Talk:1999 Russian apartment bombings/Archive 10

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The alleged arrests of FSB operatives in Ryazan

There are numerous issues with this article, which is a naked propaganda of the conspiracy theory.

One of the most striking issues has been the lack of proper attribution of the various claims concerning the alleged arrests of FSB operatives to the authors who made them.

For example, the article made a claim following Litvinenko and Felshtinsky's viewpoint, that FSB agents were arrested on September 24. But that claim was sourced to the article by Amy Knight, who follows John Sweeney's theory that FSB agents were caught red-handed on September 22.

I have corrected that mistake, and provided a full reference list of various claims concerning the alleged arrests.

Hope that helps.

Document hippo (talk) 08:04, 20 August 2019 (UTC)

There are the following problems with your changes.

1. No, the WP page tells very clearly that the bomb "was found and defused in an apartment block in the Russian city of Ryazan on 22 September". If it was 24th anywhere, let's fix the date. As about FSB agents arrested in Ryazan, this is something every source tells, including Satter, Knight, etc. This is not alleged and not a version by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky.
2. Yes, the explosive was widely named as the "hexogen", meaning RDX.
3. You used this source. If it was a publication by Izmailov in Novaya Gazeta, it should be linked to Novaya Gazeta. More important, it was dated September 13 1999, i.e. this is an opinion piece immediately after the bombings. If Izmailov was involved in any actual journalistic investigation later, that could be included.
4. I do not think the opinion by George Soros in 2000 (!) ([1]) should be included. What he thinks now? Soros tells that Berezovsky took part in the arranging the "fake" War of Dagestan and in the campaign to bring Putin to power in 1999. Yes, he certainly did, and he even did not deny it. However, Soros was far from certain that Berezovaky organized the bombings. He tells this: "I could not quite believe that the explosions in the Moscow apartment buildings could be part of a plan to justify war. It was just too diabolical. It would not be unique—Russian history is replete with crimes committed by agents provocateurs, from Azev the spy during the tsarist period to Kirov’s murder, which was used to justify Stalin’s purges—but it would nevertheless be in a class by itself. Still, I could not rule it out. From Berezovsky’s point of view the bombing made perfect sense. Not only would such attacks help to elect a president who would provide immunity to Yeltsin and his family but it would also give him, Berezovsky, a hold over Putin. So far [in 2000], no evidence has surfaced which would contradict this theory. While we may never find out the truth about the Moscow explosions, there can be no doubt that it was the war in Chechnya that has propelled Putin to victory."

1. And so on, and so on. This should be discussed separately for each issue. My very best wishes (talk) 21:42, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

P.S. Nice recent summary of these events: [2]. Context: [3]. My very best wishes (talk) 13:35, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

1) I believe that there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the alleged arrests. Most essentially, it's not something that has been reported in the press of the time. But something that was inferred — or breathlessly claimed — later by conspiracy theorists. Which is why there are numerous accounts of the Ryazan incident which do not mention the arrests — to name a few, Elena Pokalova's "Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus" or Andrew Meier’s "Chechnya: To the Heart of a Conflict".

2) The official version is that the explosive used has been a homemade explosive mixture — a mix of aluminium powder, nitre, sugar and TNT. That's a sufficient reason to mention that in the summary. Actually I believe the apartments were exploded with that mixture, and RDX was used as an explosive booster. But I haven't seen a source directly confirming that — only some interview in which that theory was ridiculed by Kovalev who reportedly heard it from security officials. But what does he know about explosives? He was all like "why to use RDX as a booster"? For f's sake! Because RDX can be detonated simply by inserting a detonator in it! And homemade explosive mixtures, such as ANFO, typically require boosters. They are weak explosives, but cheap as dirt. And can do unlimited damage when detonated in large quantities. That's why terrorists love them.

3) It is indeed a publication by Izmailov. However, Novaya Gazeta's online archive doesn't extend to the year of 1999. That's why Izmailov's article is linked to a digital library. I hope that addresses your concern.

As regards the date, Izmailov's article took place after two of the bombings and preceded two other bombings — it preceded the September 13 bombing, as well as the Volgodonsk bombing of September 16.

It's far more than an opinion piece.

Have you read Izmailov's articles? It's quite a story in itself. Izmailov got a source from Chechnya with a knowledge about the planned/future bombings, and sent him to the police, but the police wasn't interested, that person was lost, then he was found, etc.

I have uploaded those articles. The reporting by Izmailov includes the names, everything. As Izmailov writes in his recent book, after these articles were published, some high-profile security official in Chechnya stopped talking to him. No wonder.

4) I sympathize with your view that Soros was far from certain that Berezovsky has organized the bombings. Actually, in this article that theory is cited as a possibility, rather than a fact. As regards the possible evolution of views held by Soros, that would be totally interesting, however I am unaware of any such evolution.

Document hippo (talk) 11:55, 14 September 2019 (UTC)

• If you want to agree about something, you should not start from blind revert to your version [4]. Note that you made these changes only recently, i.e. without WP:Consensus. I can agree to include the old and outdated opinion by Soros. However, the essence of your claim here (the title above) that the arrest of FSB operatives in Ryazan was not true, but a conspiracy theory (you made titles like "Critics of the conspiracy), etc.) is contrary to allmost all good secondary sources on this subject, most notably books by historians and/or experts like Yuri Felshtinski, David Satter, Alexander Litvinenko, Vladimir Pribylovsky or Scott Anderson, Amy Knight, Karen Dawisha, etc. I can cite a lot more. The FSB operative who were caught while planting the bomb in Ryazan is the key fact about this case. As about Izmailov, yes, this is an opinion peace, not a result of a journalistic investigation. Some of your other changes could be acceptable, but you should start form making them one by one, instead of making the revert wirt a lot of new changes. My very best wishes (talk) 14:44, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Alright, I understand how "critics of the conspiracy" might be offensive. That should be fixed. I suggest to change that to "proponents of the official version" and "proponents of the theory of FSB involvement". --Document hippo (talk) 19:38, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

I made my changes one by one, until you reverted all my changes. But alright... After all, you are the owner of the article. I will make my changes one by one and open a discussion for each. --Document hippo (talk) 19:49, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

• Even the head of FSB, Nikolai Patrushev and Putin did not deny that FSB agents were caught in the city of Ryazan. Patrushev only said that was a "military exercise" (a day after Putin praised the vigilance of the inhabitants of Ryazan who helped to catch the perpetrators). If it was indeed an "exercise" has been debated in sources and therefore included on the page. My very best wishes (talk) 16:54, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

The absense of a formal denial doesn't mean anything. --Document hippo (talk) 19:34, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

That was not absence of denial, but admission. An admission that an "operation" by the FSB (and Russian Ministry of Interior) took place and the agents planted a device. They only claimed (falsely, as we know) that the device was not the actual bomb. My very best wishes (talk) 19:40, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Yes, it was admitted that there were exercises in Ryazan, during which FSB operatives planted a dummy bomb which involved three sugar sacks and a mock detonator.

However, as regards the alleged arrests of FSB operatives in Ryazan, that hasn't been either admitted or denied -- as far as I know.

--Document hippo (talk) 19:45, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

If you want more sources, here is the most recent book on the subject (dated 2018) and written by Amy Knight who is a professional historian and specializes on the history of such operations by Soviet/Russian state security services.My very best wishes (talk) 17:58, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

That doesn't mean that's a consensus view. Which it is actually not. --Document hippo (talk) 19:39, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

• Here is bottom line. The FSB agents planted a "device" in Ryzan as a matter of fact. Everyone agreed with this, even Patrushev and Rushailo. My very best wishes (talk) 19:43, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Yes. That information is not disputed and of course it's said in the article. More that once. --Document hippo (talk) 19:46, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

If this is not disputed, why did you call the arrest of agents "conspiracy" which has been "criticized"[5]. Can you give me a couple of good secondary sources (like books) telling they were not arrested? My very best wishes (talk) 19:55, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

It is not disputed that FSB operatives planted a dummy device. The information about the alleged arrests is controversial. I agree to pull the term "conspiracy". If you have read the article by Arifdzhanov, it is indeed a criticism of that theory.

I don't know any source which explicitly says that FSB agents were not arrested. However, there is a source providing a completely different rationale to Patrushev's announcement made on September 24, 1999. Which is, that Patrushev's announcement was made after the superior officer of the leader of the group sent to Ryazan received a written report about the operation.

