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South African Defence Review 2012

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The South African Defence Review of 2012 was a policy review conducted by a panel of experts and chaired by retired politician and former Minister of Defence, Roelf Meyer. The review was commissioned by Lindiwe Sisulu the then Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, in July 2011. The review was motivated by the need to correct errors and shortcomings of the previous review.

The 1998 Defence Review and its consequences

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The South African Defence Review of 1998, performed by management consultants from Deloitte and Touche and which forms the basis of the current defence policy, resulted in a number of serious problems:

  • Aging lower rank and medically unfit personnel cannot be discharged due to enlistment contracts based on civil service employment principles.
  • Inadequate provision for expeditionary/foreign deployment capacity. The review assumed the SANDF would not perform any foreign deployments. However, the reality is that the SANDF has been and still is heavily engaged in United Nations and African Union peacekeeping and enforcement operations (see the United Nations Force Intervention Brigade for example) in numerous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This oversight has necessitated expensive chartering of foreign civilian heavy airlifters to support deployed troops.
  • "Corporate-like" structure not suited to military operational requirements - The South African Army's brigade and divisional structures were abolished and replaced by separate "formations" and classified by role such as infantry, armour, intelligence, training, artillery, engineers, etc. This created a "silo" structural system which complicated and hindered interaction and integration of the different formations. Deane-Peter Baker of the South African Institute for Security Studies said that the D&T plan, "while alleviating to an extent, the mistrust of the new South African leadership of the remaining apartheid-era South African Defence Force personnel in middle management positions, reduced the combat effectiveness of the Army" and by 2011 was seen as a mistake. The decision to limit the force's design of the SANDF to rely on short logistic lines for highly mechanised mobile forces in defence of national territory, which caused many supply issues during modern foreign deployments, was also considered a mistake. This is one of the major problems for the army and various solutions are being considered by the government to better equip forces deployed in out-of-area SANDF project operations.[1]
  • "Top heavy" command structure (generals/troops ratio too high)

According to defence minister Lindiwe Sisulu, the old report was no longer relevant to South Africa's current situation.[2]

Mandate and terms of reference

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The committee's first meeting with Minister Sisulu was on 13 July 2011 at the Castle of Good Hope in Cape Town.[3]

Review organisation

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The review body was organized into two components, the review committee and a resource group.[4] The minister faced criticism due to the inclusion of Tony Yengeni in the committee as Yengeni had been convicted and sentenced for fraud relating to arms acquisition processes.[5]

The following members were included in the review organisation:[4][6]

Committee

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Resource group

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First consultative draft

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The first draft document, forming the basis of the public consultation process, was released on 12 April 2012.[19][20]

Immediate capability enhancements

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Immediate capability enhancements that are required to ensure that the SANDF can adequately perform its missions were identified in the consultative draft of the defence review.[21]: pages 418–420 

Special forces

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The South African Special Forces require additional weapons and systems, including a small number of dedicated aircraft for insertion/extraction missions. Additional units should be created for specialised missions.[21]: pages 418–419 

Border security

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The following needs were identified to ensure the SANDF can adequately defend South African borders.

  • Agile and protected patrol vehicles.
  • Surveillance equipment including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly micro-UAVs. Mobile and fixed acoustic, optronic and radar monitoring systems.
  • A "backbone" communications system integrated with tactical air, ground and police communication systems.
  • Various types of non-lethal weapons.
  • A system to collate data for intelligence led operations.[21]: page 419 

Air Space Surveillance and Protection

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The review found that static, mobile and airborne radar systems to track low-flying aircraft, and aircraft with the capability to intercept low and slow flying target aircraft were required in order for the SANDF to enhance its air surveillance and protection capabilities.[21]: page 419 

Extended Maritime Security Capability

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Somali-based piracy expanding into the Mozambique channel had been identified as a risk and an urgent reason to expand South Africa's maritime capability. Immediate requirements for maritime patrol aircraft, offshore patrol vessels, additional shipboard helicopters and shoreline patrol equipment were identified.[21]: page 419 

Crisis Response Capability

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The SAAF's Boeing 707s, previously used for in-flight refuelling, were retired in 2007.[22]

The following requirements were identified to enable the SANDF to fulfill South Africa's regional security responsibilities:

  • Equipment and weapons for parachute and air-landed battalion groups.
  • A rejuvenation and expansion of medium airlift capability.
  • Heavy/long range aircraft that when combined with medium airlift aircraft, will allow the Defence Force to deploy a parachute battalion group or an air-landed battalion group within 48 hours from South Africa to anywhere within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, or from a forward base within the continental SADC region to anywhere in an adjoining country.
  • The establishment of in-flight refuelling capabilities to enable effective fighter support for crisis response deployments and to extend the reach of the Special Forces.[21]: pages 419–420 

