinitely blocked as "Techwriter2B") without defending myself. This individual has been engaged in a consistent pattern of such misconduct against me and others for two months now in a wide variety of articles (including this one) to which I have contributed, and apparently has done so to many others over a period of at least the last two years if not longer. He/she has long ago forfeited any assumption of editing or commenting in good faith. Centpacrr (talk) 16:08, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Understood, but this was not the place for such responses. I hope that if he/she comes back you will please not respond here. Irnoically, if this person had said "yes I am the IP that commented earlier," and had not engaged in personal attacks, we might have had a worthwhile contributor and not a banned user. Three of the bullet points seemed to make sense, but I have not verified them. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 21:12, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Or possibly not. I see from later postings in the noticeboard that this person has a history of abuse. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 21:17, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Exactly. His/her documented history of abuse has been extensive, egregious, devious, persistent, targeted against a great many editors over several years resulting in very considerable disruption and damage to many articles (many of which he/she has also openly vandalized), and in many cases has been overtly perverse in character and intent. I have only responded and called him/her "out" here when his/her attacks were made here. I can assure you, however, that nothing would please me more then to never hear from -- or have to write another word about -- him/her again. Dealing with this individual has been by far the most unpleasant experience I have ever had on Wikipedia which has otherwise been almost universally positive and rewarding. Centpacrr (talk) 21:42, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

NOTE: Two full AN/I discussions of the well documented history of repeated patterns of disruptive editing,
sockpuppetry, and overt Wikiststalking by the subject anonymous multiple IP user can be found here. and here. Both resulted in this user and all of his/her sockpuppet accounts being Banned from Editing on Wikipedia.

RS discussion of warchronicle and CPRR

My apologies that notification was so belated. 76.22.25.102 (talk) 16:09, 2 July 2010 (UTC)

I think the situation with the troop carriers is pretty clearcut, though additional supporting refs (e.g. the Philadelphia Inquirer article) should be added.

However, the situation with the British coxswains is much more complicated. I spent quite a bit of time digging into it. I’ll try to lay out the results here.

With regard to the Hils citation in the coxswain paragraph (brought up by ‘76’) – I think there should be some rewording (and additional citations added). The sentence (with this citation following it) now reads “One writer claims that the first account was drawn from a work by S.L.A. Marshall.” Actually, Stephen Ambrose’s spokesman/son confirmed that the account in his book was taken from Marshall (and a proper citation for this should be added). Marshall has now come to be viewed as a suspect source by historians, with apparent fabrication of material. I think the intent of the WP editor adding the Hils reference might have been to bring in a citation questioning Marshall’s reliability as a source – but I think the sentence should be rewritten, since the role played by the citation is currently incorrect/ambiguous.

Regarding Elsby – the Elsby article was also posted at HNN [4]. Elsby also has had contributions published by BBC (in a feature called “WW2 People’s War”) [5] and in books (e.g. an analysis of tides, obstacles, and chronology at Omaha beach as part of a recent book by Bob Slaughter). And I’ve found him acknowledged or referenced - specifically, regarding his assistance and material - in various books and documentaries – e.g. books concerning D-day by Robert Black, Alex Kershaw; the British Royal Armouries (i.e. the British museum of arms) acknowledge him with regards to a recent documentary: “Kevan Elsby, who has become an expert Omaha historian in his own right and is helping greatly in the making of this film.” [6]; etc. Elsby does use strong concluding language in his article, but (as I mentioned before) I’ve seen plenty of other reliable sources that do likewise (e.g. look at many Gawker or Village Voice articles). And contrary to the implication of a comment from ‘76’, Elsby never uses the word “monster” (or an analogous word) regarding Ambrose. He does have a point of view, but POV does not exclude an author as a reliable source for WP. (Also, see a point I raise below regarding prior attempts at private communication with Ambrose by Sales and Elsby). And the article concerned mainly consists of quotations of others (the substance of which can essentially be corroborated). Elsby is also noted in other reliable sources discussing the Ambrose-coxswain issue, which generally support the validity of Elsby’s claims (e.g. [7] [8] – such sources should also be cited in the WP article).

Regarding the actual content. I’ll first mention in passing that there appear to be multiple additional inaccuracies in Ambrose’s account of the landing. For example, Ambrose wrote that the LCA landing craft carrying Captain Taylor Fellers and his men was “vaporized” by enemy fire before reaching shore, which is clearly false – the boat dropped these men off at Omaha beach and returned to the ship (Jimmy Green, the coxswain of the boat, notes "'How could everyone aboard have been vaporized?' Green asked. 'I'm here.'").

