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R-17 Elbrus

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R-17 Elbrus
An R-17 missile at the Muzeum Uzbrojenia (Museum of Armament), Poznań, Poland (2004)
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originSoviet Union
Service history
In service1962−Present
Used bySee operators
WarsYom Kippur war
Iran-Iraq war
Soviet-Afghan war
Gulf war
Yemeni civil war (1994)
Libyan civil war
Yemeni civil war (2014–present)
2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
Production history
DesignerViktor Makeyev[1]
Designed1958−1961[2]
ManufacturerVotkinsk Machine Building Plant
Unit costUS$1,000,000 (equivalent to US$2,576,252 in 2023)[3]
Produced1959[2]−1987[4]
No. built7,000−10,000 (est.)[5][6]
VariantsSee variants
Specifications
Mass5,682–5,950 kg (12,527–13,118 lb)
Length11.2−11.4 m (37 ft)
Diameter885 mm (34.8 in)
Wingspan1.8 m (5 ft 11 in)
Crew7
Maximum firing range300 km (190 mi)
WarheadHE, cluster, chemical, nuclear
EngineIsayev/KBKhM 9D21 liquid (missile)
D-12-525A diesel (TEL)
Ground clearance0.44 m (1 ft 5 in)
PropellantTM-185 (kerosene derivative) / AK-27I (27% N
2O
4 73% NHO
3)
Operational
range
450 km (280 mi) (full load)
Maximum speed 45 km/h (28 mph)
Accuracy450–900 m (490–980 yd) CEP[5][7]
Launch
platform
9P117M TEL
References[8]

The R-17 Elbrus (Russian: Р-17, 9К72 «Эльбрус», named for Mount Elbrus),[9] GRAU index 9K72 is a tactical ballistic missile, initially developed by the Soviet Union. It is also known by its NATO reporting name SS-1C Scud-B. It is one of several Soviet missiles to carry the reporting name Scud; the most prolifically launched of the series, with a production run estimated at 7,000 (1960–1987). Also designated R-300 during the 1970s, the R-17 was derived from the R-11 Zemlya. It has been operated by 32 countries and manufactured in four countries outside the Soviet Union. It is still in service with some. The North Koreans reverse-engineered it as the Hwasong-5.

History

[edit]

The first mock-up was designed and built by Makeyev in 1958–1959, before the programme was transferred to the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in 1959 for mass production. The first launch was conducted in 1961, and it entered service in 1962, mounted on the 2P19 tracked transporter erector launcher.[10]

The rear section of an 8K14 missile, showing the fixed fins and the graphite vanes that control the missile's path.
R-17 on reload transport trailer with ZIL-131 tractor

During the 1960s the Soviets exported the R-17 missiles and 2P19 launchers to Warsaw Pact allies, though none of their armies had access to nuclear warheads, which were stored on their soil in Soviet-controlled Missile Technical Bases (RTB). After the 9P117 TEL was introduced, Warsaw Pact Scud brigades were re-equipped with these. About 140 TELs were exported to Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Most of their Scud brigades were disbanded in the 1990s as their equipment was wearing out and ineffective without a nuclear warhead.[11]

The Soviet Union made little effort to export Scud-B systems outside of the Warsaw Pact, since it was complex, expensive, and not military effective without a nuclear warhead, but several Middle Eastern countries showed interest in obtaining some systems, partly for propaganda purposes, giving their militaries a veneer of modernity and partly for the possibility of carrying deep strikes inside Israel, since their air forces proved to be incapable of conducting ground attack missions when faced against the better-trained Israeli Air Force.[12]

The exact number of systems exported is not known, with one Russian account stating that 2,300 missiles sold to 11 countries through 1989, while Zaloga states that Warsaw Pact inventories had over 1,000 missiles, and more than 3,000 were exported to the Middle East and Afghanistan between 1970 and 1990.[13]

Faced with the Soviets refusal to supply R-17 missiles, the North Koreans set up a rogue production line with Egyptian assistance, locally producing it as the Hwasong-5.[14]

According to a 1988 CIA report, Egypt have probably assembled Hwasong-5 missiles locally from knock-down kits, though its unknown if their efforts to build them locally were successful.[15] Iran have also locally assembled Hwasong-5s, giving them the local designation of Shahab-1.[16] Syria have also locally produced Scud-B and Scud-Cs with North Korean and Iranian assistance. Prior to the Syrian civil war, it was estimated that Syria was capable of building 30 Scud-B/C missiles per year.[17]

