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Hash function security summary

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This article summarizes publicly known attacks against cryptographic hash functions. Note that not all entries may be up to date. For a summary of other hash function parameters, see comparison of cryptographic hash functions.

Table color key

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See also: Security level
  No attack successfully demonstrated — attack only breaks a reduced version of the hash or requires more work than the claimed security level of the hash
  Attack demonstrated in theory — attack breaks all rounds and has lower complexity than security claim
  Attack demonstrated in practice — complexity is low enough to be actually used

Common hash functions

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Collision resistance

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Main article: Collision attack
Hash function Security claim Best attack Publish date Comment
MD5 264 218 time 2013-03-25 This attack takes seconds on a regular PC. Two-block collisions in 218, single-block collisions in 241.[1]
SHA-1 280 261.2 2020-01-08 Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2]
SHA256 2128 31 of 64 rounds (265.5) 2013-05-28 Two-block collision.[3]
SHA512 2256 24 of 80 rounds (232.5) 2008-11-25 Paper.[4]
SHA-3 Up to 2512 6 of 24 rounds (250) 2017 Paper.[5]
BLAKE2s 2128 2.5 of 10 rounds (2112) 2009-05-26 Paper.[6]
BLAKE2b 2256 2.5 of 12 rounds (2224) 2009-05-26 Paper.[6]

Chosen prefix collision attack

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Hash function Security claim Best attack Publish date Comment
MD5 264 239 2009-06-16 This attack takes hours on a regular PC.[7]
SHA-1 280 263.4 2020-01-08 Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2]
SHA256 2128
SHA512 2256
SHA-3 Up to 2512
BLAKE2s 2128
BLAKE2b 2256

Preimage resistance

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Main article: Preimage attack
Hash function Security claim Best attack Publish date Comment
MD5 2128 2123.4 2009-04-27 Paper.[8]
SHA-1 2160 45 of 80 rounds 2008-08-17 Paper.[9]
SHA256 2256 43 of 64 rounds (2254.9 time, 26 memory) 2009-12-10 Paper.[10]
SHA512 2512 46 of 80 rounds (2511.5 time, 26 memory) 2008-11-25 Paper,[11] updated version.[10]
SHA-3 Up to 2512
BLAKE2s 2256 2.5 of 10 rounds (2241) 2009-05-26 Paper.[6]
BLAKE2b 2512 2.5 of 12 rounds (2481) 2009-05-26 Paper.[6]

Length extension

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Main article: Length extension attack
  • Vulnerable: MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512
  • Not vulnerable: SHA384, SHA-3, BLAKE2

Less-common hash functions

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Collision resistance

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Hash function Security claim Best attack Publish date Comment
GOST 2128 2105 2008-08-18 Paper.[12]
HAVAL-128 264 27 2004-08-17 Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[14]
MD2 264 263.3 time, 252 memory 2009 Slightly less computationally expensive than a birthday attack,[15] but for practical purposes, memory requirements make it more expensive.
MD4 264 3 operations 2007-03-22 Finding collisions almost as fast as verifying them.[16]
PANAMA 2128 26 2007-04-04 Paper,[17] improvement of an earlier theoretical attack from 2001.[18]
RIPEMD (original) 264 218 time 2004-08-17 Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[19]
RadioGatún Up to 2608[20] 2704 2008-12-04 For a word size w between 1-64 bits, the hash provides a security claim of 29.5w. The attack can find a collision in 211w time.[21]
RIPEMD-160 280 48 of 80 rounds (251 time) 2006 Paper.[22]
SHA-0 280 233.6 time 2008-02-11 Two-block collisions using boomerang attack. Attack takes estimated 1 hour on an average PC.[23]
Streebog 2256 9.5 rounds of 12 (2176 time, 2128 memory) 2013-09-10 Rebound attack.[24]
Whirlpool 2256 4.5 of 10 rounds (2120 time) 2009-02-24 Rebound attack.[25]

Preimage resistance

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Hash function Security claim Best attack Publish date Comment
GOST 2256 2192 2008-08-18 Paper.[12]
MD2 2128 273 time, 273 memory 2008 Paper.[26]
MD4 2128 2102 time, 233 memory 2008-02-10 Paper.[27]
RIPEMD (original) 2128 35 of 48 rounds 2011 Paper.[28]
RIPEMD-128 2128 35 of 64 rounds
RIPEMD-160 2160 31 of 80 rounds
Streebog 2512 2266 time, 2259 data 2014-08-29 The paper presents two second-preimage attacks with variable data requirements.[29]
Tiger 2192 2188.8 time, 28 memory 2010-12-06 Paper.[30]

Attacks on hashed passwords

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Main article: Password cracking