Urgent capability enhancements

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A Ratel IFV, in service since 1977.
As of 2014, the South African built Denel Rooivalk has still not received its Mokopa anti-tank guided missiles due to a lack of funding.[23]
The SAS Drakensberg (A301), in service since 1987

Various areas were identified by the review in which the SANDF lacked adequate capability to perform near/medium term missions. Obsolete equipment that needed to be replaced in order for the SANDF to retain its capabilities were identified.[21]: 420 

Infantry Combat Vehicles

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Infantry combat vehicles are suited to peacekeeping missions. The 30-year-old Ratel IFV was identified as being obsolete, making maintenance difficult. It was suggested that they be replaced urgently.[21]: 420 

Armoured Personnel Carriers

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The Casspir and Mamba APC vehicles were identified as obsolete and in urgent need of replacement. The Mfezi Ambulance is also in need of replacement. A need for Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected patrol vehicles has arisen.[21]: 421 

Logistic Vehicles

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The currently used SAMIL Trucks were identified as obsolete and in need of replacement.[21]: 421 

Light Artillery

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Recent conflicts in Africa have proven that light artillery that can be deployed quickly if needed. A 105mm long-range gun and ammunition family has been under development by Denel Land Systems since 2012.[21]: 421 

Aerial Weapons

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Weapons for the JAS-39 Gripen, BAe Hawk and Denel Rooivalk are needed in order for them to be operated effectively.[21]: 421 

Combat Support Ships

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It was identified that future operations of the South African Navy might be extended to the Mozambique Channel. The SAS Drakensberg (A301) was identified for replacement.[21]: 421 

Force support requirements

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Requirements for essential supporting equipment were also included in the consultative review. It was identified that there was a lot of obsolete or unsuitable equipment. This included water purification, field kitchen, field accommodation equipment, obsolete field workshop equipment and old field hospital equipment. The need for the re-establishment of a tactical airfield unit capability for the Air Force, in order to operate aircraft away from bases was also identified. The acquisition of munitions and explosives to allow rebuilding of ammunition stocks and effective live-fire and explosives training was also highlighted.[21]: 421 

Public consultation process

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The Public Participation Programme (PPP) consisted of a series of public meetings and consultations with stakeholder organisations at various venues around the country:[24]

Date Event Stakeholder / PPP venue City / Province
18 April 2012 Initial meeting Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans, Parliament Cape Town, Western Cape
21 April 2012 PPP Sport Stadium Tongaat Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal
24/25 April 2012 Stakeholder engagement Institute for Security Studies (ISS)[25] Pretoria
3 May 2012 Stakeholder engagement Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) Cape Town
5 May 2012 PPP OR Tambo Hall - Ikageng Potchefstroom, North West Province
8/9 May 2012 Stakeholder engagement Africa Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) Durban
26 May 2012 PPP Moses Twebe Great Hall Dimbaza, Eastern Cape
29 May 2012 Academic round table University of the Free State Bloemfontein
30 May 2012 Academic round table University of the Witwatersrand Johannesburg
1 June 2012 Industry round table Aerospace, Maritime and Defence Industries Association of South Africa (AMD) Pretoria
7 June 2012 CSIR round table Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) Pretoria
8/9 June 2012 PPP The Hoyo Hoyo High School Bushbuckridge, Mpumalanga
12 June 2012 PPP Pabalello Upington, Northern Cape
23 June 2012 PPP Aganang Community Hall Polokwane, Limpopo
18 July 2012 Stakeholder engagement University of Pretoria Gender Forum Pretoria
23 July 2012 Academic round table Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University Port Elizabeth
15 Aug 2012 PPP Walter Sisulu Square Kliptown, Gauteng
16 Aug 2012 Stakeholder engagement Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, Developmental Agenda Johannesburg
15 Sep 2012 PPP Nomzamo Community Hall Strand, Western Cape

Written submissions

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The committee received written submissions from various individuals and organisations.[26]

Second draft

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The second draft, based on the first, but with changes as informed by input received through the public consultation process was published on 7 September 2012.[27] Many of the changes were criticized by the pacifist civil society organisation, the Ceasefire Campaign, who said the proposed expansion of the defence force and increased expenditure was unnecessary as South Africa does not face any credible threat of conventional war.[28]

Second edition of the Second Draft

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A second edition of this draft was published on 6 November 2012. This was to make a number of "technical changes" after discussions with the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, the Defence Secretariat Council and the Military Command Council.[27]