Regarding the first Ambrose account of a coxswain bringing his LCA in at the point of a gun (i.e. the account involving Capt. Ettore Zappacosta) – Bob Sales was the only survivor (from the LCA), and he flatly says the account is false. Separate from the Elsby article, essentially the same information can be found elsewhere [9] “That's just not true, Sales said. Zappacosta didn't pull a gun on anyone.” Sales gives fairly detailed accounts of events (during the landing, etc.). Several days after D-day, Sales was interviewed by Marshall, who apparently embellished when he finally wrote up an account in The Atlantic Monthly in 1960 (one of many instances of apparent fabrication in his work). Ambrose then lifted the Marshall account for his book (apparently without attribution, but as I mentioned above, an Ambrose spokesman confirmed that he indeed took the account from Marshall).

Jimmy Green (one of the British coxswains) and Sales also independently make the point that such an event (where a gun is drawn on the coxswain and he takes the LCA in) would be inherently impossible, since the coxswain in an LCA is enclosed in an armored turret. This is a small (one person) elevated steering chamber, fully armored on all sides, in the front right of the boat. Access is through an armored hinged door on the top. There’s an eyeslit in front (for the coxswain to look through) and a telegraph and voicetube system running to the back of the boat.

Sales (and Elsby) were frustrated not just with the inaccuracy, but with Ambrose apparently laughing off their complaints (which they had tried to previously address via polite private correspondence with Ambrose) and not expeditiously correcting the errors. That’s a complaint many others have made (e.g. Cornelius Ryan brought one of the first complaints of plagiarism against Ambrose – even writing to Ambrose’s publisher in 1970 – but died never seeing the plagiarism of his work corrected. In 1999 the Ambrose book which had plagiarized Ryan was republished - Ambrose had corrected a garbled lifted quotation that Ryan had pointed out, but still did not reference Ryan at all). Elsby’s language (regarding Ambrose) in a news account a couple years earlier appears relatively dry, just saying that there were inaccuracies that should be corrected (compared to 2002, when he released his article about it – I would guess that this shift in tone reflects frustration and an attempt to make it a sufficient public issue to force correction by Ambrose).

The situation with the above case (the first gun-drawn-on-coxswain account) seems pretty straightforward. However, the situation in the second account is more complicated. This involves Bob Slaughter (another D-day veteran). Ambrose gives an account as follows: "At 100 meters from the shore, the British coxswain said he had to lower the ramp and everyone should get out quickly. Sgt. Willard Northfleet told him to keep going: ‘These men have heavy equipment and you will take them all the way in.’ The coxswain begged, ‘But we'll all be killed!’ Northfleet unholstered his .45 Colt pistol, put it to the sailors head and ordered, ‘All the way in!’ The coxswain proceeded."[10]

These events occurred in Bob Slaughter’s boat. The surrounding paragraphs (in the Ambrose book) are largely constructed around quotes from Slaughter. However, the gun-to-head material is just straight telling of events (i.e. not built around quotes from Slaughter).

Here’s the contemporaneous written account (29th Infantry Division, 116th Infantry Battalion, 1st Battalion, D Company. Group Critique Notes[11]): “The 2nd section of the 1st platoon was under Lieut. Athanaskos. When this boat was seven hundred yards from shore the swell almost swamped it. The men bailed frantically with their helmets until the pups brought the situation under control. Two sailors, one American, one British, were pulled from the water and revived. Four hundred yards frm shore the British coxain insisted that he could take the craft no farther so the men must swin for it. He started to lower the ramp but Platoon Sgt. Willard R. Norfleet blocked the mechanism and insisted that the boat was going farther. Two hundred yards from the shore tha boat struck an obstacle and went right down. The water was only waist deep and the men set out immediately for shore. Pvt. John W. Smead was struck in the helmet by a rifle bullet, and knocked unconscience by the helmet. Pfc. Richard Gomez carried Smead in to the shore. Smead recovered soon after. At the time the breakwater was reached none of this group had seven been wounded. These men saw many wounded on the beach, tho. One machine gun and one mortar were saved.”

On May 17, 1994, at a forum at the Eisenhower center, Slaughter gave an account largely matching that in Ambrose, with Sgt. Norfleet drawing a Colt 45, placing it to the head of the coxswain, and forcing him to take the LCA further in. Here’s the video[12]. Much of Slaughter’s account consisted of somber recitation of events on D-day. However, for the gun-to-head segment (which occurs around the 1:25 mark on the tape), Slaughter made gestures of drawing a gun from a holster, then sticking it to someone’s head – and the audience was laughing and Slaughter was briefly laughing (i.e. to my mind, a demeanor perhaps slightly inconsistent with recalling an actual event of this nature).

Quite a few people have argued that the account in Ambrose’s book must have been taken from Slaughter’s May 17, 1994 oral account at the Eisenhower center, but it appears that that would be incorrect. Ambrose’s D-day book initially was first released on June 1, 1994 (hardcover edition came out June 6, 1994 to mark the 50th anniversary of D-day), and would already have been at the printers on May 17. Also, the language differs somewhat (e.g. no begging statement by the coxswain in Slaughter’s May 17, 1994 account).