Design

[edit]

The R-17 featured important improvements over the R-11. The Isayev RD-21 engine used a combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) oxidiser and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) fuel, fed into the combustion chamber by fuel pumps that ensured a more consistent thrust. The guidance system, active only during the boosted phase, uses three gyroscopes, that give it a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 450 m (490 yd)[5] (900 m (980 yd) according to western sources[7]). A nuclear warhead was designed for the R-17, with a selectable yield, from 5 to 70 kilotons. However it could also carry a chemical warhead, containing 555 kg (1,224 lb) of viscous VX; a conventional weapon, with a single high explosive warhead; or a series of fragmentation payloads, using either high explosive, anti-tank or anti-runway munitions.[5]

MAZ-543 Uragan carrying a 9K72 Elbrus

At first, the R-17 was carried on a tracked TEL similar to that of the R-11, designated 2P19, but this was not very successful, as the vibration of the tracks had a tendency to interfere with the launch electronics. Production of this model was halted after Khrushchev cancelled the production of heavy tanks in 1962, and a wheeled launcher was designed by the Titan Central Design Bureau, becoming operational in 1967.[18] The new MAZ-543 vehicle was officially designated 9P117 Uragan, and its Russian crews nicknamed it Kashalot (sperm whale), because of its size.[19] The eight-wheeled MAZ-543 has a loaded weight of 37,400 kg, a road speed of 55 km/h and a range of 650 km. It can carry out the launch sequence autonomously, but this is usually directed from a separate command vehicle. The missile is raised to a vertical position by means of hydraulically powered cranes, which usually takes four minutes, while the total sequence lasts about one hour.[5]

Organization

[edit]

During the early 1960s R-17 missile brigades were deployed at front level with two brigades with a total of nine launchers and at army level with one brigade per army with six launchers each. Due the complexity of early launchers, each brigade had a strength of about 3,500 men plus 700 assorted vehicles. A Scud brigade included a headquarters and staff, two launch battalions (with about 745 men plus 265 vehicles and motorcycles), a technical battery, meteorological battery, repair battery, supply battery, engineer vehicle company, chemical defense platoon, and medical platoon.[20]

A Scud battery originally included six 2P19 launchers, eight 2T3 missile trailers, three 9F21 nuclear warhead shelter trucks, ten command vehicles, six UAZ-452 survey vehicles, four 8T210 crane vehicles, three 8G1 fuel trucks and four 8G17 oxidizer trucks. Following the introduction of the TR-1 Temp to front level service, most Scud brigades were reassigned to support combined-arms armies. By 1967, R-17 brigades had about 1,200 men and 12 launchers each, thanks to the introduction of the simpler 9P117 TEL and improved handling equipment. In the late 1970s and early 1980s some Scud brigades assigned to the border with NATO had an additional battery included per battalion, increasing the total number of launchers to 18. After one of these brigades was disbanded in 1979, its launchers were reassigned to other two brigades in East Germany, creating two brigades with 27 launchers (featuring 3 battalions with 9 launchers each). Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet Army had a total of 35 Scud brigades with approximately 450 launchers.[21]

Variants

[edit]

Soviet Union

[edit]
  • R-17 − Original version with a 270 km (170 mi) effective range, it used the AK-20I oxidant and TG-02 Tonka fuel.[22]
  • R-17M − Improved version, it uses a more energetic fuel (a combination of the AK-27I oxidant with TM-185 fuel) and other changes increasing maximum range to 300 km (190 mi). In the 1970s, the R-17M was further improved with specially lined fuel tanks, allowing the missiles to be stored, fully fueled for up to 90 days.[22]
  • Extended range R-17M − First tested in Kapustin Yar test range in 1965, it could reach 500–600 km (310–370 mi), but with poorer accuracy. Additionally, the missile performance was similar to the 9M76 Temp already in service, apparently preventing it from entering service with the Soviet Army. US intelligence initially designated it as the KY-3, but later called the SS-1D Scud-C.[6]
  • R-17E − Export version, it carries the 8F44F high-explosive warhead. When launched at the maximum 300 km range, it impacts at a speed of 1.4 km/s (0.87 mi/s), while the explosion usually leaves a crater 1.5–4 m (4 ft 11 in – 13 ft 1 in) deep and 12 m (39 ft) wide.[23]

