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NATO Double-Track Decision

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Protest in Bonn against the nuclear arms race between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, 1981

The NATO Double-Track Decision was the decision by NATO from December 12, 1979, to offer the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles amidst the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[1] In case of refusal, NATO planned to deploy more medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe after the Euromissile Crisis.[2]

Background

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The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the signing of SALT I and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1972) and the negotiations toward SALT II (1979). Through these agreements, the two countries agreed to freeze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, reduce the number of anti-ballistic missiles and not build more ground-based launchers.

Along with the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War these arms control measures caused European NATO members, especially West Germany to feel overlooked.[3] On 28 October 1977, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt gave a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in which he condemned the threat posed to Western Europe by the SS-20 missiles being deployed by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe earlier that year and publicly expressed a European concern that the strategic nuclear parity reduced the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee and exacerbated the military imbalance within Europe.[4][5][6][7] The road-mobile SS-20 missile was capable of carrying up to three MIRV warheads and was more accurate than the previously deployed SS-4 and SS-5 missiles.[8]

The strategic nuclear parity between the United States and Soviet Union achieved through the SALT I, ABM and SALT II arms control agreements and development of new intermediate-range nuclear by the Soviet Union led to fears of "decoupling" among non-nuclear European NATO members.[4] According to Noel D. Cary, "unless America was unswervingly prepared to risk the sacrifice of one of its cities to save a German one, West Germany might be vulnerable to Soviet political blackmail."[9]

NATO Double-Track Decision

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SS-20 and Pershing II missiles, National Air and Space Museum

The decision was prompted by the continuing military buildup of Warsaw Pact countries, particularly their growing capability in nuclear systems threatening Western Europe. European NATO members were especially concerned about the growth of long-range theatre nuclear forces (LRTNF) such as the SS-20 and Tupolev Tu-22M 'Backfire' bomber.[10][11]

On 12 December 1979, at a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels, the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision was adopted. The ministers resolved to modernise NATO's LRTNF by deploying 108 Pershing II launchers to replace the existing American Pershing 1a missiles and an additional 464 BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) ("track two")[10][11][12] if negotiations for reciprocal limits ("track one") failed by the fall of 1983.[13] NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal of banning nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the missiles could be installed four years later if the negotiations failed.

The Soviet Union was critical of the fact that neither French nor British nuclear weapons had been considered in the arms control negotiations.[14]

Protests

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Soon after the NATO Double Track Decision opposition started to mount. In November 1980, German Green Party politician Gert Bastian and footballer Josef Weber drafted the Krefeld appeal [de] calling for the federal government of West Germany to retract its support for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in the country and GLCMs across Europe. The Krefeld appeal also called upon West Germany to oppose a nuclear arms race, emphasizing that the nuclear armament of the two Cold War superpowers is endangering Europeans in particular. By 1983 the Krefeld appeal had gained five million signatures and opposition to the NATO Double Track Decision became a minimal consensus for the peace movement.[15]

"Track One" negotiations

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See also: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty § Negotiations#Early negotiations: 1981–1983

The Soviet Union and United States agreed to open negotiations and preliminary discussions, named the Preliminary Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks,[16] which began in Geneva, Switzerland, in October 1980. The relations were strained at the time due to the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which led America to impose sanctions against the USSR.[17] Formal talks began on 30 November 1981, with the U.S. negotiators led by President Ronald Reagan and those of the Soviet Union by General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. The core of the U.S. negotiating position reflected the principles put forth during the Presidency of Jimmy Carter: any limits placed on U.S. intermediate-range capabilities, both in terms of "ceilings" and "rights", must be reciprocated with limits on Soviet systems. Additionally, the United States insisted that a sufficient verification regime be put in place due to their low trust in the Russians.[18]

Between 1981 and 1983, American and Soviet negotiators gathered for six rounds of talks, each two months in length—a system based on the earlier SALT talks.[19][20] The US delegation was composed of Paul Nitze, Major General William F. Burns of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Thomas Graham of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and officials from the US Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and US National Security Council.[21][22] In the fall of 1983, just ahead of the scheduled deployment of US Pershing IIs and GLCMs, the United States lowered its proposed limit on global INF deployments to 420 missiles, while the Soviet Union proposed "equal reductions": if the US cancelled the planned deployment of Pershing II and GLCM systems, the Soviet Union would reduce its own INF deployment by 572 warheads.[23][24][25] In November 1983, after the first Pershing IIs arrived in West Germany, the Soviet Union ended negotiations.[26][27][28]

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

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Main article: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On 8 December 1987 the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This treaty reverted the double-track policy.[29] This treaty also provided for the destruction of all middle-range weapons and ended this episode of the Cold War.

"Track Two" deployments

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Pershing II

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The Pershing II launchers began to be deployed in West Germany in late November 1983 and the deployment of 108 launchers was completed in late 1985.[30] Initial Operational Status (IOS) was achieved on 15 December 1983 when A Battery, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery Regiment rotated onto operational status at the Missile Storage Area (MSA) in Mutlangen. The West German government announced on 13 December 1985 that the US Army 56th Field Artillery Brigade was equipped with 108 Pershing II launchers across three missile battalions stationed at Neu-Ulm, Mutlangen and Neckarsulm.[31][32]

BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile

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464 BGM-109G missiles would be based at six locations throughout Europe: 160 at RAF Greenham Common and RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom, 112 at Comiso Air Station in Italy,[33][34][35] 96 at Wueschheim Air Station in West Germany,[36] 48 at the Woensdrecht Air Base in the Netherlands,[37][38] and 48 at the Florennes Air Base in Belgium.[38][39][40][41]