Slaughter has given many other detailed accounts (over a span of almost two decades) of events on the LCA and during the landing. None of these accounts mention a gun being drawn on the coxswain. The details (exact chronology, distance from shore, etc.) of certain of his later accounts appear inconsistent with the coxswain incident he described on May 17, 1994. Here are some of his more detailed accounts [13][14][15][16], and a less detailed account [17].

His most detailed, and apparently definitive account is in his 2007 book Omaha Beach and Beyond: The Long March of Sergeant Bob Slaughter (which I actually purchased to try to get to the bottom of this). An incident of this sort is not mentioned in his book.

Also, the gun-drawn-on-coxswain incident is not corroborated by any other soldiers. Incidentally, Slaughter includes 16 accounts by other soldiers (who were on the LCAs) in his book (though it’s not clear to me if any were on his LCA), and I noticed a bit of a Rashoman quality – e.g. for one of the LCAs, in describing the same incident, one soldier says that the coxswain slowed the LCA of his own accord (because he was anxious) while another soldier on the same LCA states that the coxswain slowed because he was directly ordered to stop the boat by the lead officer on board (a captain).

A bit of additional background. Slaughter came up with the idea of constructing a National D-day Memorial in 1987 [18][19], and he work unceasingly at this over the subsequent years. In 1994 he gained an ally in Ambrose – he and Ambrose became friends, with Ambrose fundraising for the memorial. Slaughter appears to be a slightly controversial figure among WWII veterans (e.g. newspaper accounts mention complaints from other veterans regarding ego and liking limelight), but also someone whose work (on the memorial, etc.) is widely recognized and greatly appreciated. There’s also a bit of support for the “fragmented memory” possibility that ‘76’ articulated. E.g. One newspaper account states “The D Company guys started getting together for reunions in 1982. Their talk sharpened Slaughter's war memories.”

The logical possibilities are 1. Events actually occurred as described by Slaughter on May 17, 1994. 2. Events occurred as described in the contemporaneous written report. The Slaughter 1994 gun-drawn-on-coxswain account was initially a harmless embellishment (or interpolation into fragmented memory) that originated with Slaughter, then was incorporated by Ambrose. 3. The gun-drawn-on-coxswain account (for Slaughter’s boat) originated with Ambrose, then was incorporated by Slaughter into his May 1994 retelling. There’s no way to tell for certain which of these it is. The first possibility seems unlikely given all the information above (e.g. Norfleet would have had to crawl atop the elevated steering chamber, at a point when by all accounts the boat was under heavy fire, and open the armored door to even access the coxswain, etc.), and it wasn’t corroborated by Slaughter in subsequent oral histories/interviews (or by any other veterans). My “gut” actually sees the third possibility as the most likely – with Ambrose embellishing in his book (drawing from the Marshall tale), then Slaughter supporting Ambrose (which he would have every reason to do), though, again, there’s no way to tell for sure.

Regardless of the precise explanation in the Slaughter case - certain of the Ambrose problems might be seen as due to reliance on a very small number of oral histories. The number of people interviewed appears to have been relatively minimal, Ambrose seems to have preferentially used those telling the best stories (perhaps atypical), and it seems that there was insufficient use of written historical documents.

On a tangential note, while looking into this, I came across a book review by Robert Forczyk (PhD in International Relations and National Security from the University of Maryland; author of many books on military history; etc.), dissecting problems in Ambrose’s Band of Brothers.[20] (posted September 4, 2001). This is just a review posted at Amazon (i.e. not suitable as a reliable source). But I found it interesting, particularly the two paragraphs pointing out inaccuracies and exaggerations by Ambrose.

Also, I came across an interesting newspaper article (suitable as a WP source) entitled “More plagiarism would have helped Ambrose” (Denver Post, February 10, 2002) - it dissects several Ambrose inaccuracies (including some not currently mentioned in the WP article). The tongue in cheek title is based on the idea that, had Ambrose plagiarized good historians more, there would have been fewer factual errors in his books.

My apologies for the extreme length of this posting, but I thought it would probably be useful to lay it all out.

I’ll try to draft a slightly rewritten WP coxswain paragraph, incorporating additional references and a bit of the new information. I’ll of course use neutral language, etc. and try to keep it about the same length as it currently is (or just minimally longer). I won’t have time to do this for a week or so (I’m swamped with work - have a grant due this Thursday, etc). Eurytemora (talk) 14:25, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

• Bravo, Eurytemora! Centpacrr (talk) 14:54, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

The short version, which started out at the bottom of my reply... I've moved it to the top for convenience, but I thought it would be good to note that its conclusions depend on the material which originally preceded it:

