Talk:Remilitarisation of the Rhineland

Preventative War

Hm.. was the idea of preventive war discussed before? I mean, there is no decisive evidence that Poland suggested France the preventive war against Germany... but most of historians I read agreed that there was such proposal.. Should it be added, what do you think? My sources are exclusively Polish, though :) Szopen (talk) 14:30, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

I think they are discussed in Józef Piłsudski and German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, with some refs.--_{Piotr Konieczny aka Prokonsul Piotrus| talk} 07:22, 18 February 2008 (UTC)

this is not quite enough information to argue on a topic, —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.87.145.46 (talk) 01:26, 15 November 2010 (UTC)

First, the rightist governments/ military dictators in the new territory of Poland were busy massacring "minorities", which were the orignal population before in large areas of the new Polish territory. Then, focus was on invading Belarus and Ukraine, killing about 2 million of the Ukrainian population... Later, the racist Polish elite signed sectret treaties with Hitler, mainly on being helped out at the end of their Ukrainian war and the troubles created by their invasion. Around 1936, the racist Polish elite decided to do more massacres on individuals belonging to various minorities in Poland such as Ukrainians, Hugarians, Jews, Germans, Slovenes... Later on, when the ethnic cleansing was suceeding in most areas, they tried to expand their territory again and invaded the city of Danzig. The colonial powers France and Britan approved this more or less, at least they kept on protecting the racist Polish elite and kept on sending weapons. In that time, the racist Polish elite tried everything to get France into a war against fascist Hitler Germany. Nevertheless, the Polish government organized a pogrom on Jews in Poland at the same date and in accordance to the "Pogromnacht" Nazi-pogrom in November 1938 139.139.67.69 (talk) 10:01, 26 August 2011 (UTC)

Massacres? You'll need some solid RS's to support anything like that happened.50.111.44.55 (talk) 00:08, 14 June 2021 (UTC)

Clean-Up

I don’t mean to sound rude, but some of the information contained in this page about France and the Rhineland crisis is seriously wrong. To begin, this page speaks of French troops being in the Rhineland in 1936. That is absolutely false. The French occupied the Rhineland from 1918 until 1930. The last French soldiers were pulled out in June 1930, so I really don't understand how this page can speak of the following: "So long as the French Army occupied the Rhineland, the economically important Ruhr industrial area was liable to French invasion if France believed the situation in Germany ever became a threat.". What the page should say is that as long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, then the French could easily occupy the Ruhr, which is a little different matter from speaking of French soldiers being the Rhineland six years after the last of them left. Then there is the fact that this page uses an unnamed book by William L. Shirer as a source, which is either The Collapse of the Third Republic (1969) or The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960). The problem with both books is that Shirer wrote his books in the 1950s-1960s before the French achieves were opened in the 1970s, and thus Shirer didn’t really know what the French government was thinking at the 1930s. Given that the French achieves have been open since the 1970s, I would prefer if we were to use some books that about French reactions to the Rhineland crisis that are based on primary sources as opposed to Shirer’s books, which he essentially just offers up his own assumptions and opinions about what drove French conduct. The claim that France was “psychologically unprepared” to use force against Germany, presumably because of memories of World War I, is rather silly when one remembers that French went ahead and occupied the Ruhr in 1923. 1923 was only 5 years after the end of the First World War, so if the French were so traumatized by their Great War experiences that they ““psychologically” incapable of marching against Germany in 1936 (18 years after the war’s end), how does one explain the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923?

