Jump to content

Iraqi–Kurdish conflict

Page extended-protected
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Iraqi-Kurdish conflict)

Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (1919-present)

Kurdish refugees in camps along the Turkey-Iraq border, 1991
Date1919–present
(105 years, 6 months and 4 days)
Location
Status Ongoing
Belligerents

Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922–1924)


KDP
PUK
ICP
INC
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
Supported by:
 Israel (1961–1970)
 Iran (before 1988)
 Syria (1980–1988)


 Iraqi Kurdistan
Enforcing No-Fly Zone per UNSC Resolution 688:


Kurdistan Region Kurdistan Regional Government (2005-present)

Iraq Mandatory Iraq
Supported by:
 United Kingdom (1922–1924)


Iraq Kingdom of Iraq


Iraqi Republic


Iraq Ba'athist Iraq


Iraq Central Government of Iraq (2005-present)
Commanders and leaders

Mahmud Barzanji


Ahmed Barzani


Mustafa Barzani
Idris Barzani
Masoud Barzani
Babakir Zebari
Mahmoud Ezidi 
Jalal Talabani
Ibrahim Ahmad
Ali Askari 
Nawshirwan Mustafa
Kosrat Rasul Ali
Mama Risha 
Uthman Abd-Asis
Ahmed Chalabi
Aziz Muhammad
Iran Mohsen Rezaee
Iran Ali Sayad Shirazi
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

United States John Shalikashvili

Iraq Faisal I of Iraq


Iraq Faisal II of Iraq


Abd al-Karim Qasim Executed
Iraq Abdul Salam Arif Executed
Iraq Abdul Rahman Arif
Iraq Tahir Yahya Executed
Iraq Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr 
Iraq Saddam Hussein Executed
Iraq Ali Hassan al-Majid Executed
Iraq Taha Yassin Ramadan Executed
Iraq Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri
Iraq Tariq Aziz
Iraq Saddam Kamel
Iraq Qusay Hussein 

Iraq Uday Hussein 
Strength

KDP:
15,000–20,000 (1962)[1][2]
6,000 (1970)[3]
50,000-60,000 (1974)[4]
KDP & PUK:
5,000 (1980)[5]
100,000 (1991)[6]

 Iraqi Kurdistan 70,000 (2003)[7]

Iraq Iraqi Armed Forces
48,000 (1969)[8]
90,000 (1974)[8]
180,000 (1978)[9]
300,000 (1980)[10]
1,000,000 (1988)[10]
382,500 (1992)[11]

424,000 (2002)[12]
Casualties and losses
163,800–345,100 killed[a]
Millions of Kurds displaced and turned refugees

The Iraqi–Kurdish conflict consists of a series of wars, rebellions and disputes between the Kurds and the central authority of Iraq starting in the 20th century shortly after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Some put the marking point of the conflict beginning to the attempt by Mahmud Barzanji to establish an independent Kingdom of Kurdistan,[13] while others relate to the conflict as only the post-1961 insurrection by the Barzanis.[14]

Since the US-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent adoption of federalism in 2005 and the recognition of the Kurdistan Region (KRI) as a federal region in the new Iraqi constitution, the number and scope of armed clashes between the central government of Iraq and the Kurds have decreased. In spite of that, however, there are still outstanding issues that continue to cause strife such as the disputed territories of northern Iraq and the right to export oil and gas, leading to occasional disputes and armed clashes. In September 2023, following a series of punitive measures by the central government in Iraq against KRI, Masrour Barzani sent a letter to the President of the United States expressing concerns about a possible collapse of Kurdistan Region, and calling for the United States to intervene. In March 2024, after several court rulings issued against Kurdistan Region by the Supreme Court of Iraq, Kurdish authorities in Iraq expressed dissatisfaction at what they described as an evident shift of the political system in Iraq back towards centralism.

Background

The first chapter of the Iraqi–Kurdish dispute followed the end of World War I and the arrival of British forces. Mahmud Barzanji began secession attempts in 1919 and in 1922 proclaimed the short-lived Kingdom of Kurdistan. Though Mahmud's insurrections were defeated, another Kurdish sheikh, Ahmed Barzani, began to actively oppose the central rule of the Mandatory Iraq during the 1920s. The first of the major Barzani revolts took place in 1931, after Barzani, one of the most prominent Kurdish tribal leaders, succeeded in defeating a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] He ultimately failed and took refuge in Turkey. The next serious Kurdish secession attempt was made by his younger brother Mustafa Barzani in 1943, but that revolt failed as well, resulting in the exiling of Mustafa to Iran, where he participated in an attempt to form the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.