1. Slaughter's account of the Northfleet incident is not supported by, but is not contradicted by, any reliable source. Elsby presents no source other than his own spin of the debriefing, and it's not supported by the words he quotes. I'm extremely glad that you found the full debriefing material at americandday, because it does usefully contrast Slaughter. The two pertinent sentences should be included verbatim, rather than using anyone's spin. Present both, let the reader decide. Slaughter's account probably did "improve" over time with Ambrose's help, but we have no RS that says so.
2. Sales' account of the Zappacosta incident is a lot more credible than Marshall/Ambrose's, and the Lynchburg recounting (which I'm also extremely glad you found) eminently qualifies as RS. I think "sole survivor" is a lot more emotive than it is probative - the fact he was on the boat is ample corroboration. But that's only my opinion.
3. The RS you've mentioned that can be cited wherein Ambrose's spokesman admits he copied Marshall will be perfect, but using Hils to tie them together remains forbidden synthesis even after bringing that account in. Wrt the coxswains, Hils only condemns Marshall - and the article isn't about Marshall. Even a source that offers reasoning (which Hils doesn't) for condemning Marshall would be synthesis, unless it mentions Ambrose in the same context.
4. It's really sad that so much of the work you've done only goes to our edification and knowledge - it's good work, and presents a compelling composite picture. (And personally, it's gratifying to see that many of my gut feelings about Ambrose rang true.) But unfortunately, adding up our own reasoning in mainspace isn't allowed. If Elsby were notable enough to merit his own article, posting a list of articles he's mentioned in would be of dubious notability - but in this article, it doesn't belong at all. Especially given that you've obviated the need to use him as a source by providing sources that recount Sales and the debriefings without the histrionics.

The long version... My gut feeling has consistently been that this is a matter of he-said-she-said in which Ambrose unwisely took sides, and the sources you've looked up in trying to make the article stronger only bolster that.

However, I would note that quoting a source is not the same as endorsing them. If anything, the opposite: If Joe Blow tells me that the moon is made of green cheese and I implicitly trust Joe Blow, I'm likely to tell you "The moon is made of green cheese", possibly citing Joe Blow as my source as an afterthought. But if I'm not sure how accurate Joe Blow's claims usually are, I'll tell you that "Joe Blow told me that the moon is made of green cheese." HNN doesn't endorse him or corroborate him; they even call his "article" a "press release" that he sent them unsolicited. His appearance in the BBC is described as part of an "archive of memories". The BRA's documentary genuinely compliments him, but should be taken in the light that he's one of the "stars". But neither the Lynchburg nor Roanoake papers mention Elsby more than in passing, much less corroborate him. For that matter, the Lynchburg paper makes mention of the fact that he's been sending out press releases to a lot of papers - so it's not too surprising that some of them reprinted parts of them.

Also, I maintain: Elsby is misrepresenting source by saying that Slaughter/Ambrose is contradicted by the debriefing. 1) The debriefing does not explicitly or implicitly contradict it. 2) If you were a serviceman on that boat in the 1940s, when "snitches" were generally despised, your lack of an explicit account of how cowardly the coxswain was would not be a good proof that it didn't happen. 3) A general "The sergeant stopped him" (sorry for not offering the exact wording, but I believe this is an accurate paraphrase) is not inconsistent with Slaughter's account. This is true of Slaughter's previous accounts as well, though personally I'm inclined to stick with my "embellished fragmented memories" hypothesis.

Whether I personally believe Slaughter or not because of my fragged-memories theory, whether you personally believe him or not because of your "he laughed while telling the story" theory... doesn't matter. What matters is whether reliable sources contradict him. By misrepresenting the debriefing instead of only recounting it, Elsby crossed the line far enough that the americandday site becomes much more reliable. Frankly, Elsby's growing antipathy to Ambrose over the years makes me less likely to believe his later accounts, rather than excusing his increasingly-shrill denunciations. You're right that he never used the specific word "monster" - but I believe that's a fair paraphrase of the sum of a whole lot of other names he called him.

Like you said, Elsby seems to have gotten increasingly frustrated with the stonewalling and wanted to tell a story that would catch more attention. He's not the only one; I think the same frustration (with people no longer caring) afflicts Slaughter and others. And I think that the composite picture you've assembled provides strong circumstantial support that Ambrose was more of a "sympathetic listener" looking for a good story than he was a historian. But we're not their judges. It's just up to us to recount that which has been deemed reliable by HNN, the Podunk Times, et al. (Or a military debriefing, which I still think is probably the most reliable source out of every last one of them.) 76.22.25.102 (talk) 03:46, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

Eurytemora: It's been a little while and I don't know how much longer you'll be tied up, so I'm going to endeavor to piece together an accurate paragraph based on our combined work. It's more your work for providing usable material than mine, which was only to disqualify material. Of the two, the former is more valuable by far.

My suggested paragraph follows, and I'll dispense with the explanations this time. If there's any specific detail that anyone objects to (wrt either inclusion or omission) or thinks could be worded better, please engage here while it's still in the draft stage and we'll work on it.