That said, can you provide the primary source telling that FSB agents were arrested? --Document hippo (talk) 20:05, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

No need in a primary source (I have no idea what that might be) if numerous secondary sources claim something. My very best wishes (talk) 23:18, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

I will tell you. The primary source for the claim that FSB agents were arrested between September 23 and September 24 is the 2003 book by David Satter. Consequently, a secondary source would say something along the lines, "According to David Satter, FSB agents were detained between September 23 and September 24". If a source is not mentioned, that's just another primary source. --Document hippo (talk) 23:33, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

No, his book is a secondary RS. If you think otherwise, please ask on WP:RSNB. More important, mentioned five other authots that tell the same above.My very best wishes (talk) 23:48, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Admittances and denials of responsibility by Khattab and Basayev

What are the issues with these edits?

The problem with the current version of the article is that it just states that terrorist leaders have denied responsibility for the blasts. That's a semi-truth. They have eventually denied it, but first, Basayev has pointed to Dagestanis, while Khattab has vowed to blast Russian cities.

--Document hippo (talk) 20:32, 15 September 2019 (UTC) :No objections. My very best wishes (talk) 23:17, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Alright... glad that we are on the same page here. --Document hippo (talk) 23:30, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Sorry, I did not look carefully. First, you removed any mention about Maskhadov. Secondly, you created a very confusing story. The bottom line: they all denied the responsibility. This should be said clearly. My very best wishes (talk) 00:05, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

I have altered the text to say that Khattab has denied responsibility for the bombings. I'm sorry if my previous version looked confusing, that wasn't my intent.

One other issue. I could not find the source claiming that Maskhadov denied responsibility for the bombings. Could you help me find it?

Perhaps I have just overlooked it, and I would appreciate any help with locating the source. OTOH, Maskhadov was an elected leader of a de-facto independent state. Why would he want to deny responsibility? He wasn't a terrorist. --Document hippo (talk) 00:58, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

Maskhadov already appears in the source used in in-line citation [6], did not you read it? Yes, maybe this is not just a denial, but a lot more and needs to be rephrased. Why pointing a finger to Dagestan by Basayev was important? This is obviously a nonsense. Put another meaningless comment by him on this page? One that he refuse to repeat in his next comment? What grounds for not including? WP is not a collection of meaningless statements by terrorists. My very best wishes (talk) 01:09, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

I also noticed this your edit [7]. You say that was a "deliberate lie". Why? My very best wishes (talk) 01:17, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

I've actually removed that comment of mine. I was glad when the IP removed it, because it was too emotional. And I do not want to return to that comment. Unless you absolutely insist. --Document hippo (talk) 01:28, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

Back to the business.

1) I would rephrase that as, Chechen Foreign Ministry issued a statement on September 14 condemning Moscow blasts, and affirming that "Ichkeria stands firmly against terrorism in any manifestation".

2) Not just Dagestan, but three villages -- Wahhabi exclaves -- being under attack by Federal forces. Robert Bruce Ware sees the interview by Basayev as evidence that "the simplest explanation for the apartment block blasts is that they were perpetrated by Islamist extremists from the North Caucasus who were seeking retribution for federal military attacks upon the Islamist enclave in the central Dagestani villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar." (p. 125 of the book by Ware and Kisriev)

--Document hippo (talk) 01:29, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

What book by Ware and Kisriev are you talking about? The title? The edtition? It does not appear properly cited on the page. My very best wishes (talk) 01:42, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

This one. That's strange. I thought we had it in the list. Perhaps some glitch or anything. --Document hippo (talk) 01:46, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

• Here is the problem. The claim that the bombings were perpetrated by people from Dagestan as a retribution for the War of Dagestan contradicts everything we know and to all versions by other sources. It contradicts the official version of the events (as worded in the decision by the Russian court), and it contradicts version by Satter, Felshtinsky, etc. According to official version, it was done by Arab militants and several people who were Karachays (this is not Dagestan!). Even Basayev realized it was such an obvious lie and therefore did not repeat it. The only source claiming it is the outdated book by Ware. Given that, the view by Ware belongs to WP:FRINGE. My very best wishes (talk) 02:09, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

But Ware didn't say that the bombings were perpetrated by people from Dagestan. He said that they were perpetrated by "Islamist extremists from the North Caucasus" which is fully consistent with the official version.

--Document hippo (talk) 06:42, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

Khattab was married to a girl from a Dagestani village under attack, and his father-in-law lived in one of the three Wahhabi villages during the attack. That's the personal aspect in the decision to seek retribution for the attacks.

However, the primary motivation for the bombings had been to win the war in Dagestan by scaring the Russian population and making them force the Russian Government to stop the fighting (e.g., see the interview with Yossef Bodansky, [8]). Consequently, when the hostilities in Dagesten ceded, there was no reason for further bombings. Which is why there were no bombings after September 16.

Why did Basayev want the world to believe that Dagestanis were behind the bombings? Because that would help Basayev and Khattab succeed with their war in Dagestan.

--Document hippo (talk) 09:11, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

To summarize all statements by Basayev, this is something he explicitly denied. That should be said very briefly. Yes, one can include Ware to this section. My very best wishes (talk) 13:06, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

Alleged arrests of FSB operatives

What are the issues with this edit? Note that in my final version of the section regarding the alleged arrest, I have changed the wording, removing the "conspiracy" word, which I recognize can be offensive for some editors.

--Document hippo (talk) 20:49, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Poor sourcing [9] of an extraordinary claim (all other sources tell otherwise). Like I said, can you use a couple of books which claim the agents were not arrested. My very best wishes (talk) 23:13, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

I can cite a couple of books which review the Ryazan incident without saying that FSB agents were arrested. If that's a most essential fact pertaining to the incident, it's definitely not universally accepted.

Are there any other issues with that edit? --Document hippo (talk) 23:22, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

No, you should cite a couple of books which would tell the agents were NOT arrested. All sources tell they were in fact arrested. My very best wishes (talk) 23:26, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

As regards as citing books which tell that the agents were NOT arrested.

I'm afraid it doesn't work that way. If FSB agents were not arrested, noone would explicitly say that. Authors would just avoid mentioning that information (and there are indeed some sources which do not mention the alleged arrest while reviewing the Ryazan incident).

The only thing that could be said as a matter of criticism is that the proponents of the theory of FSB involvement in the bombings failed to provide any evidence that FSB agents were arrested.

And that's actually my point. What's the evidence that FSB agents were arrested? --Document hippo (talk) 07:30, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

The sources currently cited on the page to support statement about three (not two!) agents being arrested and released include books by Satter and Knight, The Guardian [10], and this. Do you want more? Yes, I can do it. That's not a problem, because the arrest (or detainment) of three FSB operatives was mentioned as a key fact in nearly all books on this subject. This is not "according to Knight or Satter". My very best wishes (talk) 19:55, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

If this is a key fact, why are there variations as regards the number of agents being arrested (two or three), as well as the date on which the arrests took place (September 22 or September 23-24), among the sources you have cited?

The problem is with these little but important variations among the authors writing about the subject. If you want to cite a particular version of the events, then it should be attributed to a particular source, or several sources.

That said, I believe that the most honest approach is to provide the list of all versions of the events as regards the alleged arrests.

--Document hippo (talk) 06:14, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

Which RS tell there were only two FSB agents detained and the planting of the bomb in Ryazan was not on September 22? Please link them here. I am not aware of such. Also any other RS which explicitly say that FSB agents were not detained, please. In particular, this source (one that you included to to support "Critics of the theory of FSB involvement"), names 3 FSB officers, including their military ranks, but without indicating their family names ("трое сотрудников ФСБ – Татьяна Ивановна, Василий Анатольевич и Петр Дмитриевич (имена и отчества подлинные), соответственно капитан и два майора, одного из которых, Василия, назначили старшим группы"). But the entire source/article appears to be a direct citation from the book Assassination of Russia. Is not it? My very best wishes (talk) 14:02, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

I don't dispute the fact that planting of the suspected bomb has occurred on September 22. I sincerely apologize if this case of bad communication is my fault.

My point addresses the date (as well as other circumstances) of the alleged arrests of the FSB agents.

As regards your question about the number of agents who were allegedly detained, let me quote the account by David Satter published in his 2003 book "Darkness at Dawn" (page 28):

"The operator reported the call to the police, who traced the number. To their astonishment, it belonged to the FSB.