In 1958, the younger Barzani and his fighters returned to Iraq from exile, and an attempt was made to negotiate Kurdish autonomy in the north with the new Iraqi administration of Gen. Abdul Karim Qassim. The negotiations ultimately failed and the First Iraqi–Kurdish War erupted on 11 September 1961,[14] lasting until 1970 and resulting in 75,000–105,000 casualties. Despite the attempts to resolve the conflict by providing Kurds with recognized autonomy in northern Iraq, the negotiations failed in 1974, leading to resumed hostilities known as the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, which resulted in the collapse of the Kurdish militias and the reconquest of northern Iraq by Iraqi government forces. As a result, Mustafa and most of the KDP leadership fled to Iran, while the nascent PUK, led by Jalal Talabani gained power in the vacuum, and lead an insurgency campaign against the central Iraqi government, which eventually also failed. During the period between 1976 and 1977, intra-Kurdish conflict climaxed with KDP and PUK both dealing blows against each other in a string of tit for that raids. The most notable Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in northern Iraq happened in the late 1970s.

The conflict re-emerged as part of the Iran–Iraq War, with the two Kurdish parties collaborating against Saddam Hussein, while receiving military support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. By 1986, the Iraqi government conducted a genocidal campaign known as Al-Anfal, to oust the Kurdish fighters and take revenge on the Kurdish population—an act often described as the Kurdish genocide, with an estimated 50,000–200,000 casualties. The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, in 1991, a series of uprisings happened in the north and south of the country. This, combined with the enforcing of the northern-southern no-fly zones by the United States, United Kingdom and France, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces from parts of northern Iraq, allowed the Kurds to regain control in the north by filling the vacuum. In the mid-1990s the internal conflict between the KDP and PUK erupted once again, resulting in a bloody civil war, with Iraq and Iran supporting both KDP and PUK respectively. The conflict ended in 1997, with the signing of the Washington Agreement.

Another critical event was the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in the toppling of the Ba'athist regime and the adoption of federalism. Despite the constitutional recognition of Kurdistan Region as a federal region in the Republic of Iraq, relations between Kurdistan Region and the Iraqi central government grew strained between 2011 and 2012 due to power-sharing issues and the export of oil. Following the failed Kurdish independence referendum in 2017, as well as the subsequent defeat of the Peshmerga at the hands of the Iraqi armed forces in the 2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Iraq has taken steps to weaken Kurdistan Region and expand its own authorities in order to shift the political dynamics of the country back towards a centralised political system, the one it had before the invasion.

History

Mahmud Barzanji (1919–1924)

Mahmud Barzanji revolts were a series of armed uprisings against the British forces in the newly conquered Mesopotamia and later the British Mandate in Iraq. Following his first insurrection in May 1919, Sheykh Mahmud was imprisoned and eventually exiled to India for a one-year period. When he returned he was once again appointed a governor, but shortly afterwards revolted again and declared himself the ruler of the Kingdom of Kurdistan. The Kingdom of Kurdistan lasted from September 1922 – 1924.[16] With British forces greatly exceeding his in ammunition and training, Barzanji was finally subdued and the region reverted to central British Iraqi rule in 1924. Sheykh Mahmud retreated into the mountains, and eventually reached terms with the independent Kingdom of Iraq in 1932, over his return from the underground. Shaykh Mahmud revolts are considered the first chapter of the modern Iraqi–Kurdish conflict.

1931 Kurdish revolt

Ahmed Barzani revolt refers to the first of the major Barzani revolts, taking place in 1931 after Ahmed Barzani, one of the most prominent Kurdish leaders in Southern Kurdistan, succeeded in unifying a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] The Barzan forces were eventually overpowered by the Iraqi Army with British support, forcing the leaders of Barzan to go underground.

Ahmed Barzani was later forced to flee to Turkey, where he was held in detention and then sent to exile in the south of Iraq. Although initially a tribal dispute, the involvement of the Iraqi government inadvertently led to the growth of Shaykh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa Barzani as prominent Kurdish leaders.[17]

1943 Kurdish revolt

The 1943–1945 Kurdish revolt in Iraq was a Kurdish nationalistic insurrection in the Kingdom of Iraq, during World War II. The revolt was led by Mustafa Barzani and later joined by his older brother Ahmed Barzani, the leader of the previous Kurdish revolt in the Kingdom of Iraq. The revolt, initiating in 1943, was eventually put down by Iraqi military assault in late 1945, combined with the defection of a number of Kurdish tribes. As a result, the Barzanis retreated with much of their forces into Iranian Kurdistan, joining the local Kurdish elements in establishing the Republic of Mahabad.