Third draft

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This draft was published on 10 April 2013.[27] The draft recognised that South Africa was a significant military force in Southern Africa, however it is not considered as one of the world's major military forces.[29]

Final version

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The final edition, renamed the "2014" review due to the delay in publication,[30][31] was accepted by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament in May 2014. The main points covered in the over 400-page document are:[32]

The Defence Review identified 4 main goals of the SANDF:

  1. Defend and Protect South Africa
  2. Safeguard South Africa
  3. Promote Peace & Security
  4. Developmental & other tasks

To meet these goals the Review identified a number of Required Defence Capabilities:

  • Joint Command and Control
  • Defence Diplomacy
  • Special Forces
  • Special Operations forces
  • Medium-Combat forces - configured and maintained as a projectable, multi-roled medium-combat capability with enhanced fire-power, manoeuvreability and protection making it suitable for a range of contingencies.
  • Heavy-Combat forces - to deter South Africa's potential adversaries and conduct landward operations in high-threat situations and to augment the Medium-Combat forces
  • Maritime Operations
  • Air Operations
  • Military Health
  • Information Warfare capability

Realising that the cost of implementing all of the recommendations was immense, the Review recommended 5 Planning milestones for implementing the Review's recommendations:

  • Planning Milestone 1: Arrest the decline in critical capabilities through immediate, directed interventions.
  • Planning Milestone 2: Re-balance and re-organise the Defence Force as the foundation for future growth.
  • Planning Milestone 3: Create a sustainable Defence Force that can meet current ordered defence commitments.
  • Planning Milestone 4: Enhance the Defence Force's capacity to respond to nascent challenges in the strategic environment.
  • Planning Milestone 5: Defend the Republic against insurgency and/or armed conflict to the level of limited war.

Force Design

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The Review proposed a re-organisation of the combat forces.

Army

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It is proposed that operational forces be grouped under a Land Command, with the combat elements organized into brigades grouped into three divisions, each of which has a specific operational focus. In addition, some specialized elements will be under direct command of the Land Command.:[32]: page 232  The three divisions are:

  1. Mechanised Division
  2. Motorised Division
  3. Contingency or Special Operations Division

As a short term measure it is recommended that the South African Army consolidate its existing force structure into a Land Command comprising one Division and two Brigades:

  1. A motorised division.
  2. A contingency (special operations) brigade.
  3. A mechanised brigade.

Response

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The review, having been accepted by cabinet and renamed The "2014" Review, was submitted to parliament after the general election in May 2014. In September 2014, it was reported that official opposition, the Democratic Alliance shadow minister of defence and military veterans, David Maynier and defence analyst, Helmoed Heitman had expressed concerns with the delays the review was getting and said that dealing with and implementing the defence review was a matter of urgency.[33] By October 2014 the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and Military Veterans had been established with the responsibility to take the review as input to eventually produce a new defence policy.[34]

Research papers

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During the review a number of essays were produced by members of the review structure. These documents were used to inform the process.[35]

  • Research Essay on a South African Methodology to Determine Level of Defence Ambition
  • Research Essay on Changes to South African Defence Policy Since 1910
  • Research Essay on Climate Change
  • Research Essay on Cyber Warfare
  • Research Essay on Defence Ambition, Concept & Capabilities
  • Research Essay on International Defence Policy & Strategy Experiences
  • Research Essay on Private Military Companies & Mercenarism
  • Research Essay on Resources & Conflict
  • Research Essay on Security Sector Reform
  • Research Essay on the International Credit Crunch and Defence Spending

Notes

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  1. ^ A controversial member of the committee as he was convicted and sentenced for corruption related to his role in arms purchases during the late 1990s.[10]
  2. ^ Retired from the SAN in January 2014 while still serving on the review committee.[14]
  3. ^ As of 1995, part of SANDF communications service.[16]