Hashes described here are designed for fast computation and have roughly similar speeds.[31] Because most users typically choose short passwords formed in predictable ways, passwords can often be recovered from their hashed value if a fast hash is used. Searches on the order of 100 billion tests per second are possible with high-end graphics processors.[32][33] Special hashes called key derivation functions have been created to slow brute force searches. These include pbkdf2, bcrypt, scrypt, argon2, and balloon.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Tao Xie; Fanbao Liu; Dengguo Feng (25 March 2013). "Fast Collision Attack on MD5". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
  2. ^ a b Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin (2020-01-08). SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust (PDF). USENIX Security Symposium. SEC'20. Vol. 29. USENIX Association. pp. 1839–1856. ISBN 978-1-939133-17-5.
  3. ^ Florian Mendel; Tomislav Nad; Martin Schläffer (2013-05-28). Improving Local Collisions: New Attacks on Reduced SHA-256. Eurocrypt 2013.
  4. ^ Somitra Kumar Sanadhya; Palash Sarkar (2008-11-25). New Collision Attacks against Up to 24-Step SHA-2. Indocrypt 2008. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_8.
  5. ^ L. Song, G. Liao and J. Guo, Non-Full Sbox Linearization: Applications to Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Keccak, CRYPTO, 2017
  6. ^ a b c d LI Ji; XU Liangyu (2009-05-26). "Attacks on Round-Reduced BLAKE". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
  7. ^ Marc Stevens; Arjen Lenstra; Benne de Weger (2012-07-12). "Chosen-prefix Collisions for MD5 and Applications" (PDF). International Journal of Applied Cryptography. 2 (4): 322–359. doi:10.1504/IJACT.2012.048084.
  8. ^ Yu Sasaki; Kazumaro Aoki (2009-04-27). Finding Preimages in Full MD5 Faster Than Exhaustive Search. Eurocrypt 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_8.
  9. ^ Christophe De Cannière; Christian Rechberger (2008-08-17). Preimages for Reduced SHA-0 and SHA-1. Crypto 2008.
  10. ^ a b Kazumaro Aoki; Jian Guo; Krystian Matusiewicz; Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang (2009-12-10). Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2009. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_34.
  11. ^ Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang; Kazumaro Aoki (2008-11-25). "Preimage Attacks on 41-Step SHA-256 and 46-Step SHA-512". IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.
  12. ^ a b Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Marcin Kontak; Janusz Szmidt (2008-08-18). Cryptanalysis of the GOST Hash Function. Crypto 2008.
  13. ^ a b Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xuejia Lai; Hongbo Yu (2004-08-17). "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD". Cryptology ePrint Archive.
  14. ^ Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xiuyuan Yu (October 2005). "An attack on hash function HAVAL-128" (PDF). Science in China Series F: Information Sciences. 48 (5): 545–556. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.506.9546. doi:10.1360/122004-107. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2017-08-09. Retrieved 2014-10-23.
  15. ^ Lars R. Knudsen; John Erik Mathiassen; Frédéric Muller; Søren S. Thomsen (January 2010). "Cryptanalysis of MD2". Journal of Cryptology. 23 (1): 72–90. doi:10.1007/s00145-009-9054-1. S2CID 2443076.
  16. ^ Yu Sasaki; Yusuke Naito; Noboru Kunihiro; Kazuo Ohta (2007-03-22). "Improved Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5". IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences. E90-A (1): 36–47. Bibcode:2007IEITF..90...36S. doi:10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.1.36.
  17. ^ Joan Daemen; Gilles Van Assche (2007-04-04). Producing Collisions for Panama, Instantaneously. FSE 2007.
  18. ^ Vincent Rijmen; Bart Van Rompay; Bart Preneel; Joos Vandewalle (2001). Producing Collisions for PANAMA. FSE 2001.
  19. ^ Xiaoyun Wang; Xuejia Lai; Dengguo Feng; Hui Chen; Xiuyuan Yu (2005-05-23). Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD. Eurocrypt 2005. doi:10.1007/11426639_1.
  20. ^ RadioGatún is a family of 64 different hash functions. The security level and best attack in the chart are for the 64-bit version. The 32-bit version of RadioGatún has a claimed security level of 2304 and the best claimed attack takes 2352 work.
  21. ^ Thomas Fuhr; Thomas Peyrin (2008-12-04). Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun. FSE 2009.
  22. ^ Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Vincent Rijmen (2006). On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160. ISC 2006.
  23. ^ Stéphane Manuel; Thomas Peyrin (2008-02-11). Collisions on SHA-0 in One Hour. FSE 2008. doi:10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_2.
  24. ^ Zongyue Wang; Hongbo Yu; Xiaoyun Wang (2013-09-10). "Cryptanalysis of GOST R hash function". Information Processing Letters. 114 (12): 655–662. doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007.
  25. ^ Florian Mendel; Christian Rechberger; Martin Schläffer; Søren S. Thomsen (2009-02-24). The Rebound Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl (PDF). FSE 2009.
  26. ^ Søren S. Thomsen (2008). "An improved preimage attack on MD2". Cryptology ePrint Archive.
  27. ^ Gaëtan Leurent (2008-02-10). MD4 is Not One-Way (PDF). FSE 2008.
  28. ^ Chiaki Ohtahara; Yu Sasaki; Takeshi Shimoyama (2011). Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160. ISC 2011. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_13.
  29. ^ Jian Guo; Jérémy Jean; Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin; Lei Wang (2014-08-29). The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on New Russian Standardized Hash Function. SAC 2014.
  30. ^ Jian Guo; San Ling; Christian Rechberger; Huaxiong Wang (2010-12-06). Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2. Asiacrypt 2010. pp. 12–17.
  31. ^ "ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Hashes". Retrieved November 23, 2020.
  32. ^ "Mind-blowing GPU performance". Improsec. January 3, 2020.
  33. ^ Goodin, Dan (2012-12-10). "25-GPU cluster cracks every standard Windows password in <6 hours". Ars Technica. Retrieved 2020-11-23.
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