Second, the statement by Hitler about having to ”…to withdraw with our tails between our legs” is an attempt by Hitler to show how brave and daring he was in his foreign policy, and how “providence” worked to his advantage. It was an important part of Hitler’s image that in some vague way, he was being guided by some sort of supernatural force. To promote this image, Hitler liked to make statements about how despite how the odds were all against him, somehow “providence” worked to his aid. I really do wish that historians be somewhat more critical about intreprating Hitler’s remarks because much of which he had to say was concerned about promoting his image as man guided by “providence” and "destiny". Just as an aside, in this light about Hitler’s image building that one should interpret his story about having his “vision” at the Pasewalk hospital in November 1918 in which some sort of supernatural power revealed to Hitler his “mission” to save Germany, a ridiculous story that still impresses some of the less scholarly biographies of Hitler. I am going probably going somewhat off topic, but this story about the vision is absurd for the following reasons:

• Despite having his alleged “vision” in 1918, Hitler did not see fit to mention to anyone until 1921, and then only at time when has asserting his leadership over the Nazi Party, where surprise, surprise, the story about the “vision” was used to buttress his claim to leadership.
• Even through Hitler had received his “mission” in November 1918, all of the known facts suggest it was not until the fall of 1919 that Hitler decided upon a political career, and in the months immediately following the Armistice Hitler really didn’t know what he wanted to do with his life.
• Hitler denied his “vision” story when asked about it while on trial in 1924 following the Munich Beerhall Putsch, presumably because to state something like that in court would make him look silly.

My point is that Hitler often rearranged the facts of his life in such a way to support the image of himself that he wanted to see promoted, namely that of a “Savior”, a messianic figure on a mission from some sort of supernatural power to “save” Germany. After the fact, Hitler could say about how if the French moved, he would have been forced to withdraw, but the orders given to German troops marching into the Rhineland stated that if the French were to march in, they were to resist and stage a fighting retreat. As early as October 1933, the German Defence Ministry directives stated if the French moved into the Rhineland, then the German response would be to sent in troops to stage a fighting retreat (Robertson, E.M. Hitler's Pre-War Policy and Military Plans, Longmans: London, United Kingdom, 1963 pages 25-26). What Hitler is trying to say here is that the odds against him in 1936 were so overwhemling, and yet the fact that he triumphed proved that "providence" was guiding him because he was a "man of destiny". Historians who say that if the French moved in 1936, then Hitler would have been forced to withdraw ingloriously based on a single after the fact remark by Hitler are seriously wrong. If the French responded to the German move by marching into the Rhineland, the almost certain result would have been a Franco-German war. If French soldiers marched into Germany, and German soldiers started shooting at them, it is very hard to see how events would not have escalated into a Franco-German war.

Moreover, the uncorroborated claim of General Heinz Guderian that if the French had marched in 1936, then the result have been the overthrow of the Nazi regime, is to put it bluntly shows that somebody is not being as critical as they should be in evaluating historical sources. After the war, various Wehrmacht generals developed an entire genre of historical fiction masquerading as fact in they explained how despite fighting very hard for Hitler for six long years, they were really actually opposed to Hitler and everything he stood for. In actual truth of the matter is despite they were claimed after the war, both before and during the war, the overwhelming majority of the German military leadership were for Hitler and everything he stood for, and were more then happy to spill the blood of innocents for the sake of their beloved Führer. Given the way in which German generals such as Guderian lied systematically after 1945 about what they were doing under National Socialism, I would argue that using the words of a German General is rather like using David Irving as a source, namely a source that is so unreliable that it ought not to be used at all. From the viewpoint of Guderian, it is very convenient to say after the fact that if only the French moved, then the German Army would rise up and overthrown the Nazi regime, thereby by this subtle shift of hand, transferring responsibility about why Germans did not overthrow the Nazis from the Germans onto the French. This version about Hitler was not overthrown is so convenient towards the German side that it really ought to give one pause. There is no sign that anybody in the German Army ever considered the idea of overthrowing Hitler in the event of a French move into the Rhineland in 1936; even General Ludwig Beck, the chief of General Staff, who later become involved in plots against Hitler made it very clear during the Rhineland crisis via his voluminous memos that was behind Hitler 100% in 1936. All of the historical evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of the Wehrmacht was behind the Nazi regime in 1936 just as the Wehrmacht was to stay loyal to the Nazi regime under far more adverse conditions later during World War II. The idea of the Wehrmacht as a bastion of anti-Nazism is a myth pure and simple. The Wehrmacht would not have overthrown the Nazis in 1936 any more then it would overthrown the Nazis in any other time because the overwhelming majority of the German officer corps were supporters of the regime 110%.

