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Strength of Ottoman army

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The Ottoman and Tatar army strenght have been highly exaggerated so I changed it back to realistic numbers. It was claimed that 15,000 Jannisaries took part in the expedition, while according to sources this is impossible because the total number of Jannisaries in the entire Ottoman empire was according to sources not more than 14,000. See Jannissary article. That would mean that the entire Jannisary corps was sent on this expedition to Astrakhan, this is impossible because the major part of Jannisaries stayed in the Ottoman capital or were guarding important fortresses, while it is known from sources that the total number of Jannisary troops that took part in the Battle of Vienna in 1683 were not more than 12,000, which was a major expedition, it becomes clear that it is impossible that a number higher than 2,000 would take part in a minor expedition. However it is probably that 1,500 is also an exaggeration and only 150 Jannisaries were actually sent, because they were considered an elite corps which was never more than 10% or a insignificant part of an army on the battlefield.

What I wrote about the Jannisaries number being exaggerated is also valid for the Sipahi and Azap, see the article Military of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had not unlimited manpower and the sources show this.

The Crimean Tatars were ruling the Crimea and the Steppes but they did not have a large population. but it is common to see in many articles exaggerated numbers about their armies, 50,000 100,000 are frequently used. This article claimed there were 50,000 Tatar cavalry this is an impossible number and a good example of exaggeration. The total Tatar population(male, female, children) in the Crimea and adjoining steppes was estimated in 18th century to be 300-400,000 this number was ofcourse less in the 16th century. Total Tatar population was probably 200,000 in the 16th century. 50,000 Tatar cavalry would mean that 25% of the entire Tatar population or almost all adult Tatar men took part in this expedition, this is ridiculous and impossible. Majority of the people stay with their families, on their farms,herds or protect the garrisons. There have also never been an huge Tatar cavalry army seen in the 18th century and they were then much more numerous than they were in the 16th century. It seems that the high numbers are innacurate medieval estimates, the realistic numbers were probably not more than some several thousand Tatar horsemen on a single expedition throughout the ages. And even this seems to be a very high number. § — Preceding unsigned comment added by DragonTiger23 (talkcontribs) 12:54, 15 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]

I would have removed any numbers(unless they are sourced) and kept the "large force" part which can be found in sourced material. --Kansas Bear (talk) 22:51, 20 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]

Hounding

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First tell, what you mean by commercial victory? Which is unnecessary to put, basically no where mentioned in whole wikipedia or any other literature.Capitals00 (talk) 18:25, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
First explain your sudden interest in this war? Surely it has NOTHING to do with the fact I have added sources to it! --Kansas Bear (talk) 18:35, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Again, what's the source of your unique results, that we have never seen in common. Military defeat is obvious, but commercial victory? Was there sort of business or agreement? If there was, make a new index about it, which should be enough. Capitals00 (talk) 18:41, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Again, read the article, oh wait you have.........
"The Ottoman empire, though militarily defeated, insisted on safe passage for Muslim pilgrims and traders from Central Asia as well as the destruction of the Russian's fort on the Terek river.<r>Janet Martin, Medieval Russia:980-1584, 356.</rf>
"Russia allow Muslim traders access through Astrakhan'"
Janet Martin, Medieval Russia:980-1584, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 356.--Kansas Bear (talk) 18:46, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
So it wasn't added to the theory of the main article already? Why you needed to add it into result?Capitals00 (talk) 18:48, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]

It is quite clear you are not here to discuss this article. You are here to whine about my edits, since I am opposed to your edits in Kaaba, which is clearly shown by your laughable sockpuppet investigation. Any further spurious reverts will be reported. --Kansas Bear (talk) 22:18, 22 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Considering that you failed to backup your vandalism, thus the main text will be used.Capitals00 (talk) 00:17, 23 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
Capitals00 warned for personal attacks. Dougweller (talk) 06:00, 23 July 2013 (UTC)[reply]
  • Capitals00 asked me to comment here. My standard question for all content disputes is: What do the sources say? So, here the question is: How do various sources describe the outcome of this war? bobrayner (talk) 12:13, 4 August 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Suggestion for improval

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I did research on this subject while I was writing an article of it for the Finnish Wikipedia. If someone is interested on improving this article, I would recommend reading two excellent ones: A. N. Kurat's The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan' in 1569 and the Problem of the Don-Volga Canal about the expedition itself, and Michael Khodarkovsky's Taming the "Wild Steppe": Muscovy's Southern Frontier, 1480–1600 about the political and geopolitical background of the region. Both are available in JSTOR digital library. A book I would recommed is Dariusz Kołodziejczyk's The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania. Kołodziejczyk's chapter about the war is only ten pages long (pages 90-100, 2011 ed.), but well researched. Janet Martin's Medieval Russia: 980-1584 is a fine work, but it offers a very short description of these hostilities, even though it's accurate it really can't be used as the main source like it's role is now. Therefore this article in it's current state can't give a reliable account of what happened.