A short time later the Ryazan police, with the help of tips from local people, arrested two of the terrorists. The detainees produced identification showing that they worked for the FSB. On orders from Moscow, they were soon released. Some type of explanation from the central FSB, however, was now inevitable.

On Friday, September 24, FSB director Nikolai Patrushev came out of a Kremlin meeting and told a reporter that the evacuation of the building in Ryazan had been part of a training alert and the bomb was a dummy planted by his agency."

The article by Arifdzhanov is the original writing by that author. It was published in 2002, and in a couple of places the author cites the work by Felshtinsky and Litvinenko, with the appropriate attributions.

--Document hippo (talk) 15:04, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

• Hence there is no discrepancy in sources: there were 3 agents, and this source refers to other sources that tell the agents were detained ("Что было дальше, читатели уже знают. Об этом написали все газеты, высказав каждая свою версию, сообщили все телеканалы"). Now, speaking about the source, it tells, for example: "24 сентября утром старший группы ОПГ-1 майор Василий М-в (его фамилия, как и фамилии других участников операции, нам известна, но я дал слово их не называть) написал отчет в Центр." Here "я" ("me") means Arifdzhanov who tells the story based on words by "Vasiliy" (one of three detained FSB agents) if I understand correctly. OK. That might be used to source the official/FSB-promoted version of the events, but I can see a potential WP:BLP problem - see below. My very best wishes (talk) 16:38, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

P.S. According to "Vasilii", the "exercises" was directed by ru:Тихонов, Александр Евгеньевич and conducted also in the cities of Ivanovo, Kursk and Oryol. Do we have more sources about that? We do need multiple RS to include something like that. My very best wishes (talk) 17:02, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

"this source refers to other sources that tell the agents were detained" -- except that the article was published in June 2002. By that date, there had been only a single mention of the alleged arrest in the Russian press -- namely, the work by Felshtinsky and Litvinenko, and the latter is mentioned separately in the text. So I'm afraid it's hardly the author's intended meaning.

The official account of the events in Ryazan is definitely lacking from this article. I like that idea.

Lastly, I'm glad that you have asked about FSB exercises in other cities. We have had a lot of serious debates recently, so that question provides me with an opportunity to share a couple of anecdotes. So...

October 4, 1999, Pavel Voloshin's article in Novaya Gazeta.

"Учения, подобные рязанскому, действительно проводились в нескольких городах. А среагировали только в Рязани. В Иванове, например, муляж бомбы подложили в троллейбус. Бдительные пассажиры сразу заметили коробку с проводами и отдали ее водителю. А он спокойно забрал ее к себе в кабину и катался с ней весь день. Потом привез коробку на конечную остановку и начал в ней копаться. Точно так же, как в 1996 году это сделал водитель взорвавшегося на Пушкинской площади троллейбуса. Никто с тех пор ничему не научился. Так что Россия сейчас - одна большая мишень. Взорвать можно что угодно и когда угодно."

March 21, 2000, interview with Maximov.

"Этими учениями преследовалась цель проверить готовность правоохранительных органов области к действиям в экстремальных ситуациях и бдительность граждан. И те, и другие сработали хорошо. Но мы теперь грустно шутим: "Были бы люди менее внимательными, не "валили" бы теперь на наши головы все эти телерепортажи и публикации с вариациями". Не вспоминают же ивановцев, не среагировавших на подобную проверку."

I believe I've seen other sources which mentioned more cities, but these are the ones I've immediately recalled.

--Document hippo (talk) 17:46, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

If so, there is an obvious contradiction between claims by Voloshin and "Vasiliy". "Vasiliy"/Arifdzhanov tells: "Они никого не провоцировали, просто незаметно заложили свои мешки с сахаром и муляжи и так же тихо и незаметно уехали." Did the device in trolleybus looked like "bags [plural] with sugar"? That's why we need multiple RS that normally provide enough details and consistent with each other. But the article by Arifdzhanov is interesting. It tells for starters the FSB received an intelligence that militants from the "Army of liberation of Dagestan" (this is a fake, non-existent organization as FSB admitted itself) are planning to place the bombs in these cities (obviously, the terrorists never did it because there is no such "Army"), and therefore FSB decided to send their own people to all these cities to place fake bombs, according to Arifdzhanov. Include to the page? My very best wishes (talk) 18:06, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

1) "Did the device in trolleybus looked like "bags [plural] with sugar"?" I don't think so. Perhaps different types of fake terrorist acts have been divised.

2) The first statement that was reportedly revealed to most trusted people from the FSB and MVD and which included the information that the "Army of liberation of Dagestan" allegedly intended to perpetrate terrorist acts in the cities of Kursk, Orel, Ivanovo, Ryazan, has been fake. Because as revealed in the second statement, the real story was the exercises carried out by Vympel.

It's not like the first statement was the real story, and FSB reacted by sending people to carry out exercises. Conversely, the real story was the exercises, and the initial internal statement regarding the "Army of liberation of Dagestan" intended to provoke parts of FSB and MVD uninvolved in the exercises to react to the exercises as if they were a real terrorist attack.

At least, that's my interpretation of it. I wouldn't include that information to the page.

--Document hippo (talk) 07:47, 18 September 2019 (UTC)

I am so picky about multiple RS because one can not trust anything that "Vasiliy" said to Arifdzhanov. Would you trust a single word by Anatoliy Chepiga during his interview to Margarita Simonyan on Russian TV? This is exactly the same situation. My very best wishes (talk) 20:59, 17 September 2019 (UTC)

So, do we have any other sources (preferably strong RS) telling about the alleged exercises by Vympel in the cities of Kursk, Orel and Ivanovo? If we do, that info may be arguably included. If there is nothing, this is possibly a disinformation coming from "Vasilii". My very best wishes (talk) 18:37, 18 September 2019 (UTC)

Well, since we returned to editing this page, and I checked more, it appears there are additional sources, this and this claiming that according to official statements by the FSB, the "training exercises" have been conducted in several Russian cities. Given multiple RS, I think this now can be included, as a claim by the FSB, not a fact. My very best wishes (talk) 03:58, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Theory of Berezovsky responsibility for the bombings

As this contribution involved multiple changes, I will just cite my final version here, which hopefully addresses some of previous concerns by user MVBW.

In the "Perpetrators" part of the infobox

Boris Berezovsky according to George Soros

In the introduction section:

Hungarian-American investor and philanthropist George Soros speculated that Boris Berezovsky might have been behind the bombings.[19][20][21]

Meaning he conspired with Putin? That is what Soros apparently means. My very best wishes (talk) 23:25, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

I like your idea that primary sources are subject to interpretation. Which is why my wording almost word-in-word coincides with the secondary source, which is a peer-reviewed academic article. --Document hippo (talk) 23:35, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

This is not a peer-reviewed academic article, but an opinion piece. I am talking about briefly summarizing the source instead of long quotation. That is what we suppose to do. However, what Soros tells is so murky we can not even briefly summarize his opinion. My very best wishes (talk) 23:46, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Yup. And this is a peer-reviewed article, saying that "Financier George Soros, based on his personal interpretation of Berezovsky’s operating style, even speculated that Berezovsky might have been behind the terrorist attacks themselves." --Document hippo (talk) 00:13, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

Yes, this is valid source, but it tells about the opinion by Soros as a groundless speculation (and yes, it certainly is a groundless speculation). Such citation by RS is an argument not to include his opinion. My very best wishes (talk) 02:18, 16 September 2019 (UTC)

In the section "Theory of Boris Berezovsky involvement".

In 2000, George Soros has published an article in The New York Review of Books, in which he described his recollections of the style of Boris Berezovsky's operations, based on which Soros has speculated that Berezovsky himself might have been behind the terrorist attacks.[19][21] That point has also appeared as a chapter in a 2000 book by George Soros, Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism.[20]

“ On the flight from Sochi to Moscow in 1997, Berezovsky had told me stories about how he had paid off the anti-Russian military commanders in Chechnya and Abkhazia. So when the Chechen leader Shamil Basayev invaded Dagestan, I smelled a rat. I set up a test: Would Basayev withdraw by the deadline set by Putin? He did. Even so, I could not quite believe that the explosions in the Moscow apartment buildings could be part of a plan to justify war. It was just too diabolical. It would not be unique—Russian history is replete with crimes committed by agents provocateurs, from Azev the spy during the tsarist period to Kirov’s murder, which was used to justify Stalin’s purges—but it would nevertheless be in a class by itself.