Which brings me to the next point. In a major essay "France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936" about the French reaction to the Rhineland remilitarization published in 1986 in the French Historical Studies and reprinted in the 1997 book The Origins of the Second World War edited by Patrick Finney by the American historian Stephen Schuker, and based upon French primary sources, Schuker was able to established a number of points. First, the French Army was much weaker then what contemporary opinion believed, for it was not in the French interest to advertise their weaknesses. In the early 1930s, under the impact of the Great Depression, successive governments had cut the military budget, so that by 1936, the French Army was far weaker then one the French liked to pretend in public (Schuker, Stephen"France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936" from The Origins of the Second World War pages 208-211). Second, Schuker established that in the event of a war with Germany, and it would have been a war if the French had marched into the Rhineland, would meant the full mobilization of the French Army, which would have cost 30 million francs/per day (Schuker, Stephen"France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936" from The Origins of the Second World War pages 215-216). In 1936, the French were going through a serious financial crisis, and to put it bluntly, the money to pay for mobilizing the French Army was simply not there. The French Treasury told the government if mobilization was ordered, the result would been the bankruptcy of France. Third, the prospect of war with Germany caused the Rhineland crisis caused a major capital flight of France, which meant there was even less money to pay for the costs of mobilization (Schuker, Stephen "France and the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936" from The Origins of the Second World War pages 217-218). Fourth, as the historian Robert J. Young pointed out in his 1978 book In Command of France, through the French were never serious about mobilizing, they made a great show of pretending that they were about to mobilize. A major aim of the French diplomacy throughout the inter-war period was to secure the “continental commitment” from Britain, that is obtain a British promise to come to France’s aid by sending a large army. In their talks with the British, the French tried to make a trade-off between promising not to mobilize in exchange for the “continental commitment”. So in other words, the French were trying to trade off a promise not to do something that in private they knew they could not afford to do to obtain something that they had desperately wanted since 1919. Until this page brings in some of the information from Schuker’s essay and Young’s book, I am afraid this page offers a very distorted picture of French actions in 1936. --A.S. Brown (talk) 06:02, 1 June 2008 (UTC)

The occupation of the Rhineland was one of the most important factors that brougt Hitler to power. WW-I allies tried their best to strenghen extremism and to discredit and ridicule any German democrat by their criminal and colonial occupation practices. The formal reason French politicians uttered, were 300 telegraph poles that they claimed to be missing. Nothing compared to the large amount of industrial goods (inculding the inventory of factories and railway companies such as steam engines), and it is still not proven that the telegraph poles were really missing... At the Rhineland, the French elite, used to rule by terror in the colonies, implemented colonial terror practices and massacred hundreds of workers that were peacefully refusing to work for the French occupants. 139.139.67.69 (talk) 10:15, 26 August 2011 (UTC)

Again, you've made claims that aren't supported by historical facts.50.111.44.55 (talk) 03:02, 14 June 2021 (UTC)

Very long

This article seems to be approaching the length of a master's thesis. I suggest everybody read Wikipedia:Article size and then come back here to see what can be done about the article's length. Certainly much can be omitted and the reader referred to other WP articles. Thanks. GeorgeLouis (talk) 23:13, 19 March 2015 (UTC)

I agree, and in addition, the paragraphs of the article are themselves very long. It would be easier to read with more paragraph breaks. 173.174.85.204 (talk) 17:02, 7 March 2016 (UTC)Eric

I've made a first attempt at reducing the length and improving the readability of this article. Feel free to revert if I'm off the mark. Given the spaghetti of alliances and treaties among the various powers in this period, just conveying the basic facts in the space of an encyclopedia-length article is difficult enough. Adding in the political and diplomatic back-and-forth adds length that puts it beyond the interest of the general reader. Mikeroetto (talk) 03:17, 1 January 2019 (UTC)