North Korea

[edit]
  • Hwasong-5 −
    Main article: Hwasong-5
    After some failed attempts to create a domestic tactical ballistic missiles program,[14] the Egyptians agreed to sent North Korea some Scud-B missiles and TELs for reverse-engineering in 1983.[15] The first test of the Hwasong-5 ("Mars-5") was conducted at the Musudan-ri proving ground in April−September 1984, with full scale production launched in 1986.[14]

Iraq

[edit]
  • Al-Husayn −
    Main article: Al-Husayn (missile)
    Named after Husayn ibn Ali, the Al-Husayn is a local modification of the R-17E missile with a range of 650 km (400 mi) in comparison to the maximum range of 300 km (190 mi) of the R-17E. This increase was accomplished by extending the fuel tanks to carry more propellant and reducing the size of the warhead. Its estimated that about 250 missiles were built.[24]
  • Al-Abbas −
    Main article: Al-Abbas (missile)
  • Al-Hijarah −
    Main article: Al Hijarah (missile)

Combat use

[edit]

Afghanistan

[edit]

The most extensive use of the Scud took place during the final phase of the Soviet-Afghan war. When the Soviets began their withdrawal from the country in May 1988, the Afghan Army received R-17E missiles as a substitute for the Soviet airpower. While the Afghan Scuds were nominally assigned to the 99th missile brigade in Afshur, in reality they were mostly operated by Soviet personnel with Afghans being gradually integrated into the unit. They were used against the Afghan mujahideen ammunition dumps near the Pakistan border and during the successful defense of Jalalabad, where 438 Scuds were launched in total.[3]

Through October 1989, another 995 Scuds were launched against the Mujahideen. As the Soviets concluded their withdrawal and the country descended into protracted civil war, the number of Scud launches declined. By May 1991, the 99th Missile Brigade had fired 1,554 of the approximately 1,700 Scud missiles received. On 24 April 1992, the mujahideen forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud captured the Afshur military base alongside most its remaining Scud missiles (about 50 missiles) and launchers. Other mujahideen factions also captured a few missiles and TELs, but they couldn't launch them without the help of former 99th Missile Brigade personnel. During the Afghan civil war, about 44 missiles were fired between April 1991 and spring 1996 by several factions in various battles. The Taliban managed to capture part of the surviving stockpile during the fighting in the late 1990s, but due the poor state of the equipment and lack of trained personnel, only five missiles were fired after the summer of 1996. Following the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the remaining four functional launchers were scrapped in the Panjshir Valley in January 2005.[25]

Armenia

[edit]

During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Armenians reportedly fired Scud and Tochka missiles on the city of Ganja, Azerbaijan. Analysts of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that Armenia probably used their Soviet-era Scud and Tochka missiles to conserve their small stockpile of the more advanced Iskander missiles and to avoid escalating the conflict beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region. They also noted that both Armenia and Azerbaijan could hit most targets in the region with long-range rocket artillery, limiting the tactical value of using expensive ballistic missiles.[26]

Egypt

[edit]

Egypt received nine TELs and about 18 R-17E missiles in 1973, shortly before the beginning of the Yom Kippur War. They were assigned to the 65th Artillery Brigade, attached to the 3rd Field Army at the time. Anwar Sadat threatened to fire Scud missiles at Israeli cities, but when Israel placed its nuclear Jericho missiles in plain view of Soviet reconnaissance satellites, the Soviets forced Sadat to reconsider. The 65th Artillery Brigade would later fire three missiles (with the help of Soviet advisers) against Israeli pontoon bridges over the Suez Canal near Deversoir, but the missiles exploded too far to cause damage. The Israel Defense Forces were unaware of the missile attack until they discovered the impact craters in the desert days later. After the war, the Soviets finished equipping the 65th Artillery Brigade, but support ceased during the late 1970s with the deterioration of relations between the Egyptians and the Soviets. As a result, Egypt decided to refurbish and improve its inventory of Scud missiles with North Korean assistance during the 1990s.[27]

Iran

[edit]

Lacking the ability of striking targets more than 150 km (93 mi) beyond its border during the early stages of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians entered negotiations with the Libyans, who agreed to send two TELs and around 20 R-17E missiles to Iran, alongside instructors to train Iranian personnel.[28] In 12 March, 1985 the first Iranian Scud was launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Khatam al-Anbiya Missile Unit against Kirkuk.[29]