Still, I could not rule it out. From Berezovsky’s point of view the bombing made perfect sense. Not only would such attacks help to elect a president who would provide immunity to Yeltsin and his family but it would also give him, Berezovsky, a hold over Putin. So far, no evidence has surfaced which would contradict this theory.

”

American journalist Paul Klebnikov has cited speculations that Boris Berezovsky could be behind the bombings in his book Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia, which was published in 2000.[174] Klebnikov noted that if Berezovsky was in any way involved in the bombings, "this secret would remain an iron bond attaching Putin to Berezovsky".[174] However, Klebnikov has concluded that that's only a speculation, and "there is simply too little evidence either way".[174]

The references are:

[19] Soros, George (April 13, 2000). "Who Lost Russia?". The New York Review of Books.

[20] Soros, George (2000). Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism. Time Warner Books Uk. p. 261. ISBN 978-0316855983.

[21] Hale, Henry (2004). "The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development" (PDF). Demokratizatsiya.

[174] Klebnikov 2000, p. 305

---

It's a well-sourced contribution. What are the issues with it? --Document hippo (talk) 21:08, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

WP:DUE. This is a very long citation of someone who was not a participant of a story and not an expert. And what is the claim, exactly? That Berezovsky conspired with Putin to bomb the buildings and thus bring him to power? I am not sure Soros is saying just that. In any event, this should be summarized very briefly if at all included. My very best wishes (talk) 23:22, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Alright... I don't think the quotation is really necessary. --Document hippo (talk) 23:38, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

Also, if you want to include an opinion by someone who was not a participant of these events (Soros, Soldatov, Latynina, whoever), This should not be just "I think so", but a sourced explanation why someone who is presumably an expert "thinks so". My very best wishes (talk) 23:58, 15 September 2019 (UTC)

So, back to claims about Berezovsky, I think that view can be cited with appropriate attribution, if placed to appropriate context. For example, according to David Satter (as cited here "Я абсолютно уверен, что ФСБ ответственна за взрывы домов в Москве, Буйнакске и Волгодонске и попытке взорвать здание в Рязани. Я думаю, что теракты были cпланированы ельцинским окружением – по всей видимости, Березовским – и что Путин стал премьер-министром в силу его готовности участвовать. Рассекреченные в США документы свидетельствуют, что 8 сентября Ельцин убеждал Клинтона, что Путин, у которого тогда было 2% поддержки, станет президентом России. И на следующий день было взорвано здание на улице Гурьянова. Мы не можем исключить, что Ельцин либо согласился прикрыть тех, кто взрывал дома, или отдал приказ сам"). I do not mind this to be included. My very best wishes (talk) 04:09, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

So, yes, this definitely should be included, but it is not so much about Berezovsky as about conversation between Yeltsin and Clinton. I did not know about it. My very best wishes (talk) 04:34, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Criticism by Ware

This edit (summary). I can see several problems. (a) "Ware's criticism is a discussion of well-known facts". Well, the claim about large amounts of hexogen returned to authorities in Dagestan is not a fact, but a claim in a local Dagestan newspaper (according to Ware). Given the amount of disinformation propagated in this area, I would check for at least one additional and better source to verify this claim. (b) As written, it is entirely not clear which claims by Basyev and Khattab he is talking about. Moreover, both Basayev and Khattab ultimately denied any responsibility (Basyev indeed was not involved, even according to "official" version). This makes text even less understandable. I suggest to remove or rephrase it. My very best wishes (talk) 03:33, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

a) The claim appears in a peer-reviewed article published in an academic journal, which is a reliable source according to Wikipedia policies. For Wikipedia, it is good as it is. However, I admire your unquenchable thirst for knowledge.

For example, Regnum (a major Russian news agency) reported in 2003 that 1 ton 793 kg of explosives were surrendered to police by the population of Dagestan. That's consistent with the information provided by Ware.

b) I admit that my summary of Ware's article hasn't been really well written. Indeed, Ware has quoted the relevant interviews in his article, so if you read his article it's clear what he refers to. But the context was missing in my previous summary, as you have quite sagaciously remarked. To address that criticism, I have provided the necessary references.

Meanwhile, I wanted to thank you for a little bit of practice. Writing is a valuable skill, and I enjoy learning to become a better writer.

-- Document hippo (talk) 06:36, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Yes, it is consistent because it comes from the same claim by Dagestani authorities. Well, this new source seems to disprove the statement because it does not mention hexogen anywhere. There is obviously a lot of explosives in Dagestan, but only hexogen was very difficult to get according to claims by other sources. Also note that Ware (who refers to the same info by Dagestani authorities) does NOT tell how much of the explosives was hexogen (1 kilo?). Now I am even more convinced this is an extremely unreliable info. As about describing in detail the interview by Basayev where he made a number of false claims, this is simply "undue" on the page. His initial claims were false according to all other sources and according to his own admission later. My very best wishes (talk) 14:49, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

A man is entitled to his beliefs, however Wikipedia operates according to its policies. The article by Robert Bruce Ware is a reliable source and as such it belongs to the article. --Document hippo (talk) 19:35, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

I am afraid that I'm unable to further help you in your quest. To answer your questions, I would suggest that you 1) get the article from Novoe Delo to see what does it say regarding the quantity of hexogen among the surrendered explosives, or 2) correspond with Robert Bruce Ware to get any further insight from him. Hope that helps. --Document hippo (talk) 20:10, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Not all sourced content belongs to pages. As about "Novoye Delo" and giving up weapons in Dagestan, I found only this. Nothing about hexogen. My very best wishes (talk) 22:43, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

It's another article from 2015, not the article you need from 2004. I'm afraid it might be not on the Internet. In which case you might either visit a library in an old-fashioned way, or contact Robert Bruce Ware who might hopefully have a copy of that article. --Document hippo (talk) 09:14, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

The discussion of patently and self-admittedly false claims by Basyev is undue on the page, as we discussed above already. Why clog this page with nonsense? My very best wishes (talk) 17:28, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

Please remind me, at which point has Basayev rejected his earlier claims? I don't recall that. --Document hippo (talk) 18:17, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

That was his next interview cited on the page. He made a different claim. My very best wishes (talk) 19:22, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

Has he rejected the earlier claim by making a different claim later?

--Document hippo (talk) 19:28, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

Lead section

I propose some changes to the lead section. Firstly, "according to historians" is misleading as it suggests that there is a consensus among historians in general that the bombings were conducted by the security services. It would make more sense if this would be something along the lines of "according to some historians" or "according to a number of historians." Secondly, I don't see why the lead section should not include the term "conspiracy theory" as there are reliable sources which use that label to describe the theory of government involvement, such as the CNN article from 2019 that I tried to include, and I also don't see why there shouldn't be any mention at all of any historians, researchers etc. who criticize said theory. This section in the Terrorism in Russia article does a better job. 2A00:23C4:B87:3B00:7994:D8E8:155A:921D (talk) 23:52, 21 December 2019 (UTC)

Yes, I think there is generally such consensus among historians cited on this page. The lead is just as summary of views currently included on the page, with an emphasis on books where at least a chapter was dedicated specifically to the subject of these bombings. What exactly alternative summary do you suggest? Please post it here. Speaking about a CNN publication, do you mean this? I do not see the author, but it seems to be consistent with other publications and content of this page. My very best wishes (talk) 01:00, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

WP:RS please

Re to this. A lot was published on this subject, and the subject is highly controversial. Let's just use reliably published books, preferably in English and more or less recent. A source like this, does it qualify as RS? I am not sure, especially after the alleged assassination of the editor in chef of this newspaper. Also, speaking about authors X,Y,Z, some of them are reputable and widely known historians or experts we have pages about, but others do not. That also should be taken into account. My very best wishes (talk) 14:54, 18 September 2019 (UTC)

I don't agree with the suggestion to use only published books, because it's not something which is said in WP:RS.

Also, if you want to undo my few recent edits, please discuss what do you disagree with. The article you've mentioned is clearly not something you've removed from the article. --Document hippo (talk) 15:53, 19 September 2019 (UTC)

According to WP:RS, some types of sources are much better than others. That is what I am talking about. "Please discuss"? But we just discussed this above. Once again: (a) the claims about FSB agents are not "according to Satter or Knight", but according to essentially all RS which mention the events in Ryazan, (b) we should only very briefly summarize statements by Basyaev and Khattab (yes, they denied it; this is all that matters), (c) the opinion by Soldatov was completely described in the previous para, this is a duplication. My very best wishes (talk) 17:29, 19 September 2019 (UTC)

a) As I said before, there are accounts of the events in Ryazan which do not mention the alleged arrest. For example, Elena Pokalova's "Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus" or Andrew Meier’s "Chechnya: To the Heart of a Conflict".