Two Ambrose accounts in D-Day of alleged cowardice by British coxswains have also been challenged as inaccurate. One, in which Sgt. Willard Northfleet is portrayed as drawing his gun on a coxswain when he tried to offload the men 400 yards from shore, is corroborated by Sgt. John Slaughter (who was on the boat) in a C-SPAN video recording veterans' D-Day experiences. It was disputed by Kevan Elsby, however, on the basis of a contemporary debriefing which stated that "Four hundred yards frm shore the British coxain insisted that he could take the craft no farther so the men must swin for it. He started to lower the ramp but Platoon Sgt. Willard R. Norfleet blocked the mechanism and insisted that the boat was going farther." The other, in which Capt. Ettore Zappacosta was portrayed as drawing his gun on a coxswain to make him go in when he protested he could not see the landmarks, was challenged by Pvt. Bob Sales as untrue. Both Ambrose and Sales assert that Sales was the only survivor from that landing craft.

76.22.25.102 (talk) 21:39, 23 July 2010 (UTC)

(I'll wait until Friday before making this edit, to make sure anyone who wants to offer an alternate suggestion has a chance.) 76.22.25.102 (talk) 20:59, 26 July 2010 (UTC)

Good Luck

I don't get paid enough to wade through all this.

Sorry. Am sure good faith is operative principle and all of you, essentially, are "right" in your individual viewpoints.

Good luck! Am removing this from watch list.

Calamitybrook (talk) 06:51, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

Idle hands do the Devil's work

Noticed this while waiting:

• The section title of "Inaccuracies and falsifications" is unduly judgmental - I haven't yet seen it suggested that he intended for his books to be false. Suggested alternate wording: "Inaccurate facts and disputed characterizations". If anyone can think of a briefer way to put that, it would certainly be welcome.

Then the first paragraph of that section, about the airborne controversy:

• "Veterans of troop carrier units who transported paratroopers in the American airborne landings in Normandy have severely criticized Ambrose for portraying them as unqualified and cowardly in several of his works, including Band of Brothers and D-Day." Unsourced. 1) Hils doesn't even mention Band of Brothers. 2) It's Hils who takes considerable personal umbrage at Ambrose's characterization of them, not the vets. Hils attributes only thoughtful, patient attempts to talk to Ambrose about it to the vets themselves. 3) Hils doesn't come within a mile of saying he called them cowardly. Suggest a cite tag.
• I would love to replace it with this Ambrose quote and a short explanatory note: "They could speed up which most of them did. They were supposed to throttle back to ninety miles per hour or less, to reduce the opening shock for the paratroopers, but ninety miles per hour at 600 feet made them easy targets for the Germans on the ground, so they pushed the throttle forward and sped up to 150 miles per hour". I'm a big believer in letting readers draw their own conclusions. But using Hils as a source for Flanagan's quote of Ambrose's book would be really bad karma. What would that be, a quaternary source? (^_^)
• "He characterized them as "cranks" when they asked that he make changes to passages in his books." 1) This should be attributed to Hils' assertion, not cited as a proven fact. 2) What Hils actually said was that the Ambrose organization characterized them as cranks. Suggested alternate wording: Can't think of any. Even if Hils really did accuse Ambrose directly, I'm not sure how relevant that is to his credibility or honesty. It sounds more like a personal aggrievement of little notability. Bad karma to take sides in those.
• "In 1995, U.S. Army Air Corps veterans objected to his characterization of C-47 pilots as untrained and incompetent in the Normandy invasion." This looks like a mistaken conflation. I didn't see Hils accuse Ambrose of this anywhere in the letter, only Flanagan and Keegan. Remember, Hils wrote this to Flanagan criticizing him and his sources (Ambrose, Keegan, et al). No suggested alternate wording: It's baseless and should be struck.
• "A letter-writing campaign asserted that Ambrose did not interview a single troop carrier pilot from among the 1,642 who participated in Operation Neptune." - Hils' letter isn't a "campaign", and shouldn't be pejoratively labeled that way. For that matter, the "1,642 who participated in Operation Neptune" doesn't appear in Hils' letter. Suggested alternate wording: "Among the numerous errors he asserts in an open letter posted on the War Chronicle website, Randy Hils notes that Ambrose did not interview a single troop carrier pilot."
• "He relied only on short quotes from some paratroopers critical of the jumps." This appears to be another mistaken conflation, this time with Marshall. I can't find Hils saying anything of the sort about Ambrose. Suggested alternate wording is to explain why not talking to pilots was stupid on Ambrose's part: "This becomes highly relevant in light of Ambrose's assertion that the pilots sped up while the paratroopers were trying to jump. Hils hypothesizes that if Ambrose's only sources were inexpert witnesses whose only indication of airspeed were the sound of the engines, the maneuver of using the propellers as an airbrake would have sounded like power being applied." (I think this is a fair paraphrase of Hils' intended meaning wrt "the uninitiated", but would be glad for correction. My intent was to explain it clearly rather than regurgitate something that wouldn't make sense to the reader.)
• "He was also accused of failing to follow through on promises to correct the record before his death." Inaccurate. What Hils' letter actually says is that Ambrose promised twice to correct the record, but reneged. Better to drop this and spend that time on the meat of Hils' most damning charge, i.e. the lines above, because the accurate version of what he said isn't particularly relevant or probative.

