Genocidal intent
Genocidal intent is the specific mental element, or mens rea, required to classify an act as genocide under international law,[1] particularly the 1948 Genocide Convention.[2] To establish genocide, perpetrators must be shown to have had the dolus specialis, or specific intent, to destroy a particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, in whole or in part. Unlike broader war crimes or crimes against humanity, genocidal intent necessitates a deliberate aim to eliminate the targeted group rather than merely displace or harm its members.[3][4]
The concept of genocidal intent is complex and has spurred significant legal debate, primarily due to the challenge of proving an individual’s intent to destroy a group without direct evidence.[5][6] International criminal tribunals, such as those for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, have relied on circumstantial evidence to infer intent, considering the scale, systematic nature, and targeting patterns of atrocities. Legal standards for genocidal intent have varied, with some rulings demanding dolus directus (direct intent to cause harm) and others allowing for dolus indirectus (foreseeable consequences accepted by the perpetrator). This discrepancy has influenced judicial outcomes, as seen in the acquittal of certain defendants under stringent intent requirements, leading some scholars to advocate for a knowledge-based standard to better facilitate genocide convictions.[7]
The debate surrounding genocidal intent also intersects with state accountability.[8] For instance, Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls argued that state genocidal intent could be inferred through a pattern of conduct and policies targeting a specific group. The rigorous evidentiary standards for genocidal intent, however, remain a point of contention, as critics argue they hinder genocide prevention by setting a high threshold for intervention and prosecution.[9]
Definition and legal standards
[edit]For an act to be classified as genocide (under the Genocide Convention), it is essential to demonstrate that the perpetrators had a deliberate and specific aim (dolus specialis) to physically destroy the group based on its real or perceived nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Intention to destroy the group's culture or intending to scatter the group does not suffice.[10]
In 2019, Canada's National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women argued that when it comes to state responsibility for genocide, "a state's specific intent to destroy a protected group can only be proved by the existence of a genocidal policy or manifest pattern of conduct."[11] The MMIWG inquiry used a broader definition of genocide from the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act which encompasses "not only acts of commission, but 'omission' as well."[12] The inquiry described the traditional legal definition of genocide as "narrow" and based on the Holocaust.[12]
Judicial interpretations
[edit]International Criminal Tribunals
[edit]The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and International Court of Justice have ruled that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal intent can be proven with circumstantial evidence, especially "the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups."[13]
Standards of intent
[edit]It is non-controversial that proving dolus directus would meet the Genocide Convention's intent requirement; the weaker standard of dolus indirectus (indirect intent, meaning that the perpetrator did not desire the harm but foresaw it as a certain result of their actions and committed the act with this knowledge) is less clear.
Some scholars argue that a knowledge standard would make it easier to obtain convictions. Some of the existing international tribunal cases like Akayesu and Jelisić have rejected the knowledge standard.[14]
The acquittal of Jelisić under the more onerous standard was controversial, and one scholar opined that Nazis would have been allowed to go free under the ICTY's ruling.[15] When Radislav Krstić became the first Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard, the Krstić court explained that its decision did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.[14]
Recent developments
[edit]In 2010, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal referred to the precedent of the ICTR in discussing the role of genocidal intent.[16]
Debate
[edit]In the 2004 United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the War in Darfur, Claus Kress argued that the ICTY and ICTR were incorrect in their view of the genocidal intent of individuals.[17] Hans Vest argued for the interlinked roles of an individual's intent and the individual's expectation of contributing to a collective action.[18] Kjell Anderson discussed ways of separating out the roles of collective policies and their interaction with individual intent.[19] Olaf Jenssen disagreed with the lack of sentencing Goran Jelisić for genocidal intent, arguing that legal consistency would imply that some of the perpetrators of the Holocaust would not have been convicted for genocide.[15]
Cases
[edit]- Akayesu: The court rejected the knowledge standard.
- Jelisić: Acquittal under the more onerous standard, controversial for its implications.
- Krstić: First Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard; did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.
References
[edit]- ^ Simon, Thomas W. (2016). Genocide, Torture and Terrorism: Ranking International Crimes and Justifying Humanitarian Intervention. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 17. ISBN 978-1-349-56169-8.
- ^ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. 2, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 – via Wikisource. ("In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy [emphasis added], in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such ...") [scan ]
- ^ Ochab & Alton 2022, p. 28.
- ^ Bachman 2022, p. 57.
- ^ Kiernan, Madley & Taylor 2023, pp. 4, 9.
- ^ Ochab & Alton 2022, pp. 28, 30.
- ^ Rodenhäuser, Tilman (2018). Organizing Rebellion: Non-state Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 284.
- ^ Bachman 2022, p. 47.