But, if you want to cite more authors, that's perfectly alright. Let's just take care that their accounts are mutually consistent. For that matter, I suggest to cite all claims regarding the alleged arrest which appeared in writings by proponents of the conspiracy.

b) Yes, they denied it. No, their other/preceding statements also matter. Because they cast their denials of responsibility in a completely different light.

c) Here's what the first paragraph says:

According to Russian journalist Andrei Soldatov, "From the start, it seemed that the Kremlin was determined to suppress all discussion ... When Alexander Podrabinek, a Russian human rights activist, tried to import copies of Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's Blowing up Russia in 2003, they were confiscated by the FSB. Trepashkin himself, acting as a lawyer for two relatives of the victims of the blast, was unable to obtain information he requested and was entitled to see by law". However, he believed the obstruction may reflect "“paranoia” rather than guilt on the part of the authorities".

Here's the second paragraph which you've removed:

Russian investigative journalists Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan in their 2010 book The New Nobility have expressed their conviction that the Ryazan incident had actually been a training exercise.[161] According to the authors, such exercises are typical for Vympel, an unit of the FSB whose mission is to verify the efficacy of counterterrorism measures at sites such as nuclear plants.

@Document hippo: By the way, I have read The New Nobility but I don't recall any such claims. Cloud200 (talk) 12:38, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

@Cloud200: Check page 111:

"The authors believe that there were indeed exercises carried out in Ryazan. Such exercises are typical for Vympel, a special unit of the FSB with the mission of verifying the efficacy of counterterrorism measures at locales like nuclear plants. But it is also the authors’ impression that the FSB needlessly bungled the crisis by giving an explanation that raised more questions than it answered. The idea that the FSB might have been involved in the bombings to help bring Putin to power became a runaway conspiracy theory. To date, the FSB has failed to counteract this speculation with convincing evidence of what did happen in Ryazan."

Hope that helps!

--Document hippo (talk) 14:54, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

Yes, thanks - must have missed that. This is actually quite balanced opinion - on the other hand they mention possible Vympel involvement based on similar pattern but at the same time balance it by saying that FSB "has failed" to convincingly explain what happened in Ryazan. Cloud200 (talk) 15:13, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

The suggestion by Soldatov looks like a pure speculation. I did not find anything at all about the similar exercises conducted previously by Vympel in other sources. What I found was this: "Эффективность подобных учений весьма сомнительна, что показало аналогичное мероприятие МВД в отношении московских борцов с терроризмом, проведенное летом этого года. В частности, учебная закладка взрывного устройства состоялась тогда в одном из престижных ресторанов-пиццерий в центре Москвы. Служба безопасности ресторана сообщила об этом в милицию, однако ее сотрудники действовали столь непрофессионально, что "бомба" сработала прямо в их руках.". So, yes, MVD did conduct one such training exercise previously, however Vympel does not belong to MVD. My very best wishes (talk) 18:02, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

Indeed, most of the information pertaining to Russian secret services is classified. That's why we need experts in the Russian security services, such as Soldatov and Borogan, who are most knowleageable about the subject. Why have Soldatov and Borogan arrived to the said conclusion is indeed a very good question. I would enjoy to learn what is their take on that story. Sadly, they have been very concise!

Meanwhile, the English Wikipedia article on Vympel contains the following passage:

"In 1995, the FSB RF Special Operations Center (TsSN FSB RF) was granted control over Vympel. The group regained its original name and was reintegrated into the Intelligence Service structures. The emphasis shifted from covert and clandestine sabotage operations to counter-terrorism and nuclear safety enforcement. Vympel operatives undergo special training related to improvised or special explosive devices, permitting them to use "terrorist-like" tactics to carry out their operations. Physical training includes close hand combat, parachute training, diving, underwater combat techniques, climbing, and alpine rope techniques. Regional groups of Vympel were deployed in cities with especially important nuclear facilities."

I know that Wikipedia is not a reliable source, but perhaps it could be used as a starting point to find some actual reliable sources.

Hope that helps!

--Document hippo (talk) 19:21, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

For example, p. 183 of "Dangerous Weapons, Desperate States: Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine" by Gary K. Bertsch, William C. Potter (1999):

"The structure that is responsible for anti-nuclear-terrorism activities has the name Vympel, also known as the Directorate V of the Federal Security Service (FSB). In August 1997, Vympel organized a simulation drill with the code name Atom-97. It was a training exercise designed to prevent potential terrorist attack at the Kola NPP and at the atomic icebreaker Siberia (both located in the Russian northwest). In its simulation of sabotage against the NPP, the "terrorists" managed to conquer it for some time, but were not able to explode it or create any significant radioactive danger. In the Siberia exercise, "terrorists" attacked and occupied the Siberia and took hostages. They were attacked from the surface by the Murmansk surface fleet, by the Vympel paratroopers by air, and from under the sea by the Vympel military scuba divers. As General Dmitry Gerasimov of the FSB concluded, "Unfortunately, the threat of nuclear sabotage in Murmansk Oblast [region] still exists"."

--Document hippo (talk) 20:52, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

• You are missing the point. Yes, sure, they conducted various exercises. But did they ever conduct other exercises that involved a lot of unsuspecting civilians? Civilians who would be woke up in the middle of the night and evicted from their apartments by the local policemen who also had no idea about the "exercise"? That is what the sources on the subject emphasize. Given that such exercise would be impossible to hide, and no one published anything about other similar exercises by Vympel, one can only conclude there was no any other "exercises" like that. But Soldatov knew it, obviously. So, why he is missing the point? There is obviously an answer (and that was published somewhere), but I would rather not discuss it because of our BLP rules. Note that it was probably Soldatov who created an article in WP about himself. My very best wishes (talk) 23:19, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

I presume, that 1997 exercises at a nuclear power plant in Murmansk oblast have also involved a lot of unsuspecting civilians (the workers of the plant). Must have been quite stressful for them.

--Document hippo (talk) 23:28, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

Oh no, if any workers of the plant have been involved, they knew it was an exercise. Do you have any sources telling otherwise? Once again, I am just saying what sources say: there was no any other exercise like that (they only mentioned the case of the bomb planted in Moscow by MVD people - see above). Maybe in other countries? Maybe something by other GRU people? They said they were just tourists. My very best wishes (talk) 23:45, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

The Ryazan exercise has stood out as regards its media coverage and perhaps psychological traumas inflicted on unsuspecting civilians, but in purely technical terms it's something that Vympel officers were clearly qualified to do. It's crickets compared to capturing a nuclear power plant or an icebreaker. --Document hippo (talk) 23:52, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

You are welcome!

Note that Soldatov and Borogan only say that FSB has failed to "counteract this speculation with convincing evidence of what did happen in Ryazan".

--Document hippo (talk) 15:38, 27 December 2019 (UTC)

If there's any duplication at all, the second paragraph is much more specific in terms of criticism, so it's that which should stay. Let's remove the first paragraph if you believe there's duplicating content.

--Document hippo (talk) 17:40, 19 September 2019 (UTC)

I am busy now, but you should read this. My very best wishes (talk) 03:40, 20 September 2019 (UTC)

• A couple of recent English language refs [11], [12]. Last one, this is 2nd source I see which makes analogy with Reichstag fire... My very best wishes (talk)

OK, I will be back to edit this page when I have more time. My very best wishes (talk) 02:19, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

The book by Max Abrahms

Here is what his book say on the subject [13]. There are different ways to summarize it, but the text is mostly about the influence of the bombings on the public opinion in Russia, rather than anything else. Main point by author: this terrorism act has changed the public opinion in Russia dramatically against the Chechen (which is an indisputable fact). Therefore, according to the author, the bombings by the Chechen perpetrators led to the loss of the independence by Chechnya precisely at the moment when the de facto independence has been already achieved after the Khasavyurt Accord. Which suppose to prove the central idea by the book that terrorism is inefficient in general. As author (who only recently defended his thesis) tells himself [14], he wants to dispute "the prevailing view within the field of political science ... that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy." However, books that I read (e.g. about Narodnaya Volya) say that the terrorist organizations did not really wanted to coerce anyone, but to damage their enemy (e.g. the Russian Empire), and that is exactly what they did in a number of cases as a matter of fact (so that terrorism, just like the guerilla warfare, is a highly efficient method of destruction, but not coercion). And in that particular case, author choose to forget a number of important and highly relevant facts (as described in other mainstream sources on the subject), and every case is different from others. For example, no one is saying seriously that Reichstag fire was something similar to 9/11. However, it took me one minute to find this source by Masha Gessen (who knows Russian subjects much better than Abrahms) and who does compare the Reichstag fire with Russian apartment bombings. My very best wishes (talk) 17:31, 9 December 2019 (UTC)