Negotiations over Kurdish autonomy (1958–1960)

After the military coup by Abdul Karim Qasim in 1958, Mustafa Barzani was invited by new Iraqi President Qasim to return from exile, and was greeted with a "hero's welcome", as a former dissident to the now abolished Iraqi monarchy. As part of the deal arranged between Qasim and Barzani, Qasim promised to give the Kurds regional autonomy in return for Barzani's support for his policies. Meanwhile, during 1959–60, Barzani became the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was granted legal status in 1960.

First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970)

First Iraqi–Kurdish War[18] or Barzani Rebellion was a major event of the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, lasting from 1961 to 1970. The struggle was led by Mustafa Barzani in an attempt to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Throughout the 1960s the uprising escalated into a long war, which failed to resolve despite internal power changes in Iraq. The war ended with a stalemate by 1970, resulting in between 75,000[19] to 105,000 casualties.[20] A series of Iraqi–Kurdish negotiations followed the war in an attempt to resolve the conflict.

Cease-fire (1970–1974)

A Kurdish Autonomy agreement was reached in March 1970 by the Iraqi government and the Kurds, in the aftermath of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War, for the creation of an Autonomous Region, consisting of the three Kurdish governorates and other adjacent districts that have been determined by census to have a Kurdish majority. The plan also gave Kurds representation in government bodies, to be implemented in four years.[21] For its time it was the most serious attempt to resolve the long-running conflict.

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975)

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War was an offensive, led by Iraqi forces against rebel KDP troops of Mustafa Barzani during 1974–75. The war came in the aftermath of the First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–70), as the 1970 peace plan for Kurdish autonomy had failed to be implemented by 1974. Unlike the previous guerilla campaign, waged by Barzani, the 1974 war was an attempt for symmetric warfare against the Iraqi Army, which eventually led to the quick collapse of the Kurds, lacking advanced and heavy weaponry. The war ended with the exile of the Iraqi KDP and between 7,000 and 20,000 deaths on both sides.

Arabization of northern Iraq and PUK insurgency (1976–1979)

The PUK insurgency was a low-level militant campaign by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) against the state of Iraq, after the defeat of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the Second Iraqi–Kurdish War, which forced the KDP organization to declare a ceasefire and move into exile. Due to lack of foreign support, however, the guerrillas were only able to operate in the highest regions of northern Iraq's mountains.[22] The PUK also faced the KDP, the KDPI, led by Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and Iran supporting the Iraqis at various occasions. The insurgency dimmed with the 1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran.

Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in North Iraq were forced displacement and cultural Arabization of minorities (Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, Shabaks, Armenians, Turkmen, Mandeans), in line with settler colonialist policies, led by the Ba'athist government of Iraq from 1960s to early 2000s, in order to shift the demographics of North Iraq towards Arab domination. The Baath party under Saddam Hussein engaged into active expulsion of minorities from the mid-1970s onwards.[23] The campaigns took place during the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, being largely motivated by the Kurdish-Arab ethnic and political conflict.

The policies are sometimes referred as "internal colonialism",[24] described by Francis Kofi Abiew as a "Colonial 'Arabization'" program, including large-scale Kurdish deportations and forced Arab settlement in the region.[25]

Kurdish rebellion during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

Between 1980 and 1988, the conflict intensified as the Iran–Iraq War commenced. One of the groups targeted in particular by Iraqi authorities were the Feyli Kurds, a community of Shi'ite Kurds settled in the southern area of the Zagros Mountains near Iraq's border with Iran. Saddam Hussein considered the group as 'Iranians' and began a campaign to drive the settlers out of the area as a part of his 'Arabization' policy in 1980.,[26] Saddam Hussein was severely critical of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as they aligned forces with Iran in the conflict. In 1983, to avenge this liaison, he ordered the Army to abduct as many as 8,000 men and boys from Erbil province, where the clan of Barzani Kurds was based. Massoud Barzani, the leader of the clan and the KDP, himself lost 37 members of his family to the Iraqi troops. They were reported to having been sent to Nugra Salman prison in the southern deserts of Iraq, where they were tortured. Subsequently, the remains of 512 Barzani men were discovered in a mass grave.[27] On March 16, 1988, Iraqi troops began shelling the Kurdish town of Halabja, in retaliation for an attack on Iraqi positions carried out by Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the aligned Peshmerga fighters. Subsequently, the town was attacked with a mix of chemical substances such as VX (nerve agent), sarin and mustard gas (see Halabja chemical attack). Over 5,000 people are believed to have been killed in the attack, which was considered to be a part of the Al-Anfal Campaign, directed against Kurds by the government under the command of Ali Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau of the Ba'ath Party.[28][29]