Baghdad was attacked with 13 missiles while Kirkuk was attacked by another missile before an agreement to halt the firing of ballistic missiles was reached in June 1984. Following their success in striking Iraq's capital, the Iranians led new diplomatic missions to acquire more Scuds. The Libyans, under pressure from Moscow, refused to send any more missiles. Syria is believed to have supplied Iran with about a dozen missiles (despite Soviet objections), allowing them to fire launch another eight missiles against Baghdad and other Iraqi cities in the second half of 1986.[28] The Iranians also turned to North Korea to obtain Hwasong-5 misiles.[30] It's estimated that North Korea provided Iran with 6−12 TELs and up to 200 Hwasong-5 missiles between 1987 and 1992, though some reports claim that as many as 300 missiles were delivered.[31]

Iraq

[edit]

Iraq acquired a Scud B brigade with 11 TELs and 819 missiles in 1974, shortly after Egypt.[32] When war broke out with Iran in 1980, the Iraqi Brigade 224 launched some missiles, but most of the strikes against Iranian targets were conducted by the Iraqi Air Force. Following a failed air campaign, the Brigade 224 was deployed to strike Iranian cities along the border.[29]

Following Iranian Scud strikes in Baghdad, Saddam Hussein attempted to buy long-range missiles to strike Tehran, but faced with Moscow's refusal, the Iraqis began modifying their existing stockpile of Scud-B missiles, extending their range. The resulting missile, the Al-Husayn was extensively used during the final phase of the War of the cities starting in 29 February 1988, with a profoundly demoralizing effect on the civilians and forcing around a quarter of the 10 million inhabitants to be evacuated from the city by the early spring. Both sides agreed to halt the missile attacks on 20 April 1988, but Iraq managed to bring Iran to the negotiating table following the missile campaign.[33]

The Iraqis continued the development of extended range Scud missiles after the war ended, including the Al-Abbas with a range of 860 km (530 mi), and the Al Hijarah with a concrete warhead for penetrating hardened targets such as Iranian or Israeli nuclear facilities. They were less successful at manufacturing Scud copies, due the difficulty in producing some of the more complex components such as engine turbo-pumps and guidance gyroscopes. Iraqi engineers also worked on locally building TELs (based on commercial trucks) and some static launchers (to be used against Israel).[34]

During the Gulf war, the Brigade 224 carried missile strikes against Israel and Saudi Arabia, with at least 42 against the former and 46 against the latter. The Coalition forces employed MIM-104 Patriots to intercept Iraqi Al Husayn missiles. A problem faced by the Patriot was the Al Husayn poor design: due the stretched fuselage, the missile became unstable upon descent, disintegrating upon atmospheric re-entry, forcing Patriots to choose which trail of debris to intercept, with critics pointing out that 1.8 tons of missile debris hitting the ground at high speed could still cause significant damage regardless of whether the Scud warhead detonated. Regardless of the controversy, Zaloga argues that the use of Patriots did serve the political purpose of restraining the Israeli response to the Iraqi missile strikes which could have severely affected the cohesion of the Coalition.[35]

Most of the Iraqi fixed Scud launchers were destroyed by coalition airstrikes, while attempts of destroying Iraq's 9P117 TELs failed, with 1,500 sorties launched and no hits scored. After the war, the coalition forced Iraq to destroy its remaining stockpiles of Scud missiles, though suspicions that Iraq had failed to do so would persist for the next decade.[36]

Libya

[edit]

In 1974, Libya received at least six battalions of Scud missiles, with 72 TELs and around 200−300 missiles.[12] Some of these missiles were sent to Iran in the War of the cities.[28][37] In 1986, Muammar Gaddafi ordered a Scud missile strike against a United States facility on the Italian island of Lampedusa in retaliation for the United States bombing of Libya. Two missiles were fired, but they fell short of their mark, causing no damage.[37][38]

It has been rumoured that R-17s were fired by loyalist forces against rebels in the 2011 Libyan civil war during the first phase of the war.[39] On 14 August 2011 a confirmed R-17 launch was detected by a US Aegis destroyer, with the missile fired from Sirte and heading toward rebel positions in Ajdabiya. The missile fell 80 km off target in the middle of the desert, inflicting no damage.[40] Eight days later, on August 22, three more R-17 launches were detected by NATO.[41]

Yemen

[edit]

In the late 1970s, Yemen acquired a Scud brigade. During the civil war in May−June 1994, Southern Yemeni rebels fired Scud missiles against the capital Sanaa, prompting the Northern forces to retaliate with Tochka missiles. Around 30 R-17 and 35 Tochka missiles were fired by the end of the conflict.[42]