Map displays poorly in Firefox v.37xxx on Win7 laptop

Map national borders [black lines] are incomplete. Also, I question the area of the RL shown in tht map. Most other maps I'v seen show it much larger. 74.60.161.158 (talk) 15:39, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

19 Wehrmacht batallions ?

Obviously, not more than 3 (three) battalions marched in the Rhineland. Who says nineteen ? --129.187.244.28 (talk) 11:20, 15 May 2015 (UTC)

Three battalions would be c. 3,000 men. The invading force was 32,000 men and police. So c. 19 military and police battalions would be about right. Missaeagle (talk) 11:59, 24 June 2018 (UTC)

A Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion

The following Wikimedia Commons file used on this page has been nominated for deletion:

• VonBlomberg.jpg

Participate in the deletion discussion at the nomination page. —Community Tech bot (talk) 19:51, 13 September 2018 (UTC)

Recent revelations

It was discovered quite recently that the new king Edward VIII sent a personal note to Hitler on the day when the troops marched in, reassuring him that Britain would not oppose the occupation of the Rhineland. (Sorry, I have no reference). Valetude (talk) 10:57, 10 June 2019 (UTC)

Mussolini and the blow

Since the Italian article has been badly translated from this article, I stepped in the Mussolini's quote from Dennis Mack Smith's book "Mussolini felt free to engage in all sorts of wild threats of war against Britain from late 1935 onwards and to declare at one point that he rather see the entire world "go up in a blaze" than to stop his invasion." Note: Smith, p. 262.

I got curious about it and I searched among Mussolini's speeches (all available online in Italian). The only partial match I found is with the article of February 1936, but I am not sure.

Probably in Dennis Mack Smith's book there is a reference to the actual speech, which would help me with avoiding a re-translation for Italian Wikipedia.

Please ping me in your reply. Thank you in advance. Avemundi (talk) 16:21, 16 September 2020 (UTC)

Yeah that doesn't look like a very good quote. "Mussolini felt free to engage in all sorts of wild threats of war against Britain from late 1935 onwards and to declare at one point that he [sic]] rather see the entire world "go up in a blaze" than to stop his invasion."

How does anyone know how he felt. And wild threats -- what is "wild"? Mussolin was entirely sane and while he may have often sabre-rattled and pointed out that certain British actions might compel him to war, that is statecraft. "Wild threats" would be threats with no cause or expected benefit. News to me if the Duce did that as a rule. "Go up in a blaze" does not sound like Musso. He shied away from war in 1939. He was an opportunist not a monger of war for the sake of war. So he said it once. But he gave a lot of speeches. I don't think burning the word is a good description of his policy or rhetoric generally. Herostratus (talk) 03:06, 26 August 2024 (UTC)

Biased POV

The article shows preference towards academics that show a very radical approach to the topic, to the point of finalizing the whole article with the following statement: "Weinberg wrote that attitude of the entire German elite and much of the German people was that any new war would only benefit Germany and that ending the Rhineland's demilitarized status could be only a good thing by opening the door to starting a new war. He considered the attitude was extremely short-sighted, self-destructive and stupid, even from a narrowly-German viewpoint". There is no doubt of the irrationality of Nazism, but that's not about Nazism, there's a lot of academics that support the obvious fact that the remilitarization of the Rhineland was favored by most of the German people, political affiliations apart. When you finalize this way the article about a country remilitarizing a part of it's territory you are not only being biased, but you're showing the ineptitude to write separately about facts. The chain of events that happened after that were more related to the bellicose nature of the involved States (Nazi Germany specially, but also the Soviet Union, Britain and France) than the simple fact that Germany wasn't anymore a hostage of France. We have sources that are more centred and dispassionate than Weinberg. I suggest showing a diversified set of academics, to neutralize the effects of such radical sources that use here so many adjectives and even nationally targeted offenses. Sawyersx (talk) 22:18, 30 September 2021 (UTC)