1991 Kurdish uprising

On 2 August 1990, Saddam launched a military invasion onto neighboring Kuwait, reportedly due to its vast oil reserves, which would have helped him pay off the debts he owed to other countries during the Iran–Iraq War (see Gulf War). Within 24 hours, the Emir of Kuwait had fled. However, subsequently, an international coalition force consisting of American, British, Saudi and other troops liberated the country in 1991 and Iraqi troops were forced out of Kuwait (see Operation Desert Storm).[30] Subsequently, one month after the Gulf War in February 1991, United States President George H. W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to stage an uprising against Saddam Hussein. This was followed by a series of rebellions in many parts of the country, such as the south by Shi'ite groups such as SCIRI and the Islamic Da'awa Party in what is known as the Sha’ban revolution. Meanwhile, the Kurds in the north staged their own uprising for autonomy, under the leadership of Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. The Peshmerga were trained into hardened guerrillas, who managed to infiltrate the Jash, a Saddam-orientated Kurdish militia (see Jash (term) and National Defense Battalions (Iraq)). The rebels soon managed to capture the town of Ranya, Sulaimaniya and ultimately the oil center of Kirkuk. Saddam retaliated swiftly, battering Kirkuk with artillery and targeting hospitals in particular. Geographically the towns captured by the Kurdish rebels were difficult to defend as they sat on plains below mountains. The rebels were forced to retreat in the mountains, where reportedly the Iraqi helicopters threw flour on them (which was believed to be a grim legacy of the reputed powdery chemical weapons which were used by the Iraqi administration during the Al-Anfal Campaign).[31]

Iraqi no-fly zones

In August 1991, the United States, United Kingdom and France enforced two no-fly zones in Iraq after the latter’s loss in the Gulf War, one in the north and one in the south. This gave the Kurds de-facto autonomy in the north for the first time, and the Shias in the south a sense of security after they had taken part in their own uprising against Saddam, which is referred to as the Sha'ban revolution. The no-fly zones effectively ended with the start of the Iraq war.

The "two-state solution" for the conflict refers to the permanent separation of Kurdish-populated areas from Iraq, as opposed to retaining Iraqi unity within a federal state. It would change the long-term status which has existed in the country following the formation of the Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq in 1991 facilitated by the enforcement of the no-fly zones.[32][33] Another solution that has been proposed is the "three-state solution", dividing the country into three independent states for its three major components: the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds.[34][35]

Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997)

The Iraqi Kurdish Civil War was a military conflict, which took place between rival Kurdish factions in the mid-1990s; that is, between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Over the course of the conflict, Kurdish factions from Iran and Turkey, as well as Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish forces were drawn into the fighting, with additional involvement from the American forces. Between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters and civilians were killed throughout more than 3 years of warfare.

Operation Viking Hammer

Arriving in July 2002 to Iraqi Kurdistan, the CIA seldom worked with the Peshmerga, despite their claim to be on a counterterrorism mission against Ansar al-Islam. To the disappointment of PUK Peshmerga intent on destroying Ansar al-Islam, the true mission of the CIA was to acquire intelligence about the Iraqi government and military. CIA-Peshmerga operations eventually went beyond the scope of intelligence gathering however, as PUK Peshmerga were used to destroy key rail lines and buildings prior to the U.S. attack in March 2003.[36] Following Turkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the Coalition was forced to modify the planned simultaneous attack from north and south.[37] Special Operations forces from the CIA and US Army managed to build and lead the Kurdish Peshmerga into an effective force and assault for the North.

On March 20, 2003, at approximately 02:30 UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:33 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad, signaling the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion. Beginning on 21 March 2003, U.S. forces launched Tomahawk missiles at selected Ansar al-Islam positions throughout the Sargat Valley. In preparation for the ground assault, nicknamed Operation Viking Hammer, American Lt. Col. Tovo divided his forces into six mixed peshmerga-Special Forces units. The peshmerga in two of these teams refused to contribute to the assault for various reasons including having lost too many personnel in previous fighting.[36] The Peshmerga who did fight were once again armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and other assorted weapons.

Despite their well-armed adversaries, during the operation only 24 Peshmerga were killed in the fighting, compared the opposite body count of over 300.[36]

Invasion and occupation of Iraq

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw a full military occupation of the country and the toppling of the Ba'athist regime and the installation of a temporary Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) tasked with administering the country until the issuance of the new constitution as well as the establishment of the new Iraqi government following general elections. In 2004, UN Resolution 1546 stipulated the installation of an interim Iraqi government which succeeded the CPA. In 2005 following months of deliberation and discussions represented by different components of the Iraqi population, the new constitution was issued and voted into effect. The new Iraqi constitution recognized the Kurdistan Region as a “federal region” with its own government and parliament within the Federal Republic of Iraq.[38] The military occupation of Iraq ended in 2011.