After the 2015 Houthi takeover in Yemen, the Houthis managed to capture the country pre-war stocks of Scud-B and Hwasong-6 missiles. They were used against the internationally recognized government forces during the summer of 2015.[43] According to the OSINT website Oryx, most Scuds (and Hwasongs) were convered into Burkan missiles until their stockpiles were depleted.[44] Since 2016, the Houthis have used domestically produced missiles with Iranian assistance instead.[43]

Specifications

[edit]
  • Range – 300 km,[45]
  • CEP – 500–900 m[4]
  • Type of fuel – liquid
  • Preparation time – 1 hour
  • Period of storage – 19 years (in stock), 6 month (in combat condition)
  • Flight time – 15 minutes

Operators

[edit]

Current

[edit]

Former

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 13.
  2. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 29.
  3. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 92.
  4. ^ a b "Баллистические ракеты России" [Russian Ballistic Missiles]. InBSite.com. Archived from the original on 2013-03-31. Retrieved 2015-09-14.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s "SS-1 'Scud' (R-11/8K11, R-11FM (SS-N-1B) and R-17/8K14)". Jane's Information Group. 26 April 2001. Archived from the original on 15 December 2007. Retrieved 2008-02-12.
  6. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 39.
  7. ^ a b "R-11/SS-1B SCUD-A R-300 9K72 Elbrus/SS-1C SCUD-B". Federation of American Scientists. September 9, 2000. Archived from the original on March 7, 2008. Retrieved 2008-02-21.
  8. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 71−72.
  9. ^ "Soviet/Russian Missile Designations". Johnston's Archive. Archived from the original on 2008-10-08. Retrieved 2008-11-22.
  10. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 29−31.
  11. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 61−62.
  12. ^ a b c d Zaloga 2013, p. 76.
  13. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 76−77.
  14. ^ a b c Zaloga 2013, p. 96.
  15. ^ a b c Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on". Military Balance Blog. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  16. ^ a b Samore 2013, pp. 95−96.
  17. ^ "Syria Missile Overview". The Nuclear Threat Initiative. 7 August 2014. Retrieved 1 December 2024.
  18. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 31−32, 35.
  19. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 35.
  20. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 48.
  21. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 48−49.
  22. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 38.
  23. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 42−43.
  24. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 81.
  25. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 92−93.
  26. ^ Shaikh, Shaan; Rumbaugh, Wes (8 December 2020). "The Air and Missile War in Nagorno-Karabakh: Lessons for the Future of Strike and Defense". Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Retrieved 25 November 2024.
  27. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 78.
  28. ^ a b c Samore 2013, p. 95.
  29. ^ a b c Zaloga 2013, p. 80.
  30. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 82, 96.
  31. ^ Samore 2013, p. 96.
  32. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 76, 80.
  33. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 81−82.
  34. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 82−84.
  35. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 85−87.
  36. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 88.
  37. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 90.
  38. ^ House Committee on National Security Subcommittee on Military Procurement, United States Congress (1996). Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996--S. 1124 (H.R. 1530) and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session: Military Procurement Subcommittee Hearings on Title I--Procurement : Hearings Held March 7, 9, 15, 16, 29, 30, April 6, 1995 (Report). U.S. Government Printing Office. p. 485. Retrieved 9 November 2024.
  39. ^ Gilligan, Andrew (2011-05-08). "The forgotten frontline in Libya's civil war". The Daily Telegraph. London. Archived from the original on 2018-04-18. Retrieved 2019-07-21.
  40. ^ McElroy, Damien (2011-08-16). "Gaddafi fires Scud missile at rebel forces". The Independent. Archived from the original on 3 November 2012. Retrieved 19 September 2011.
  41. ^ "NATO says Gaddafi forces fire three Scud-type rockets". Reuters. 2011-08-22. Archived from the original on 2015-09-24. Retrieved 2019-07-21.
  42. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 90−91.
  43. ^ a b Samaan 2023, p. 162.
  44. ^ a b Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (4 September 2022). "Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook". Oryx. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
  45. ^ Krebs, Gunter Dirk. "Soviet Ballistic Missiles". Gunter's Space Page. Archived from the original on 2014-05-27. Retrieved 2014-05-26.
  46. ^ IISS 2024, p. 179.
  47. ^ IISS 2024b, p. 348.
  48. ^ IISS 2024a, p. 282.
  49. ^ IISS 2024b, p. 386.
  50. ^ IISS 2024, p. 209.
  51. ^ Zaloga 2013, p. 93.
  52. ^ a b Zaloga 2013, p. 62.
  53. ^ Zaloga 2013, pp. 81−83.

Bibliography

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