Adding it all up, my suggested edit of that paragraph would be:

Veterans of troop carrier units who transported paratroopers in the American airborne landings in Normandy have severely criticized Ambrose for portraying them as unqualified and cowardly in several of his works, including Band of Brothers and D-Day. Among the numerous errors he asserts in an open letter posted on the War Chronicle website, Randy Hils notes that Ambrose did not interview a single troop carrier pilot. This becomes highly relevant in light of Ambrose's assertion that the pilots sped up while the paratroopers were trying to jump. Hils hypothesizes that if Ambrose's only sources were inexpert witnesses whose only indication of airspeed were the sound of the engines, the maneuver of using the propellers as an airbrake would have sounded like power being applied.

76.22.25.102 (talk) 02:03, 8 July 2010 (UTC)

It's coming up on two weeks, and I haven't heard any objection yet. Unless someone does so in the next few days, I'll go ahead and make this edit. 76.22.25.102 (talk) 13:07, 20 July 2010 (UTC)

I see no problem with these suggested edits on the merits. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 22:40, 21 July 2010 (UTC)

"factual errors section"

The "correction" states:

"Military deaths were 416,800, the most of any Allied country except the Soviet Union.[25]"

Someone obviously forgot about China —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.10.194.163 (talk) 03:45, 23 May 2011 (UTC)

Very valid point. I believe there were also considerably more Polish than American deaths during the war. Furthermore, the writer of the article seems to be brushing over Amrose's point which seemed to be that the losses compared to population size were relatively "insignificant"; for instance Britain's losses were similar despite a population of around a third of that of the USA.

Furthermore, the citation used for the 416,800 figure puts the total dead at 405,399. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Edwardlea1985 (talk • contribs) 20:52, 12 October 2011 (UTC)

Kevan Elsby on British 'Coxswains' on Omaha Beach

I found this discussion group when researching Omaha Beach. My name is Kevan Elsby; the author of some of the source material referenced in this discussion.

By Kevan Elsby:

My feelings about Stephen Ambrose were mixed. In his writing and in his advisory role for Saving Private Ryan, Stephen Ambrose did a great deal to bring D-Day to the attention of a new generation of people, including me. It was only subsequently when I spoke with British and American veterans from Omaha Beach that I started to question some of the details. These veterans were furious. This led me to a course of determined and thorough research of archive sources from 1944, supplemented by veteran’s accounts. In my considered opinion, some of the events written about by Stephen Ambrose just did not happen and in many cases just could not have happened. I bear no animosity to Stephen Ambrose. I wish he had been better informed. If the tone of one or more of my long-since issued press releases or other statements bore undertones of animosity, then this is something I regret.

To the best of my knowledge, here are some points for debate:

1. Not enough is appreciated about the nature of Omaha Beach, particularly at the western end in front of the Vierville-sur-Mer draw. The current in the English Channel rips along the coastline from Point-et-Raz-de-la-Percee, scouring deep tidal runnels in the beach. The topography of the beach in 1944 was plotted in incredible detail on Bigot Maps before D-Day. At and around Vierville-sur-mer, the average angle of the beach to the horizontal was less than two degrees, with sand ridges and tidal channels running parallel to the beach over a distance of over one-third of a mile from the water's edge at high tide. Omaha Beach would be better described as Omaha tidal flats. Walking across Omaha Beach on a spring low tide, as it was on D-Day, is a 'must do' if you wish to have any chance of appreciating Omaha Beach on D-Day. Walking across Omaha Beach at low tide in a storm, let alone with the 60lb of equipment carried by troops of 29th Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division does not bear thinking about.

2. In addition to the tidal runnels, there were two huge sandbars off Vierville-sur-Mer, clearly marked on the Bigot Maps. Tidal runnels and sandbars off this section of Omaha Beach have been documented for centuries.

3. D-Day was postponed for 24 hours due to a storm. On the morning of D-Day this storm had not abated. The first wave of landing craft lowered into a 12-feet swell in pitch-black darkness 12 miles from shore, where 2 - 4 feet of surf still came onto the beach. This was by far the worst sea that any of the infantry landing craft had been in. My father-in-law, Jimmy Green, has advised me many times that they were lucky to get away with landing infantry in those seas before and around dawn on D-Day. [Jimmy Green was in command of 6 LCAs from the SS Empire Javelin carrying A Company / 116th Infantry Regiment and 2 LCAs from HMS Prince Charles attached to the right flank carrying C Company / 2nd Rangers to Dog Green and Charlie sectors of Omaha Beach].