2011–2012 tensions

Kurdish flag in the Kurdistan Region

Following the withdrawal of occupational forces from Iraq, tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government mounted through 2011–2012 on the issues of power sharing, oil and gas, and territorial control.[39] In April 2012, the president of Iraq's semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region demanded that officials agree to their demands or face consequences of a secession from Baghdad by September 2012.[40]

In September 2012, the Iraqi government ordered the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to transfer its powers over Peshmerga to the central government and the relations strained further by the formation of a new command center (Tigris Operation Command) for Iraqi forces to operate in a disputed area over which both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claim jurisdiction.[41]

On 16 November 2012, a military clash between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga resulted in one person killed.[41] CNN reported that 2 people were killed (one of them an Iraqi soldier) and 10 wounded in clashes at the Tuz Khurmato town.[42]

On the night of November 19, it was reported that clashes between security forces of the central Iraqi government and the KRG forces in Tigrit left 12 Iraqi soldiers and one civilian dead, according to Doğan news agency.[43] The clash erupted when Iraqi soldiers attempted to enter northern Iraq; Peshmergas tried to prevent the Iraqi soldiers from entering the area upon Barzani's instructions.[43] There was no confirmation of the event.

On November 25, it was reported that Iraqi Kurdistan sent reinforcements to a disputed area, where its troops are "involved in a standoff with the Iraqi army", despite calls on both sides for dialogue to calm the situation.[44]

On December 11, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, dressed in a military uniform, visited Kurdish-controlled areas of Kirkuk, a city long seen as a flashpoint for Arab-Kurdish tensions after the US military withdrawal in December 2011.[45] Following Massoud Barzani's visit of Kurdish troops stationed in the disputed area near Kirkuk, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's party – The State of Law – issued a statement that "the visit of the President of Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani and his son wearing a military helmet to inspect the battlefronts in Kirkuk province is a 'declaration of war' on all Iraqis not only Maliki, and even on President Jalal Talabani".[46]

Kurdistan Region initiates oil exports to Turkey

In late 2013, the Kurdistan Regional Government announced that it had started independent oil exports to Turkey.[47] This came after the Kurdistan Region Parliament enacted its own hydrocarbon law in 2007.[48] The Iraqi central government voiced its disapproval at both actions, and vowed to take legal action after the KRG started exporting oil to Turkey without its consent. Iraq subsequently issued an international arbitration case against Turkey in May 2014, at the International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris.

2014 Northern Iraq offensive

In 2014, Iraqi army units withdrew from large parts of northern Iraq in the face of attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Peshmerga forces took control of Kirkuk and other Kurdish-populated areas outside the official territory of the KRG. Officials in Baghdad were angered by the sale of tankers worth of oil transported through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline.[49]

In November 2016, Amnesty International reported that Kurdish authorities (namely Peshmerga and Asayish) had taken part in Kurdification (forced displacement of Arabs) in Kirkuk, namely by bulldozing homes and banishing the residents.[50]

Failed Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, Peshmerga defeated in Kirkuk

Pro-independence rally in Erbil in September 2017

Following the defeat of Islamic State in the Battle of Mosul, the former President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, facilitated the 2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum.[51]

Angered by the decision, the Prime Minister of Iraq, Haider al-Abadi, demanded the cancellation of the referendum and called on the KRG to initiate dialogue "in the framework of the constitution", ordered it to withdraw its forces from the disputed territories seized in 2014, and warned of a possible military retaliation.[51][52]

Following the reluctance of the KRG to heed the warnings, in October 2017, Iraq began to move its forces into areas seized by the KRG in 2014, and all the disputed areas outside the Kurdish Region, including Kirkuk. In a successful military operation that lasted less than two weeks, the Iraqi Armed Forces defeated the Peshmerga and successfully reclaimed the area seized by the KRG, as well as later took control of the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Masoud Barzani subsequently announced his resignation and the referendum was effectively abandoned.

Arabisation of disputed territories

Since October 2017, Kurdish news reports have made claims of Arabisation and forced demographic displacement of Kurds, most notably in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Khanaqin.[53][54][55] In June 2024, an Iraqi Kurdish source claimed that the Arabisation campaign of Kirkuk, under the administration of Arab governor Rakan Al-Jubouri, surpassed even the level committed by the previous Ba'athist regime.[56]

2023 ICC ruling on illegal Kurdistan Region oil exports

In light of the Kurdistan Region initiating independent oil exports to Turkey in late 2013, on 23 May 2014, Iraq issued an international arbitration case against the latter at the International Chamber of Commerce based in Paris, regarding Turkey’s role in the illegal sale of crude oil by the Kurdistan Regional Government through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. Iraq claimed Turkey had breached provisions of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline Agreement (ITPA 1973) by not heeding the instructions of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. In February 2023, the International Court of Arbitration issued a verdict in favour of Iraq and on 25 March 2023, all oil exports from the Kurdistan Region were halted. Since then, the KRG has been officially rendered unable to resume the export of oil to Turkey without the permission of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, as outlined in the ITP Agreement.[57][58][59][60]