What happened in short: The Ottoman expedition can be seen as a part of the war, which Crimean Khan Devlet Giray had waged against Russia since Ivan IV took over Kazan in 1552 and which ended in 1576, as the war turned out to be too demanding to Khanate, which had been weakened by it's loss in the battle of Molodi. This is a neglected part of history. Several different Crimean-Russian crisis and wars with separate political backgrounds and different leaders are often described only as centuries long continuum of Crimean raids against Russia. Crimean Khanate was indeed an Ottoman subject, but stayed largely autonomous for a long time - in this case this was proved by Devlet's own successful expedition against Moscow a year after this war. In 1568 when the operation was set to happen, Devlet wasn't happy about the Ottoman plans to join his conflict, as he himself wanted Kazan and Astrakhan. He had appreciated all material help he could get, but a large and successful Ottoman-led operation would have ment Ottoman ownership in North Caucasus. Nevertheless the Ottomans mounted a large expedition and ordered Devlet to join, but because of latter's reluctancy and resistance the expedition arrived to the site of the planned canal late, and found out the plan was impossible to carry out before the winter. Their canal builders and ships left back to Azov, while the troops continued to Astrakhan city, and besieged it for couple of weeks. Interestingly, the besiegers camped in the ruins of the old capital, Xacitarxan. Their military power was way too overwhelming for Serebrianyi-Obolenskiy (who was primarily military governor of Kazan) to "drive out the besiegers" or take raids against the canal building site, as is told in some 19th century descriptions. Also, if you take a look at the time table, Serebrianyi-Obolenskiy should have been in several places in the same time for this to take place (read A. N. Kurat). Instead the Ottoman-Crimean party had to retreat since the winter was coming and they were out of supplies, as according to earlier big plan the supply should have been handled using the Don-Volga connection they didn't now have. Their retreat through the hard and unforgiving terrain of North Caucasus steppes without supplies was a sad one, and the Ottoman party lost about third of their manpower to hunger, sickness and thirst. The Crimean Tatars however went to their lands using separate route and as they were accustomed to steppe conditions, they didn't suffer in similar manner. However, due to this inequality there was some disharmonity between the parties after the war. There also exists a contemporary account of the Ottoman retreat written by Polish ambassador Jędrzej Taranowski, who joined the retreating Ottoman party after meeting with Devlet Giray (Taranowski and his account are described in Renata Holod's and Oleksandr Halenko's article The Harsh Landscapes of “Mother Sarmatia”: Steppe Ukraine through the Eyes of a Sixteenth-Century Polish Diplomat, which is definitely worth to read and was at least available in academia.edu). Interestingly, as if to underline the bad luck and hardships of the Ottoman party had to deal with there were indeed two additional mishaps: when they returned back to Azov to rest, the local gun powder storage accidentally exploded and killed many, and later as the Anatolian part or the party sailed back through the Black Sea, there was a major storm which drowned some of their ships.

In conclusion, The Ottoman Empire had lost catastrophically, and the Russian Empire had won you could say almost without firing a shot. I read that there has been a dispute about describing victory conditions here. Earlier claim about the war being a "Ottoman commercial victory" has been changed to "Ottoman commercial success", which is a good start, but then again the war wasn't really a commercial success for the Ottomans either. Based on aforementioned works of Kurat, Khodarkovsky and Kołodziejczyk their strategic goals were to build the canal, to take ownership of Astrakhan and all areas near and south of Don-Volga area, and later Kazan if possible. Their economic goals were to secure main part of the trade in areas in and above the Don and Volga -rivers, and in the whole Caspian Sea area and connect to silk producing centers in the Far East. It's obvious, that none of this happened - so can be called a commercial success when they didn't reach any of their major goals? All what Janet Martin's Medieval Russia says on the subject, I quote directly: "But they did insist that the Russians open the route through Astrakhan to Muslim merchants and pilgrims from Central Asia and that they destroy their fort on the Terek River. The Muscovites agreed. The Astrakhan campaign thus contributed to the achievement of the Ottoman Turks’ basic goals." Basic goals needs to be underlined here. What the Ottomans gained commercially was uninhibited passage of traders and pilgrims through Astrakhan as these had been compromised by the Russians. The Ottomans had lost the war and could only ask this and nothing else - can it really be highlighted as a success when you fail your big plans and success only in gaining the bare minimum? The only strategic success they gained in negotiations was dismantling the fortress in Terek river, which later freed Devlet Giray to wage another personal war against Russia's Kabardian allies in Terek river area - but in near future the Russians build new fortresses to Astrakhan. In comparison, trade between Russia and the Ottoman Empire continued throughout the hostilities, although it was lesser than before the war. It was Ivan IV, who started peace talks first, as he saw Ottoman trade more important to Russia, than Ottomans saw Russian trade to their empire. He was happy to give in to the few Ottoman demands, which could be seen as insignificant in comparison to their original goals, as he got to keep Astrakhan and Kazan, and have all the Ottoman traders back in Russia - so if we continue thinking this way, wasn't this then a Russian commercial success as well? I'm hoping someone would improve this article, I would do it myself but I have more work elsewhere than there's time. It's a fascinating and dramatic part of less known history, well worth of the research and read. --Ukas (talk) 12:56, 6 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Martin source