- ^ Moyd, Michelle (2022). "Genocide and War". In Bloxham, Donald; Moses, A. Dirk (eds.). Genocide: Key Themes. Oxford University Press. p. 227. ISBN 978-0-19-286526-7.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link) - ^ "United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect". United Nations. Retrieved 2024-11-22.
- ^ A Legal Analysis of Genocide: Supplementary Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (PDF) (Report). National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. 2019-05-29. p. 20. Retrieved 2024-01-26.
- ^ a b "A Legal Analysis of Genocide" (PDF). National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Retrieved December 17, 2024.
- ^
- Lattanzi, Flavia (2018). "The Armenian Massacres as the Murder of a Nation?". The Armenian Massacres of 1915–1916 a Hundred Years Later: Open Questions and Tentative Answers in International Law. Springer International Publishing. pp. 27–104 [65–66]. ISBN 978-3-319-78169-3.
- Smith, Roger W. (1999). "State Power and Genocidal Intent: On the Uses of Genocide in the Twentieth Century". Studies in Comparative Genocide. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 3–14. ISBN 978-1-349-27348-5.
- Campbell, Jason J. (2012). On the Nature of Genocidal Intent. Lexington Books. ISBN 978-0-7391-7847-8.
- Kim, Sangkul (2016). A Collective Theory of Genocidal Intent. Springer. ISBN 978-94-6265-123-4.
- Clark, Janine Natalya (2015). "Elucidating the Dolus Specialis: An Analysis of ICTY Jurisprudence on Genocidal Intent". Criminal Law Forum. 26 (3–4): 497–531. doi:10.1007/s10609-015-9260-5. S2CID 143072669.
- "Three Responses to 'Can There Be Genocide Without the Intent to Commit Genocide?'". Journal of Genocide Research. 10 (1): 111–133. 2008. doi:10.1080/14623520701850955. S2CID 216136915.
- Aydin, Devrim (2014). "The Interpretation of Genocidal Intent under the Genocide Convention and the Jurisprudence of International Courts". The Journal of Criminal Law. 78 (5): 423–441. doi:10.1350/jcla.2014.78.5.943. S2CID 144141503.
- Behrens, Paul (2015). "Between Abstract Event and Individualized Crime: Genocidal Intent in the Case of Croatia". Leiden Journal of International Law. 28 (4): 923–935. doi:10.1017/S0922156515000503. S2CID 152124051.
- Singleterry, Douglas (2010). ""Ethnic Cleansing" and Genocidal Intent: A Failure of Judicial Interpretation?". Genocide Studies and Prevention. 5 (1): 39–67. doi:10.3138/gsp.5.1.39.
- Dojčinović, Predrag (2016). "The chameleon of mens rea and the shifting guises of culture-specific genocidal intent in international criminal proceedings". Journal of Human Rights. 15 (4): 454–476. doi:10.1080/14754835.2015.1127139. S2CID 148074049.
- Ambos, Kai (2009). "What does 'intent to destroy' in genocide mean?". International Review of the Red Cross. 91 (876): 833–858. doi:10.1017/S1816383110000056.
- ^ a b Nersessian, David L. (2002). "The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals". Texas International Law Journal. 37: 231.
- ^ a b Jensen, Olaf (2013). "Evaluating genocidal intent: the inconsistent perpetrator and the dynamics of killing". Journal of Genocide Research. 15 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/14623528.2012.759396. S2CID 146191450.
- ^ Park, Ryan (2010). "Proving Genocidal Intent: International Precedent and ECCC Case 002" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 63: 129.
- ^ Kress, Claus (2005). "The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 3 (3): 562–578. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqi054.
- ^ Vest, H. (2007). "A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 5 (4): 781–797. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqm036.
- ^ Anderson, Kjell (2019). "Judicial Inference of the 'Intent to Destroy'". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 17 (1): 125–150. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqz025.
Sources
[edit]- Bachman, Jeffrey S. (2022). The Politics of Genocide: From the Genocide Convention to the Responsibility to Protect. Rutgers University Press. ISBN 978-1-9788-2147-7.
- Blackhawk, Ned; Kiernan, Ben; Madley, Benjamin; Taylor, Rebe, eds. (2023). The Cambridge World History of Genocide. Vol. II: Genocide in the Indigenous, Early Modern and Imperial Worlds, from c.1535 to World War One. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108765480. ISBN 978-1-108-76548-0.
- Kiernan, Ben; Madley, Benjamin; Taylor, Rebe. "Introduction to Volume II". In Blackhawk et al. (2023), pp. 1–20.
- Ochab, Ewelina U.; Alton, David (2022). State Responses to Crimes of Genocide: What Went Wrong and How to Change It. Springer International Publishing. ISBN 978-3-030-99162-3.