2023 Unrest in Kirkuk

The 2023 unrest in Kirkuk was an incident which resulted in four Kurdish protesters being killed. The incident involved Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen residents of the city of Kirkuk. It began on 26 August 2023, after a building that used to be the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (which was used at the time by the Iraqi Armed Forces as a Joint Operations Command) was about to be transferred back to the former following an order by the Prime Minister of Iraq. Two days later, on 28 August, Arab and Turkmen anti-KDP residents of Kirkuk staged a sit-in in front of the building to prevent its transfer as well as blocked the main road between Erbil and Kirkuk. In response, pro-KDP Kurds iniated counter-protests as well as demanded the opening of the blocked road. Iraqi security forces responded by opening fire on the Kurdish protesters. Following this, the government imposed a curfew in Kirkuk. The Supreme Court of Iraq subsequently issued a verdict halting the transfer of the building back to KDP, which was criticized by the latter.

Concerns about possible Kurdistan Region collapse

In September 2023, Al-Monitor published an article claiming that the Prime Minister of the KRG, Masrour Barzani, had sent a letter to the President of the United States urging him to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad on issues threatening the Kurdistan Region, stating: "I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming. …[W]e are bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically. For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of … the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since."[61]

Yerevan Saeed, director of the 'Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace' at American University in Washington, expressed concerns in February 2024 about the future of the Kurdistan Region if problems persist. He stated that the combined effect of Baghdad's obstructive attitude towards the Kurdistan Region as well as intra-Kurdish problems will “inevitably result in the diminishment of the Kurdistan Region’s political, legal, and economic influence, and could potentially lead to its dissolution."[62]

2023 Makhmour clashes

On 22 October 2023, clashes between Iraqi security forces and Peshmerga occurred in the town of Makhmour after it was handed over to the Iraqi forces following the withdrawal of the PKK. At around noon, both sides exchanged mortar fire for two hours until a ceasefire was announced. The clashes resulted in six deaths in total, including the 18th Peshmerga Infantry Brigade commander and his deputy.[63] Both sides denied being the aggressor. The town of Makhmour is situated strategically between Mosul, Erbil and Kirkuk.

Growing state centralism

In March 2024, after a series of court rulings by the Supreme Court of Iraq targeting the Kurdistan Region, Abdul Rahman Zibari a Kurdish judge resigned in protest, describing the Court's actions as "a move towards centralization and a blatant violation of the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan Region".[64] In his resignation statement, the judge hinted at concerns about Baghdad's departure from the principles of federalism, the political system adopted after the US-led invasion of Iraq.[65][66] The Supreme Court subsequently announced that the resignation of Zibari will not hinder its work.

The KDP also announced that it will not participate in the upcoming regional parliamentary elections dated June 10, 2024, citing "unconstitutional rulings against the Kurdistan Region in the past four years" and labeling the actions of the Supreme Court as "a clear and dangerous violation of the constitution” and an attempt to “return Iraq to a centralized system."[67][needs update]

Casualties

[a].^ Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (combined casualty figure until 2003; 163,800–345,100):

Mahmud Barzanji revolts (1919–1924) – unknown
Ahmed Barzani revolt (1931–1932) – hundreds killed
1943 Barzani revolt (1943–1945) – hundreds killed
First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970) – 12,000–105,000 killed.[68]
Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975) – 9,000 killed.[69]
PUK insurgency (1976–1978) – 800 killed.
1980 Persecution of Feyli Kurds under Saddam Hussein - 25,000[70][71][clarification needed]
Iraqi Kurdish uprising (1982–1988) – 50,000–198,000 killed.
1991 Uprising in As Sulaymaniyah – 700–2,000 killed.
Iraqi Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997) – 3,000[72]–5,000 killed
2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation Viking Hammer) – 300 Islamists killed, at least 24 Peshmerga killed;[36] unknown number of Iraqi agents "eliminated".
2017 Iraqi-Kurdish conflict – 150 Iraqi forces (Army + PMU) killed (7 in Battle of Kirkuk per Kirkuk hospital), 105 Peshmerga killed, 200 wounded, 45 detained as well as 400 Kurdish civilians killed, 200 missing in Kirkuk (per Kurdish sources) and 183,000 displaced (per United Nations)
2023 unrest in Kirkuk – 4 Kurdish protesters killed, 16 injured, 40 detained
2023 Makhmour clashes – 2 Iraqi soldiers killed, 6 injured and 4 Peshmerga killed, 5 injured