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Per Medieval Russia, 980-1584, page 356-357;

  • "The conduct of the Muscovites at Astrakhan' was also attracting Ottoman attention. The wars between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Empire in Iran were disrupting security along the route between Central Asia and the Middle East that had passed through Persian territory south of the Caspian Sea. Central Asian Muslims, traveling westward for commercial purposes, to support Ottoman military forces, or on religious pilgrimages to Mecca opted to use the more northerly route that passed north of the Caspian Sea through Astrakhan' to Azak(Azov, Tana). But reports began to reach the Ottoman officials that the Muscovites were interfering with their passage, and the Ottomans' allies in Central Asia were appealing to them to apply pressure on Muscovy to open the route."
  • "The Ottomans responded in 1569 by undertaking their first aggressive action against Muscovy..[...]..Militarily, the Turkish campaign against Astrakhan was a failure, and in subsequent negotiations the Turks were silent about a Muscovite retreat from lower Volga. But they did insist that the Russians open the route through Astrakhan to Muslim merchants and pilgrims from Central Asia and that they destroy their fort on the Terek River. The Muscovites agreed. The Astrakhan campaign thus contributed to the achievements of the Ottoman Turks basic goals."

Sounds important to me, since the reason they went to war was commercial purposes and Muslim pilgrims(ie. Ottoman Turks basic goals).--Kansas Bear (talk) 05:31, 22 February 2019 (UTC)[reply]

  • Militarily, the Turkish campaign against Astrakhan was a failure, and in subsequent negotiations the Turks were silent about a Muscovite retreat from lower Volga -this is what is meant when it comes to Russia's military victory. As for the plans, it was not about the Muslim pilgrims, but about an attempt to squeeze the Russians out of the lower Volga and unite with the Central Asian khanates. In addition, it was part of the struggle between the Turks and the Persians, who actively traded with the Russians through Astrakhan. Based on this logic, Turkey has not achieved any of the goals. Каракорум (talk) 06:41, 16 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • "Based on this logic, Turkey has not achieved any of the goals."
Except for the remaining sentences in that paragraph,
  • "But they did insist that the Russians open the route through Astrakhan to Muslim merchants and pilgrims from Central Asia and that they destroy their fort on the Terek River. The Muscovites agreed. The Astrakhan campaign thus contributed to the achievements of the Ottoman Turks basic goals."
  • "As for the plans, it was not about the Muslim pilgrims, but about an attempt to squeeze the Russians out of the lower Volga and unite with the Central Asian khanates."
And again Martin explains, in detail,
  • "Central Asian Muslims, traveling westward for commercial purposes, to support Ottoman military forces, or on religious pilgrimages to Mecca opted to use the more northerly route that passed north of the Caspian Sea through Astrakhan' to Azak(Azov, Tana). But reports began to reach the Ottoman officials that the Muscovites were interfering with their passage, and the Ottomans' allies in Central Asia were appealing to them to apply pressure on Muscovy to open the route." --Kansas Bear (talk) 13:43, 16 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • All this is quite consistent with the result, which was reflected in the article earlier. The military victory of Russia (the Turks could not take Astrakhan), the commercial success of Turkey (the Russians agreed to let the missionaries pass and left Kabarda). Каракорум (talk) 15:02, 16 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
You mean like this?As opposed to Russian victory instead of Ottoman defeat, which is what Martin states. --Kansas Bear (talk) 17:30, 17 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • ""The Ottoman empire, though militarily defeated, insisted on safe passage for Muslim pilgrims and traders from Central Asia as well as the destruction of the Russian's fort on the Terek river." --Janet Martin, Medieval Russia:980-1584, 356. --Kansas Bear (talk) 17:29, 18 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I would assume so as well, but I would rather not be accused of WP:OR. I have asked Peacemaker67 for clarification. If we follow the Template:Infobox military conflict for results;
  • "result – optional – this parameter may use one of two standard terms: "X victory" or "Inconclusive". The term used is for the "immediate" outcome of the "subject" conflict and should reflect what the sources say. In cases where the standard terms do not accurately describe the outcome, a link or note should be made to the section of the article where the result is discussed in detail (such as "See the Aftermath section"). Such a note can also be used in conjunction with the standard terms but should not be used to conceal an ambiguity in the "immediate" result."
Which means Russian victory would be the correct result for the infobox. Unless you would prefer a link to a section within the article much like Russo-Turkish War (1676–1681), which would mention the success the Ottomans achieved commercially and religiously. Your thoughts? --Kansas Bear (talk) 23:32, 21 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The difference in the case of this war and the war of 1676-81 is that the sources do not differ in the results of the war. Therefore, I do not see the need for a link. We just specify it like this:

Russian military victory

Turkish commercial success

Каракорум (talk) 06:40, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

How about,
  • "Russian military victory"
  • "Ottoman commercial success"
??--Kansas Bear (talk) 16:06, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
+ Каракорум (talk) 16:38, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
It was not an Ottoman commercial success. --Ukas (talk) 18:23, 19 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Ukas what do you mean? Каракорум (talk) 07:24, 1 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Even if consensus is reached, the parameters of result for Template:Infobox military conflict indicate a short, easy to undersatnd, straight meaning for the reader. Remember that the idea of the Infobox is to resume the reader the content of the article. Since there is not a clear idea of what a commercial success means, we should keep Russian Victory or Russian military victory.Mr.User200 (talk) 16:51, 2 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Каракорум I quote my own text above: "Ottoman strategic goals were to build the canal, to take ownership of Astrakhan and all areas near and south of Don-Volga area, and later Kazan if possible. Their economic goals were to secure main part of the trade in areas in and above the Don and Volga -rivers, and in the whole Caspian Sea area and connect to silk producing centers in the Far East. It's obvious, that none of this happened - so can it be called a commercial success when they didn't reach any of their major economic goals?" Ukas (talk) 13:30, 4 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I agree with you. Каракорум (talk) 14:37, 4 April 2021 (UTC)[reply]

More sources

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  • "In 1466, with the decline of the Golden Horde, Astrakhan became the capital of an independent Tatar khanate which fell into Russian hands, first in 1554 and finally in 1556-57. Since then the town has stood on the present site. In 1569 the Ottomans tried to free the town but failed. " -- B. Spuler. (1987). "Astrakhan". Encyclopedia Iranica. Vol. II, Fasc. 8, pp. 857-858 [1]
  • " The Ottomans and the Russians struggled for control of the city and former khānate. In 1570, the Ottoman sultan gave up his claims to Astrakhan, thus opening the entire Volga River to Russian traffic. In 1719, Astrakhan was plundered by Iranian forces." -- Zaytsev, Ilya, (2010) “Astrakhan”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, Edited by: Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, Everett Rowson. [2]
  • "The extension of Muscovite control over Astrakhan’ four years later enabled him to enlist the interest and aid of the Ottoman Turks as well. In 1569-72 they launched a set of military campaigns. The Ottoman Turks unsuccessfully tried with the support of Crimean Tatars to evict the Muscovites from Astrakhan’(...)" -- Janet Martin (2012). "Simeon Bekbulatovich and Steppe Politics: Some Thoughts on Donald Ostrowski’s Interpretation of the Tsar’s Remarkable Career". Russian History. Brill. Volume 39: Issue 3. p. 335 doi 10.1163/18763316-03903004

- LouisAragon (talk) 22:45, 22 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

@Каракорум: Its kinda off-topic to respond to this on this talk page, but you are saying that the Encyclopedia of Islam is publishing "fake" information? - LouisAragon (talk) 14:18, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Каракорум: The Encyclopedia of Islam is one of the most renowned academic works out there. If you think its unreliable, you need to bring it to WP:RSN. Also, bear in mind that capturing =/= pillaging. I'm gonna leave it at that. - LouisAragon (talk) 14:27, 23 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The Encyclopedia of Islam is of great help & mostly accurate, but even it has some inaccuracies. Read this before you read anything else: The Turkish Expedition to Astrakhan' in 1569 and the Problem of the Don-Volga Canal as professor Akdes Nimet Kurat did research on this special subject. Kurat also was the guy who found a 400 year old transcript written by Jędrzej Taranowski, a polish diplomat who witnessed the retreat of the Ottoman army from Astrakhan. --Ukas (talk) 14:00, 2 March 2021 (UTC)[reply]