4. The procedure for all LCAs was to proceed towards the beach line astern. In the case of 551 LCA Flotilla, the lead LCAs of two columns followed LCC50 which was a US Coast Guard Landing Craft Control equipped with radar, part of the way to the beach. From approximately 1000 yards from the beach, the landing craft moved to line astern and went at full speed to the beach. For D-Day the throttle limiters on the LCA landing craft had been removed.

5. I have a photograph given to me by a US Navy veteran Victor Hicken from LCT(A) 2227 taken at approximately 06:25 on D-Day showing these LCAs racing to the beach moving to line abreast.

6. Each LCA had a crew of four. Each wave of typically six LCAs had two officers. The coxswain sat completely protected in a metal turret with only thin slits to see outwards. The coxswain spoke through a voice pipe with the 'stoker' who sat protected in the stern between two 100 percent Octane engines, adjusting the throttles manually at the voice command of the coxswain. Both the coxswain and the stoker were completely protected and contained on the run in to the beach. On the deck of each LCA, there were two additional crew members: the bowman and the stern-sheetsman. On the LCAs with officers, the officer replaced the bowman. The bowman operated the ramp that formed the complete flat front of the LCA. (Two crewmen on deck were required at the very least to unhook each LCA from the davits on the transport ship. Re-hooking an LCA onto the davits was difficult, particularly in rough weather.)

7. The procedure, which had been practiced many times over day and night and in fog, was that when an LCA grounded, the coxswain would call to the stoker to hold back the engines to keep the LCA grounded and the bowman would make ready with a rope handle to lower the bow ramp. When ready the bowman, whose sole decision it was, would fully lower the bow ramp. To do so, the bowman took hold of the rope and started to release the ramp by a few degrees until he was ready to fully lower the ramp. In this way he could be sure the ramp mechanism was working and that he was ready to lower the ramp as quickly as possible. The decision when to lower the ramp was critical: too soon and the boat would sink. Too late and the boat would be a static target for too long. The decision as to when the boat grounded was made by the coxswain. The decision to lower the ramp was made by the bowman.

8. The bow ramp on an LCA is the complete flat front of the boat. If the bow ramp on an LCA laden with a platoon of infantry was lowered fully before the boat had grounded, then it would quickly sink by the bow.

9. On the back of the Bigot Maps for Omaha Beach, there is very detailed topography of Omaha Beach at all locations and tidal times. When this data is taken and transcribed into a spreadsheet database with the dimension of all type of landing craft overplayed, the landing craft from the smaller LCAs to the larger LCTS and LCT(A)s grounded exactly where these Bigot Maps indicated they should at the time their hulls would ground on the beach. In all the plans for D-Day, it was planned that the larger LCT(A)s would land sooner and in front of the smaller infantry landing craft, discharging water-proofed tanks from A Company / 743rd Tank Battalion [not DD-Tanks] directly onto the beach in advance of the first wave of troops as was practiced in Fabius and Tiger Exercises. Omaha Beach was so flat around Vierville-sur-Mer that the LCT(A)s landed earlier, but the LCA landing craft with much shallower hulls proceeded straight past them. The lead LCA of the group of three LCAs to the east of the Vierville-sur-Mer reversed off the beach into a tank from LCT(A)2227. This tank was meant to be in front of the troops.

10. Omaha Beach is so flat that even on the Bigot Maps the vertical access drawing the topography of the beach had to be amplified, otherwise the topography of the beach was portrayed as a flat line over one-third of a mile across. This did not allow the Navy Crews to see the undulations on the beach. This topography with an elevated vertical axis has been transcribed in many sources, indicating that the beach is steep and not flat.

11. I have travelled to meet and discuss at length events with American veterans including Bob Sales and Bob Slaughter who are referred to in this discussion. Bob Sales has been fighting his corner of accuracy of what happened on Omaha Beach since he first read S.L.A. Marshall's article which was first published in Stag Magazine in 1960 and subsequently in The Atlantic Monthly. I cannot find any reference to guns pulled to coxswains heads before this date. Bob Slaughter described to me at length how his LCA rocked up and down with the ramp flapping up and down in the surf. Bob Slaughter is a very tall guy well over 6 feet tall. He sat on the end of the ramp waiting for the bow to fall down and then jumped into deep water. He had to pull his not so giant comrades from the depths. His LCA had grounded amidships on a sandbar or tidal runnel and was rocking up and down. There is no other physical way for an LCA to behave in this way. This also concurs with the detailed Bigot Map from 1994.