See also

References

  1. ^ Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948–91, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 2002, p.157, ISBN 0-8032-3733-2
  2. ^ Page 39 Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
  3. ^ Page 47 Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
  4. ^ Page 48 Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
  5. ^ Page 54 Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
  6. ^ Page 59 Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine
  7. ^ "Page 24" (PDF).
  8. ^ a b Al-Marashi, Ibra; Salama, Sammy (2008). Iraq's armed forces. Routledge. p. 121. ISBN 978-0-415-40078-7. Iraq 60,000 1969.
  9. ^ "Army - Iraq Special Weapons". fas.org. Archived from the original on November 22, 2022.
  10. ^ a b John Pike. "Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)". GlobalSecurity.org. Archived from the original on April 17, 2023.
  11. ^ "Iraq Overview (page 17)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-07-23. Retrieved 2011-04-06.
  12. ^ "Iraq" (PDF). Archived from the original on August 7, 2011.
  13. ^ "The Iraqi State and Kurdish Resistance, 1918–2003" (Archive)
  14. ^ a b Heo, Uk (September 15, 2007). Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 9781851099191 – via Google Books.
  15. ^ a b The Kurdish Minority Problem, p. 11, December 1948, ORE 71-48, CIA "The Kurdish Minority Problem". CIA. December 1948. p. 11. Archived from the original on 2012-03-08. Retrieved 2012-03-15..
  16. ^ Prince, J. (1993), "A Kurdish State in Iraq" in Current History, January.
  17. ^ Lortz, Michael G. "The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga" Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine, Willing to face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces – the Peshmerga – from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq, 2005-10-28. Chapter 1
  18. ^ Michael G. Lortz. (Chapter 1, Introduction). The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga. pp. 39–42. Michael G. Lortz. "Chapter 1: Introduction: The Kurdish Warrior Tradition and the Importance of the Peshmerga" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-10-29. Retrieved 2014-10-16.
  19. ^ Arnold; et al. "18. Iraq/Kurds (1932-present)". University of Central Arkansas. Archived from the original on October 23, 2021.
  20. ^ Wars since 1900. "All wars in the 20th century, since 1900 | the Polynational War Memorial". www.war-memorial.net. Archived from the original on July 27, 2018.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  21. ^ G.S. Harris, Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, pp.118–120, 1977 JSTOR
  22. ^ Galbraith, Peter (September 4, 2008). The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War without End. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 9781847396129.
  23. ^ Eva Savelsberg, Siamend Hajo, Irene Dulz. Effectively Urbanized - Yezidis in the Collective Towns of Sheikhan and Sinjar. Etudes rurales 2010/2 (n°186). ISBN 9782713222955
  24. ^ Prof. Rimki Basu. International Politics: Concepts, Theories and Issues:p103. 2012.
  25. ^ Francis Kofi Abiew. The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention:p146. 1991.
  26. ^ "PBS: The Fayli Kurds". PBS. Archived from the original on May 10, 2023. Retrieved 22 November 2014.
  27. ^ "PBS: The Missing Barzanis". PBS. Archived from the original on May 22, 2023. Retrieved 22 November 2014.
  28. ^ "FRONTLINE/WORLD . Iraq - Saddam's Road to Hell - A journey into the killing fields. PBS". www.pbs.org. Archived from the original on May 10, 2023.
  29. ^ "1988: Thousands die in Halabja gas attack". March 16, 1988. Archived from the original on May 5, 2023 – via news.bbc.co.uk.
  30. ^ Dave Johns. "FRONTLINE/WORLD. Iraq - Saddam's Road to Hell - A journey into the killing fields. PBS". PBS. Archived from the original on May 10, 2023.
  31. ^ Dave Johns. "The Crimes of Saddam Hussein". PBS. Archived from the original on May 22, 2023.
  32. ^ Mirawdeli, Kamal (9 January 2019). "The two-state solution: Divide and Democratise!". History of the Present: Kurdistan in the 21st Century. AuthorHouse. ISBN 9781728383088.
  33. ^ Dubin, Rhys (September 13, 2017). "Netanyahu Finally Supports a Two-State Solution — In Iraq". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 10 August 2021.
  34. ^ Park, Bill (2004). "Iraq's Kurds and Turkey: Challenges for US Policy". The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters. 34 (3): 25. doi:10.55540/0031-1723.2219. S2CID 151138570.