I noticed that you dropped the relevant page numbers (pp. 80-81) from the citation in your edit, presumably because you didn't have access to them. While those pages may not be readily accessible on Google Books, that is no basis to remove content sourced to a major academic expert on terrorism sight unseen. Furthermore, while Abrahms may have said some other things about the effect of the bombings on Russian public opinion elsewhere in the same book, that does not refute the point made on the page numbers cited previously. Turning to the source:

Since the bombings, a conspiracy theory has circulated that the Federal Security Services framed the Chechens to build support for a counteroffensive. ... Civilian attacks are so counterproductive for the organization that often people conclude its members couldn't have committed them. When civilians are killed, conspiracy theories flourish of a so-called false flag attack, whereby suspicion falls on the government for surreptitiously carrying out the violence in the name of the group in order to weaken it. ... In Algeria [for example], the GIA's indiscriminate violence was so self-defeating for the group that many observers thought the bloodshed was perpetrated by its political enemies. ... But the false flag allegation arose because the civilian attacks hurt the GIA—not because of any evidence its opponents did them. ... Ever since the September 1999 apartment bombings backfired so spectacularly against the Chechens, observers have likewise speculated that the attacks must have been carried out by the Russian government.—Source: Abrahms, Max (2018). Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History. Oxford University Press. pp. 70, 80–81. ISBN 9780192539441.

In sum, Abrahms considers the narrative that you have used this article to propagate a "conspiracy theory" similar to the "false flag" conspiracy theories that consistently arise after virtually every major incident of terrorist violence around the world. He states that such theories tend to be based on the fallacy that since terrorism usually backfires, the perpetrators must be the actual beneficiaries of terrorist violence, which are almost invariably governments rather than terrorist organizations. By quoting another part of the book demonstrating that the apartment bombings empowered hardliners in the Russian government and omitting this sourced context on the pretext that it is not readily accessible on Google Books, you left readers with the misleading impression that Abrahms confirms the theory of Russian culpability in the bombings, when his point was the opposite: Even granting that the bombings hardened Russian sentiments against Chechen aspirations, it is still a fallacy to assume on that basis that the Russian government must have engineered this outcome. I'm sure that now that your good faith error has been pointed out and the relevant excerpts provided to you on this talk page that you will drop your insistence on reversing Abrahms's thesis and accept this single line of criticism in an article that is already (due largely to your own efforts) 99% weighted in favor of the alternative narrative, as 100% control isn't really necessary to advance your objectives on Wikipedia.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 09:30, 12 December 2019 (UTC)

"it is still a fallacy to assume on that basis that the Russian government must have engineered...". Yes, sure, none of the sources I read assume it on that basis, although this is something to consider. The reasons for assuming it are completely different. I wonder why Abrahms decided that any of the alleged (by the FSB) bombers were Chechens or affiliated with Chechen government. Any refs he gives? My very best wishes (talk) 04:29, 13 December 2019 (UTC)

So, it appears that Abrahms tells one thing on pages 61-64 (that portion is accessible online and something I cited), but something else on pages 80-81 (that portion is not accessible online and something you cited). So perhaps one might include the both claims. However, Abrahms is not anyone even remotely notable (we do not even have a page about him and can not create one per WP:GNG) and not an expert on subjects related to Russia. Hence citing him a lot would be definitely undue. Therefore, I suggest a compromise short version that includes both claims and support the central thesis of his book (see below). Note that you need consensus to include new materials per WP:BRD. Per WP:BRD, please do not restore the new and disputed material until we can agree about new version here, on talk. My very best wishes (talk) 16:30, 12 December 2019 (UTC)

Here is my suggested version:

Max Abrahms, a researcher who is critical of the efficacy of terrorism in general, argued that the bombings were detrimental for the self-determination of Chechnya. He noted that the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria has achieved a de facto independence from Russia after the Khasavyurt Accord, with two thirds of Russian citizens favoring the separation of the breakaway republic. However, the public opinion in Russia has changed dramatically after the bombings. Most Russians started "baying for blood" and strongly supporting the war with Chechnya that became inevitable and led to the loss of the independence as a result of the bombings. According to Abrahms, this supports his theory that attacks by terrorist organizations were always counterproductive for the perpetrators, counterproductive to a such degree that they gave rise to conspiracy theories about different perpetrators who benefited from the events

If you think something should be changed or added to clarify his position, please suggest it. Note that even saying "Chechen perpetrators" would be incorrect because none of the alleged perpetrators was a Chechen even according to the official version. And speaking on the essence of the claim, the interpretation by Abrahms does not make any sense simply because none of the perpetrators (according to the official Russian state/FSB version!) has been affiliated with Chechen government or other Chechen forces, but with Arab militants. Author is simply trying to bend the facts to fit his own "theory" of inefficient terrorism, which is a "minority view" if not "fringe" (he tells himself [15], that he wants to dispute "the prevailing view within the field of political science ... that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy.") My very best wishes (talk) 17:07, 12 December 2019 (UTC)

I want to reinstate the version written by TheTimesAreAChanging here[16]. I don't see why we would use My very best wishes's version, since it completely omits the central points that Abrahms is trying to convey regarding the bombings. Unquestionably, Max Abrahms is a reputable scholar, and his view should be included in the way that TheTimesAreAChanging recommended. Worldlywise (talk) 01:39, 13 December 2019 (UTC)

That was explained just above. The central point by the Abrahms in general [17]], by the book, and by the text in question [18] is that attacks by terrorist organizations were always counterproductive (did not achieve the intended purpose). I think that is incorrect view, but that is what source tells. I suggested a compromise version. Now let's wait for response from TTAAC. My very best wishes (talk) 03:38, 13 December 2019 (UTC)

I've read pages 80-81 of the book by Max Abrahms and have observed that the statement by TheTimesAreAChanging ([19]) correctly reflects the point made by Abrahms on the said pages. In principle, one might want to exclude other page numbers from the reference to prevent confusion. Other than that, I want to reinstate the version by TheTimesAreAChanging.

As regards the preceding discussion, I would only note that while the "Chechens" might be not a precise moniker for the group of terrorists who perpetrated the attack, it's not our problem but that of Max Abrahms. Let other scholars criticize him in that regard if they wish so. Doing so ourselves on the pages of Wikipedia, however, would be Wikipedia:Synth.

The criticism by Max Abrahms makes sense in the context of this article, because currently the article implies that "Chechens" (broadly defined; of course we understand that they were not the Government of the Chechen Republic and not the civilian population, but rogue Arab warlords who used Chechnya as a safe haven for their jihad against the infidels, i.e. Russians) were a victim, rather than the aggressor — which is precisely the trope Abrahms argues is shared among the various conspiracy theories of "false flag" operations. --Document hippo (talk) 21:49, 6 February 2020 (UTC)

Obviously, I stand by my previous comments and do not see any justification for excluding a single short reference to a notable OUP academic critical of the predominant slant of this article, certainly not on the basis of any second-guessing of said academic's analysis by a Wikipedia editor with strong views on this topic (which amounts to mere original research). Now that there is no longer a dispute about the actual contents of Abrahms 2018, My very best wishes seems to have no recourse other than to assert a lack of consensus for inclusion, but with Document hippo weighing in there are now three editors that have expressed support for it, with only My very best wishes opposed.TheTimesAreAChanging (talk) 18:37, 7 February 2020 (UTC)

I've reintroduced the criticism by Max Abrahms, following the most recent revision by TheTimesAreAChanging. Hope this helps. --Document hippo (talk) 10:43, 13 March 2020 (UTC)

That was fully explained and directly cited just above in this thread. My very best wishes (talk) 01:29, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

As I've said before, the argument provided by TheTimesAreAChanging relies on pages 80-81 of Abrahms.

Naturally, the point which Abrahms made on pages 61-64, 70 (and which you apparently relied on), does not contradict his point on pages 80-81. Both could be included.