References

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  1. ^ "The post-apartheid South African military: Transforming with the nation" (PDF). Institute for Security Studies Africa. Archived from the original (PDF) on 3 May 2014. Retrieved 3 May 2014.
  2. ^ "Draft Defence Review report released". Archived from the original on 2014-12-07.
  3. ^ "About Defence Review Committee". Sadefencereview2012.org. 2011-07-13. Archived from the original on 2015-02-24. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
  4. ^ a b "Defence review structure". Sadefencereview2012.org. Archived from the original on 2015-02-24. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
  5. ^ Molefe, Osiame (2011-08-31). "Sisulu stands by decision to appoint Yengeni to defence review committee". Daily Maverick. Retrieved 2014-04-29.
  6. ^ "Draft Defence review report released". South African Government News Agency. 12 April 2014. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  7. ^ Mashamaite, Kgabo (20 August 2012). "Defence Review Committee meets with Soweto residents". Department of Defence. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  8. ^ "Thandi Modise | Who's Who SA". whoswho.co.za. Retrieved 2014-06-23.
  9. ^ "Press Releases - Old Mutual Foundation drives CSI visibility, commuters round Sandton CBD". Oldmutual.co.za. 2012-11-06. Retrieved 2014-06-22.
  10. ^ Dempster, Carolyn (2001-10-03). "The rise and fall of Tony Yengeni". BBC News.
  11. ^ "SA: Statement by Jimmy Manyi, Government spokesperson, on the cabinet meeting of October 26th (27/10/2011)". Polity.org.za. Retrieved 2014-06-25.
  12. ^ a b "Defence Review 2012 consultative document: overview by Defence Review Committee". Parliamentary Monitoring Group. 10 May 2012. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  13. ^ Zulu, Nkululeko. "Fallen Soldiers remembered". SA Navy. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  14. ^ van der Berg, P.G. "Navy HQ bids farewell to Flag Officer Fleet, R Adm Philip Schoultz". SA Navy. Archived from the original on 5 December 2014. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  15. ^ "About us - Profiles". Department of Military Reserves. Archived from the original on 29 May 2014. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  16. ^ Sendall, Nick. "African Security Review, Vol 4 No.4 The creation of a single national defence force". Archived from the original on 30 November 2014. Retrieved 23 June 2014.
  17. ^ Hosken, Graeme (16 August 2001). "Security forces on alert for violence". IOL News. Retrieved 23 June 2014.
  18. ^ Heitman, Helmoed (10 January 2013). "SA safe-guarding its real interests with troop deployment to the CAR". South African Broadcasting Corporation. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  19. ^ "Lindiwe Sisulu launches draft defence review document - DOCUMENTS". Politicsweb. 2012-04-15. Retrieved 2014-04-29.
  20. ^ "Take part in defence review – Sisulu". City Press. 2012-04-12. Retrieved 2014-04-29.
  21. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n "South African Defence Review 2012 - Draft Document for Public Engagement" (PDF). sadefencereview2012.org. 2012-04-12. Archived from the original on 2013-11-15. Retrieved 2014-06-23. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  22. ^ "60 Squadron". The Unofficial South African Air Force. Retrieved 23 June 2014.
  23. ^ Heitman, Helmoed (31 March 2014). "South Africa's defence minister calls for Rooivalk line to be reopened". Jane's Defence Weekly. Retrieved 24 June 2014.
  24. ^ "Public Participation Programme". SA Defence Review 2012. Archived from the original on 8 July 2014. Retrieved 22 June 2014.
  25. ^ "ISS Seminar Report: The South African Defence Review 2012 - Consultative and Informative Public Meeting". ISS Africa. 2012-04-25. Retrieved 2014-06-25.
  26. ^ "Annexure C - Public Submissions to the Defence Review Committee (Part of the final review document)" (PDF). sadefencereview2012.org. Archived from the original on 2015-02-24. Retrieved 2016-04-20. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  27. ^ a b c "South African Defence Review 2012 - Publications". 2012-09-07. Archived from the original on 2013-11-15. Retrieved 2014-06-22.
  28. ^ Martin, Guy (2012-11-30). "Second draft of Defence Review 'like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic'". defenceWeb. Retrieved 2014-06-22.
  29. ^ "Creamer Media publishes Defence 2013: A review of SA's defence industry". Engineering News. Creamer Media. 27 November 2013. Archived from the original on 1 February 2014. Retrieved 24 September 2014.
  30. ^ Helfrich, Kim (2015-01-28). "Defence Review short-changed time-wise by Parliamentary committee". defenceweb.co.za.
  31. ^ Helfrich, Kim (2015-01-12). "2015 must be the Year of the Defence Review". defenceWeb. Retrieved 2016-10-14.
  32. ^ a b "South African Defence Review 2014". 2014-03-25. Archived from the original on 2015-02-24. Retrieved 2016-04-20.
  33. ^ Hartley, Wyndham. "Report on critical state of SANDF gathers dus". BDLive. Archived from the original on 12 November 2014. Retrieved 11 October 2014.
  34. ^ Matroos, Jamie-Leigh (2014-10-15). "Defence Review Needs To Be Tackled Directly – DA". SA Breaking News.
  35. ^ "Research Papers". Sadefencereview2012.org. Archived from the original on 2015-02-24. Retrieved 2016-04-20.

Further reading

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