  35. ^ Stewart Mason, David (2009). The End of the American Century. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 150. ISBN 9780742557024.
  36. ^ a b c d Willing to face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces – the Peshmerga – from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq (page 67) Archived 2013-10-29 at the Wayback Machine, Michael G. Lortz
  37. ^ Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War inside Iraq, Mike Tucker, Charles Faddis, 2008, The Lyons Press.
  38. ^ "Iraqi Constitution article 117". Constitute Project.
  39. ^ "Iraqi Kurdistan president visits forces in Kirkuk". 10 December 2012. Archived from the original on March 6, 2022.
  40. ^ "Iraqi Kurd leader threatens secession unless power share demands met". 26 April 2012. Archived from the original on May 28, 2023.
  41. ^ a b "Iraqi Kurdish leader says region will defend itself". November 18, 2012. Archived from the original on August 9, 2022 – via www.reuters.com.
  42. ^ Mohammed Tawfeeq (16 November 2012). "Two dead, 10 wounded after Iraqi, Kurdish forces clash in northern Iraq". CNN. Archived from the original on March 26, 2023.
  43. ^ a b "Iraq tensions added to regional turmoil - World News". Hürriyet Daily News. 21 November 2012. Archived from the original on December 25, 2022.
  44. ^ Iraqi Kurdistan send more troops into standoff with Iraq Arab-led army EKurd Daily. November 25, 2012. (Archive)
  45. ^ "Iraq's Barzani says Kurds ready to fight over disputed city". Today's Zaman. December 11, 2012. Archived from the original on 2012-12-14. Retrieved 2012-12-13.
  46. ^ al-Rubayi, Zaidan (December 12, 2012). "Maliki's Party Says Troop Review Was Barzani's 'Declaration of War'". Al-Monitor. Archived from the original on December 18, 2012.
  47. ^ "Kurdistan Region Begins Oil Export to Turkey". Rudaw.
  48. ^ "Kurdistan Oil and Gas law". Kurdistan Regional Parliament.
  49. ^ Emre, Peker (23 June 2014). "Iraqi Kurdistan Gets Around $100 Million for First Major Oil Export". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on June 24, 2014. Retrieved 24 June 2014.
  50. ^ "Iraq: Kurdish authorities bulldoze homes and banish hundreds of Arabs from Kirkuk". Amnesty International. 7 November 2016.
  51. ^ a b "Iraqi PM calls on Kurdistan to cancel referendum, start dialogue". www.efe.com. Archived from the original on December 15, 2018.
  52. ^ "'We don't want armed confrontation': Iraqi PM on Kurds". France24. 5 October 2017.
  53. ^ "Arabization helps no one, but hurts Kirkuk most". Rudaw.
  54. ^ "UN probe confirms 100s of houses, businesses burned or bombed in Tuz Khurmatu". Rudaw.
  55. ^ "Demographic change threatens Khanaqin, officials warn". Rudaw.
  56. ^ "Arabization in Kirkuk reaches critical level amid demographic shifts". Kurdistan24.
  57. ^ "ICC Arbitration Tribunal Finally Issues Ruling In The Iraq-Turkey Pipeline Dispute – What It Means For Iraq And The Kurdistan Region". Mondaq.
  58. ^ "Iraq halts northern crude exports after winning arbitration case against Turkey". Reuters.
  59. ^ "Iraq wins arbitration over KRG's Turkey crude exports". Argusmedia.
  60. ^ "Iraq wins landmark case against Turkey over Kurdish oil exports". Financial Times.
  61. ^ "In letter to Biden, Barzani warns of Iraqi Kurdistan's collapse, urges mediation". Al-monitor.
  62. ^ "Iraqi Court's Decision Threatens to Undermine Kurdish Autonomy". VOA. 22 February 2024.
  63. ^ "Qarachugh clashes: struggle to control strategic, military and economic region". KirkukNow.
  64. ^ "Kurdish judge resigns from Iraq's supreme federal court in protest of recent ruling on Kurdistan Region". Gulan Media.
  65. ^ "Kurdish Judge withdraws in protest against Federal Supreme Court". Kurdistan24.
  66. ^ "Federal Supreme Court's role in Baghdad-Erbil relations". The New Region.
  67. ^ "KDP says will not participate in upcoming Kurdistan elections". Rudaw.
  68. ^ "Twentieth Century Atlas - Death Tolls". users.erols.com. Archived from the original on April 17, 2023.
  69. ^ "Iraq (Kurds)". Minorities at Risk. University of Maryland. Archived from the original (Word document) on 2017-10-11. Retrieved 2012-05-06 – via Political Asylum Research and Documentation Service (PARDS).
  70. ^ Jaffar Al-Faylee, Zaki (2010). Tareekh Al-Kurd Al-Faylyoon. Beirut. pp. 485, 499–501.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  71. ^ Al-Hakeem, Sahib (2003). Untold stories of more than 4000 women raped killed and tortured in Iraq, the country of mass graves. pp. 489–492.
  72. ^ Jordi Tejel. Syria's Kurds: history, politics and society. 2009. p.156.

Further reading