--Document hippo (talk) 06:03, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

• This is very simple. Here is claim by the source. Was my text/summary a fair summary of the claims by the source as they appear in the link? Yes, more or less. If you want to improve it further, pleased do. Was your version [20] a fair summary of the text as it appears in the link? No, not at all. My very best wishes (talk) 20:54, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

The point of that section is criticism of the conspiracy theory. I believe that my or that by TheTimesAreAChanging version correctly summarizes claims on pages 80-81 which are relevant in terms of criticism. However, for completeness and to provide the context, I have also included your version which correctly summarizes claims on pages 60-64 and 70.

--Document hippo (talk) 21:28, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

No, the entire book (and this section of the book) by Abrams is not about conspiracy theories. It is about the idea by Max Abrahms that terrorism in general is inefficient (for terrorists). Therefore, both me and TTAAC start it from the same: "Max Abrams, a researcher who is critical of the efficacy of terrorism in general...". But one should simply follow link above to the book to see that my summary was correct. (In my opinion, Max Abrams was wrong. For example, 911 was "success" for the terrorists (looking from their perspective), because they did enormous damage to the USA, and not only during the terrorist act, but by involving it to the Iraq invasion and other affairs. But that is what Abrams claims in his book. We only say what RS say.).My very best wishes (talk) 04:28, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Your summary was correct. And the summary by TheTimesAreAChanging was correct. That's why the both are included. --Document hippo (talk) 05:43, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

WP:SYNTH

This edit by user My Very Best Wishes is WP:SYNTH.

The article by David Satter (which is the first reference in the edit) says in the lead that "The 1999 Russian apartment bombings were the greatest political provocation since the burning of the Reichstag." Alright.

However, the rest of the paragraph quotes the essay by Masha Gessen, who is far less sure that the bombings were a political provocation. Actually, Masha Gessen said that in the referenced article that

“ It is certainly too early to exonerate Putin and the FSB for the apartment bombings, but the Russian autocrat may eventually be proved to have simply seized an opportunity, as he has done many times since. For now, though, we do not know enough, and this paucity of information, too, is one of the signs of an autocracy. ”

--Document hippo (talk) 06:52, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

No. Here is the source, an article by Masha Gessen, and it tells:

"Fear has a way of catapulting citizens into the inside of a lie. Following the apartment-building bombings of 1999, Russians huddled together, forming neighborhood patrols, eyeing strangers and neighbors alike with suspicion, and then threw their support behind the recently appointed prime minister, Vladimir Putin. ... Over the years many Russians, including me, have come to believe that the apartment-building bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were organized and carried out by the FSB, the intelligence agency, in order to shore up Putin’s power grab."

That is what source tells, and that is what I have cited, word to word, with "...". This is not WP:SYN. I am also really surprised why would anyone regard this as a copyvio. This is brief quotation. As per Acceptable use, "Brief quotations of copyrighted text may be used to illustrate a point, establish context, or attribute a point of view or idea.". That is what I did. Perhaps I should use a better template like "Quotation2". OK, will do. P.S. I do agree that the article by Gessen can be easily misinterpreted and therefore cited it directly, and cited several phrases, not just one, to make sure that the idea by the author was reflected correctly. My very best wishes (talk) 20:12, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

What you cited out of context is a part of a large paragraph in the source which starts from "When we talk about the Reichstag fire..." and involves the murder of Kirov, etc. We can't cite directly this whole para (that indeed would be a copyvio), however, if you can briefly summarize it (I can not), you are welcome to do it and include. My very best wishes (talk) 21:14, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

The full quotation is:

“ Over the years many Russians, including me, have come to believe that the apartment-building bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were organized and carried out by the FSB, the intelligence agency, in order to shore up Putin’s power grab. There has never been a transparent and satisfying investigation of the blasts, but the available evidence stacks up in favor of this theory.

When we talk about the Reichstag fire, we speak not only about an event that precipitates a state of exception and launches coercive national mobilization but also of a conspiracy. Many Germans were certain that the Reichs­tag fire was set by the Nazis themselves. So much evidence supported this theory that for decades after the Second World War a Nazi conspiracy was the historians’ consensus. During the same period, it was generally accepted that the Kirov murder was a secret-police assassination. But when all the available information on the Kirov murder was excavated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was no proof to back up the conspiracy theory: It is now believed that Kirov was killed by his assistant’s jealous husband. In the 1960s, reporting cast doubt on the theory that the Nazis burned down the Reichstag, but in the 1990s, a new wave of evidence suggested they may have been involved after all. Historians continue to debate the issue. (A young Dutch Communist was apprehended at the scene, tried, and sentenced to death by beheading.) It is certainly too early to exonerate Putin and the FSB for the apartment bombings, but the Russian autocrat may eventually be proved to have simply seized an opportunity, as he has done many times since. For now, though, we do not know enough, and this paucity of information, too, is one of the signs of an autocracy.

”

Masha Gessen says the lack of information makes her believe in the theory of FSB involvement in the bombings. However, when more information becomes available, it might appear that Putin and FSB had nothing to do with the bombings.

It's a distinctly different view from that of David Satter. Those two views should not appear in the same paragraph to avoid confusion among readers.

--Document hippo (talk) 21:23, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Yes, this if full quotation of one of the paragraphs (and possibly a copyright violation by you). What I cited was a different part of the article. As I said, if you can briefly summarize this big para, and we can include your summary, along with my direct quotation above. My very best wishes (talk) 21:29, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Masha Gessen believes in the conspiracy theory, but also realizes that she might be wrong, because what causes her to believe so is the lack of information.

I don't think that a quotation is necessary. Or that Masha Gessen's opinion deserves to be discussed in the article. Basically it's an elaborate way of saying "I don't know".

--Document hippo (talk) 21:40, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

No, she only tells this is not proven at this point. Did her views deserve to be included on the page? I would say yes, because she is an expert on Russian affairs, and we have a big page Masha Gessen. Did view by Max Abrahms deserve to be included? I would say no because we do not even have a page about him, he is only known as an author of a book, and not even about Russian affairs, but about terrorism in general. My very best wishes (talk) 22:02, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Which is not proven? That Putin blew up the apartment building blocks, or that Khattab did?

Gessen abstains from adopting any responsibility whatsoever.

Her article was not written to make a point. It was written to entertain.

--Document hippo (talk) 22:21, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

In your quotation, she tells (a) "It is certainly too early to exonerate Putin and the FSB for the apartment bombings [meaning it well could be they did it], (b) "but the Russian autocrat may eventually be proved to have simply seized an opportunity" [this is less clear because she does not explain what an "opportunity", exactly, he seized], and (c) there is not enough information to make a definitive conclusion at this point. My very best wishes (talk) 22:33, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Gessen compares the bombings to Reichstag fire (in which case there was a government conspiracy), and to Kirov murder (in which case there was no conspiracy). She says that either comparison could turn out to be true in the end.

--Document hippo (talk) 22:49, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Also note that she did not mention Khattab. Why? Because she, along with most others, does not consider the "Russian government version" seriously. Come on. This "government" version has not been even reliably published (as one RFE/RL sources emphasizes). The page uses this source. Is it even an RS? I am sure it would be rejected on WP:RSNB. And no, the consensus [of historians] view about the murder of Kirov is that it was arranged by Stalin (but that belong to other pages). My very best wishes (talk) 22:33, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

Indeed, a lot of people including myself are dissatisfied with the apparent lack of transparency on the part of the Russian state.

I do believe in the official version of the events, though. Yulia Latynina did an impressive amount of work to show that the conspiracy theory is wrong. I wonder, why the article doesn't cite her.

--Document hippo (talk) 23:11, 14 March 2020 (UTC)

• "an impressive amount of work"? Are you kidding? She is writing an opinion piece in "ej" to disprove a well known article by Scott Anderson (novelist) - that one, and she did not even mentioned anything by Satter or the events in Ryzan (first author and key fact on the subject). If anything, this proves the worst suspicions about her. My very best wishes (talk) 03:42, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Not kidding. I was impressed. But I do realize that it looks different to you.

Perhaps she didn't mention Satter or Ryazan, because they were not germane to her point.