References

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  1. ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
  2. ^ "Thirtieth Anniversary of NATO's Dual-Track Decision". nsarchive2.gwu.edu.
  3. ^ Heuser, Beatrice (12 December 1997). NATO, Britain, France and the FRG. Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000. Palgrave Macmillan London. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-312-17498-9.
  4. ^ a b The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2015. p. 127. ISBN 978-0-8047-9286-8.
  5. ^ Becker-Schaum, Christoph; Gassert, Philipp; Mausbach, Wilfried; Klimke, Martin; Zepp, Marianne (2016). The Nuclear Crisis: The Arms Race, Cold War Anxiety, and the German Peace Movement of the 1980s. New York: Berghahn. p. 73. ISBN 978-1785332678.
  6. ^ Pincus, Walter (25 October 1983). "Soviets' Posture Shifts as SS20s Deployed". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  7. ^ Schmidt, Helmut (3 March 2008). "The 1977 Alastair Buchan memorial lecture". Survival. 20 (1): 2–10. doi:10.1080/00396337808441722. ISSN 0039-6338.
  8. ^ Rose, François de (1979-06-01). "Europe and America: The Future of SALT and Western Security in Europe". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 57, no. 5. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  9. ^ Cary, Noel D. (27 March 2019). "Helmut Schmidt, Euromissiles, and the Peace Movement". Central European History. 52 (1): 148–171. doi:10.1017/S0008938919000104. ISSN 0008-9389.
  10. ^ a b "NATO Basic Documents". web.archive.org. 2009-02-27. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  11. ^ a b "NATO – Official text: Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The Double-Track Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces), 12 Dec. 1979".
  12. ^ Trakimavicius, Lukas. "NATO at 70: Lessons from the Cold War". Atlantic Council. Retrieved 2021-12-02.
  13. ^ Søe, Christian (April 1995). "Jeffrey Herf. War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles". The American Historical Review. 100 (2). doi:10.1086/ahr/100.2.497. ISSN 1937-5239.
  14. ^ Drozdiak, William (20 January 1983). "Mitterrand Gives Boost to Kohl in Speech on Arms". Washington Post. Bonn. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  15. ^ Frank Biess (2020). German Angst: Fear and Democracy in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford University Press. p. 315. ISBN 9780198714187.
  16. ^ "Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces [INF] Chronology". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 15 August 2016.
  17. ^ Talbott, Strobe (1979-01-01). "U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Bad to Worse". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 58, no. 3. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  18. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, pp. 6, 9.
  19. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, p. 9.
  20. ^ Hoffmann, Stanley (1981-12-01). "NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Reasons and Unreason". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 60, no. 2. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  21. ^ "Paul Nitze and A Walk in the Woods – A Failed Attempt at Arms Control". Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. 30 March 2016. Retrieved 19 August 2016.
  22. ^ "Nomination of William F. Burns To Be Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency". Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. 7 January 1988. Retrieved 19 August 2016.
  23. ^ Rose, Francois de (1982-09-01). "Inflexible Response". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 61, no. 1. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  24. ^ Bell, Coral (1985-02-01). "From Carter to Reagan". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 63, no. 3. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  25. ^ Adelman, Kenneth L. (1984-12-01). "Arms Control With and Without Agreements". Foreign Affairs. Vol. 63, no. 2. ISSN 0015-7120. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  26. ^ "Mitterrand Tells West: Maintain Missiles Resolve". Washington Post. 2023-12-26. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  27. ^ Bohlen et al. 2012, p. 10.
  28. ^ Drozdiak, William (8 December 1983). "Soviets Halt Strategic Arms Talks". Washington Post. Geneva. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  29. ^ Spencer C. Tucker, ed. (2020). The Cold War: The Definitive Encyclopedia and Document Collection [5 Volumes]. ABC-CLIO. p. 434. ISBN 9781440860768.
  30. ^ Markham, James M. (1983-11-24). "FIRST U.S. PERSHING MISSILES DELIVERED IN WEST GERMANY". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2024-05-13.
  31. ^ "Pershing Missiles Now All in Place". Washington Post. 2023-12-28. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-13.
  32. ^ Pincus, Walter (15 October 1983). "Pershings Packed to Go". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  33. ^ Gilbert, Sari (15 April 1982). "Italy Begins Cruise Missile Base Despite Left's Protest". Washington Post. Rome. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  34. ^ Pincus, Walter (5 November 1983). "Cruise Missiles to Be Placed At Temporary Site in Sicily". Washington Post. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  35. ^ "COMPONENTS OF THE CRUISE ARRIVE IN ITALY". The New York Times. 1983-11-28. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  36. ^ Fisher, Marc (11 April 1990). "CRUISE MISSILE 'DRAWDOWN' BEGINS AT U.S. AIR BASE IN WEST GERMANY". Washington Post. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  37. ^ "Agreement Between The United States Of America And The Netherlands Concerning The Stationing, Support And Operation Of The Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) System In The Territory Of The Netherlands". www.un-ilibrary.org. The Hague. 4 November 1985. doi:10.18356/085bfbf8-en-fr. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  38. ^ a b "The Verification Sites". Washington Post. 10 December 1987.
  39. ^ "Belgium Removes Last Cruise Missile". Washington Post. 13 December 1988. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  40. ^ Montgomery, Paul L.; Times, Special To the New York (1988-12-14). "U.S. Flies the Last Cruise Missiles Out of Belgium". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2024-05-14.
  41. ^ Dryden, Stephen (14 March 1985). "Belgium to Deploy Cruise Missiles". Washington Post. Brussels. Retrieved 2024-05-14.

Works cited

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