12. LCAs had a curved hull so they could land on a beach at the bow, but still withdraw from the beach using ketch hooks to pull back from the beach if stuck. In the Tiger and Fabius Exercises, beaches such as Slapton Sands were chosen to represent the beach exits and bluffs, but the beach itself has an angle of about 20 degrees to the horizontal and the exercises were not in a storm. Even the larger landing craft beached at the water's edge and from the infantry landing craft the troops took one step from the ramp onto dry sand. I have picture of smaller and larger landing craft on Slapton Sands. Omaha Beach was unique not just in terms of the cliffs, the bluffs, the Germand strongpoints and the guns at Point-du-Hoc that drove Allied planners to anchore transport ships 12 miles out to see and to dedicate two Ranger Battalions to the capture of the guns at Point-du-Hoc, but in the nature also to the 'beach' proper.

13. Referring to the 'top secret' Bigot Maps showing the detailed topography of Omaha Beach, it is good that we can discuss this detail today, but the first time my father-in-law saw these charts was when I showed them to him 10 years ago. He informed me that the hardest information to get hold of at all during the war was tidal charts. He just could not get hold of them for the most part. This Bigot information was kept so secret, that it was not disseminated to the SS Empire Javelin from the USS Charles Carroll until after the first wave of landing craft had left the SS Empire Javelin, partly because there as so much Bigot information left back to the last minute and partly due to the rough seas on the eve of D-Day. To compensate for the rough seas, the CO of 551 Assault Flotilla ordered the first wave to leave earlier. In rough seas the landing craft had to proceed at a slower pace to take on less water and stay afloat. One of the two RNVR officers in the third wave of LCAs from the Empire Javelin was recalled at the last moment stay aboard the SS Empire Javelin to help disseminate the Bigot information and orders.

From my perspective, this whole debate is just a matter of understanding. Stephen Ambrose had no opportunity to interview a single Royal Navy veteran from Omaha Beach or to understand the naval perspective, until I contacted him by letter. In the same way that Randy Hils asserted tha Stephen Ambrose had not interviewed a single troop carrier pilot, neither had Stephen Ambrose had the opportunity to interview a single British Landing Craft Assault veteran to appreciate the operation of infantry landing craft on Dog Green and Charlie sectors of Omaha Beach; all British LCAs crewed by the Royal Navy and by the Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve, who had signed up and volunteered for hostilities only.

By this time Stephen Ambrose's latest book had been published, veterans from British landing craft flotillas and Bob Sales had long-since been riled by the writings of S.L.A. Marshall. U.S. Military historians in 1944 and 1945 pursued Infantry survivors from Omaha beach across France and Germany for methodical interviews. Like the pilots from the Dakota troop carriers who moved on and dispersed to different actions, the sailors from the landing craft dispersed to different beaches and different flotillas to maintain the supply of men and equipment to Fortress Europe. Many of 551 Assault Flotilla eventually witnessed the Japanese surrender on the US Navy ship and US Navy ensign Victor Hicken from LCT(A)2227, the first vessle to land on Dog Green, Omaha Beach, witnessed The Enola Gay fly to Japan after Recovering US Marines from Japanese Islands.

When I started this Endeavour The Internet was in its infancy and it was not so easy to share information and exchange views. These days it is far easier and more power to forums such as Wikipedia. We have more information available to us these days and more quickly.

I bear no animosity towards Stephen Ambrose and simply put, may he rest in peace.

Today, it is possible for us to access all kinds of information from a wide range of sources.

If we are to discuss what happened on Omaha Beach on D-Day, as we always must lest we forget, then let's do so in a different forum and not in the memory of Stephen Ambrose.

Kevan Elsby

Kevan551 (talk) 23:40, 6 November 2010 (UTC)

Terrific post. Many thanks for all the fascinating and insightful information!! Centpacrr (talk) 00:00, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

This is an inappropriate post. The purpose of this page is to discuss improvement to the article, and not for general discussion of the subject of the article. CheeseStakeholder (talk) 21:24, 1 May 2012 (UTC)

Controversy at hand is too dense

I've quickly and superficially read, much of this but don't really getit. Article doesn't really look too bad. Consider that all the article/talk page crap/controversey is relatively current and "history" per se, hasn't quite caught up with topic. To understand fine points of this talk page, above, is too much to ask of non-insider reader. One might ask that the recent talk-page yakking be boiled down to a few sentences to facilitate non-"insider" discussion. "Thanks." Contributors may want to say "see what I've already said," but this isn't practical or reasonable way to move talk forward. Especially given gas-bag nature of talk above.

Calamitybrook (talk) 05:30, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

The page on Stephen Ambrose seems to contain too much detail on controversies and loses neutrality, detracting from the non-controversial contributions of his numerous works. Although the controversies may be correct many are too minor in nature to merit detailed listings and comments. Reasonably similar errors by other historical writers frequently occur yet have not followed a similar pattern. For instance, omitting a quotation but correcting it later is not something that needs to be listed. May I suggest reducing the details of the controversies or adding more detail on those areas where there is no controversy.

--Optomic (talk) 04:30, 27 October 2012 (UTC)