--Document hippo (talk) 09:15, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Well, I do not mind including anything assuming that: (a) it was published (not self-published) in a secondary RS, (b) the author is an expert on the subjevt, and (c) the claims from a source were summarized correctly. In the case of Latynina, I think we had problems with (a) and (b). Her personal views on a variety of subjects are obviously her own and hugely controversial, to say this politely. My very best wishes (talk) 00:20, 15 March 2020 (UTC)

As regards (b), Litvinenko was an FSB operative, Felshtinsky is a historian, David Satter is a journalist and a historian, Alex Goldfarb is a microbiologist... There should be nothing wrong with Latynina who is a prominent Russian journalist. As regards (a) Indeed, self-published content does not belong to Wikipedia. However, I'm specifically speaking about this article which appeared in a Russian opposition media outlet, which is not self-published.

--Document hippo (talk) 07:44, 15 March 2020 (UTC)

The book State Building in Putin’s Russia by Brian Taylor, Professor and Chair of Political Science is interesting.

Taylor says that there's too little evidence to decide which version of the bombings is correct. Yet, he acknowledges several "good reasons" to doubt the conspiracy version. First, while the bombings did propel Putin to power, in and of itself it is not the evidence that this was the goal of the attacks. Second, the invasion of Dagestan as well as the multiple kidnappings in the region provided a sufficient casus belli even without the bombings. Third, a key problem with the conspiracy version is the number of bombings. One or two bombings in Moscow would have been more than adequate to justify a new war. Fourth, the conspiracy version suggests considerable confidence that a plot involving multiple players in and out of government could be kept secret, which seems dubious.

--Document hippo (talk) 11:28, 15 March 2020 (UTC)

Why did they (the Mafia state) needed the bombings if the invasion of Dagestan was enough for the casus belli, and why did they do so many bombings? Because they needed to incite real fear and to change the public opinion in Russia, as has been noted in numerous sources, included the article by Masha Gessen (one that you just removed from the page), and according even to the book by Max Abrams (see section just above), one that you refuse to properly summarize. My very best wishes (talk) 04:06, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

I see that you disagree with Taylor. But to my knowledge he is the first researcher to frame it as a quantitative question. Do the sources you mention specify why the four bombings were required, while one or two would have been insufficient (and why)?

--Document hippo (talk) 05:42, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

The publications by Gessen and Abrams note this very briefly and do not discuss such details. However, this publication (RFE/RL) tells the following (Google translation from Russian):

Immediately after the explosions, law enforcement analysts calculated the time needed for "calculating the plan of the houses, going to the place, adjusting the calculations, determining the optimal composition of the explosives, ordering them to be made, ... renting the premises, bringing in the bombs, etc." All this required 4–4.5 months. This means that the decision to prepare terrorist attacks was made in April-early May 1999 ... It can be assumed that it was then in someone’s mind that a plan matured that envisioned the start of a new war in Chechnya and a series of terrorist attacks - events that would introduce state of emergency and cancel the election. It is no coincidence that on September 24 Patrushev said: “exercises” were being prepared not only in Ryazan, but also in several other cities. After the president resigns, the prime minister automatically becomes his temporary successor. But it is well known that there is nothing more permanent than temporary... It seems that the explosions in Moscow and Volgodonsk were the beginning of the implementation of this plan, but after the scandal with the "exercises" in Ryazan it had to be canceled. The former governor of Krasnoyarsk, who was not afraid of anything, General Lebed, stated that the terrorist attacks were based on an agreement between the Russian authorities and Shamil Basayev.

I hope that answers your question. My very best wishes (talk) 16:03, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Thanks for bringing up that argument. Unfortunately, it doesn't answer the question why four bombings in different cities—rather than one or two in Moscow—were presumably required to justify a new war. --Document hippo (talk) 16:27, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Indeed, the KGB committed only two smaller bombings in Moscow in 1977, but that's because they had a smaller goal, i.e. framing a group of "Armenian nationalists", rather than staring a war within the country. Starting such war is a big deal. One needs to incite a lot of fear to the population, which did happen, as Gessen, Abrams and other authors do note. But there are different views in RS about it. For example, according to another publication in RFE/RL by Dmitri Volchek [21], it did not really matter how many buildings they would blow (Google translate, corrected)

We were interested in the following question in 2001 and later: did Putin knew about the planned terrorist attacks (operations by the special services). We answered to it positively in 2001. And this confidence has not weakened over the years. Putin headed the FSB until mid-August 1999. He then became Prime Minister. The attacks occurred in September. There is evidence from Sergei Stepashin, the former director of the FSK, that the invasion of Chechnya was prepared in advance and would have occurred even if the attacks had not taken place in September. In other words, the attacks were an auxiliary operation, not the main one. The main thing was staring the war in Chechnya.

My very best wishes (talk)

That's Taylor's point. One or two explosions would work just as fine as four as a pretext for the war. Why to perpetrate extra bombings and risk failing the entire operation? --Document hippo (talk) 17:09, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Well, the last source [22] cites David Satter where he implies that Putin did not have enough popular support after blowing the buildings in Buynaksk by the GRU team, so he had to dispatch the FSB team in Moscow: "Declassified documents in the United States indicate that on September 8, Yeltsin has tried to convince Clinton that Putin, who then had 2% support, would become president of Russia. And the next day the building on Guryanova Street was blown up." My very best wishes (talk) 17:28, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Taylor's point is that blowing up one or two buildings in Moscow would be more than adequate as a pretext for a war. Why to bother with Buynaksk and other cities? --Document hippo (talk) 17:38, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

If I remember correctly, according to sources like books by Felshtinsky and Pribylovsky, they started from Buynaksk because it was much easier to do in Bynaksk than in Moscow. Note that they acted differently in Byinaksk, i.e. placed much larger amounts of explosives in a truck outside the building. Therefore, housands people received serious Concussion. They did not repeat this in Moscow. My very best wishes (talk) 18:14, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Alright, but just blowing up one or two buildings in Moscow would provide the justification for a war, as Taylor points out. Why to bother blowing up Buynaksk at all? --Document hippo (talk) 18:19, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Because they started from Buynaksk as an easier target, as the chronology of the events show. My very best wishes (talk) 18:24, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

Yes, we know the bombings happened that way. The question is, if the bombings were organized by Putin and FSB, why didn't they just blow up one or two buildings in Moscow and have a wonderful pretext for a war in Chechnya? --Document hippo (talk) 18:27, 16 March 2020 (UTC)

"Two narratives"

This edit (summary). According to one "narrative" (one that appears in all sources I read), the bombing were prevented because Gochiaev called to police and said where the additional devices were located. Who called and how the bombs were located according to another "narrative"? My very best wishes (talk) 02:58, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

Estate agents who have rented the warehouse at Borisovskiye Prudy street in Moscow to Gochiyaev (known to them as "Laipanov") have called the police and informed it about the location he rented. [23]

Document hippo (talk) 10:15, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

This is an editorial in Kommersant published during the bombings (on 24.09.1999). Well, maybe they all called, and there is no contradiction? Any way, this source does not dispute the claim by Gochiyaev. In cases like that one needs a good secondary source published long after the events, and this is book Death of a Dissident by Alexander Goldfarb (biologist). It tells Achemez Gochiyayev did call. My very best wishes (talk) 15:46, 14 December 2019 (UTC)

I restored old version, with modifications. You need to have something better than editorial in Kommersant published during the events to justify an alternative fringe "narrative". My very best wishes (talk) 17:25, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

I object. What's fringe about Kommersant?

To anyone who might be following our discussion, I would just clarify that Kommersant is basically Russian New York Times in terms of influence and reliability. --Document hippo (talk) 18:51, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

No, Kommersant is absolutely not NYT in terms of reliability. And even a single editorial from NYT to justify something that contradicts claims in good books would not be sufficient. My very best wishes (talk) 19:21, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

In terms of U.S. news, indeed. In term of Russian news, Kommersant is one of the top five national newspapers, that's what I've tried to convey.

Why do you think there's a contradiction? As you have quite wisely remarked, it's possible that both Gochiyaev and estate agents have alerted the police after the September 13 explosion on Kashirskoye Highway.

--Document hippo (talk) 19:27, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

This is an important claim that seems to contradict the claim in the book by Goldfarb and other sources (hence you said "two [alternative] narratives"). If you can find some additional sources (better than an editorial in Kommersant during the events), then we can probably include it. There are plenty of good sources on this subject. I am kind of busy now though.My very best wishes (talk) 17:26, 16 December 2019 (UTC)

Stavitsky's book also contains a claim that the Moscow bombings since September 13 were prevented in part due to a tip from a frightened real estate agent: [24]. One of the book's publishers is the FSB public relations centre, so it's an official FSB account. That warrants a discussion in this article. --Document hippo (talk) 20:12, 31 March 2020 (UTC)