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China–Nigeria relations

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China–Nigerian relations
Map indicating locations of People's Republic of China and Nigeria

China

Nigeria

The bilateral relations between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and People's Republic of China were formally established on February 10, 1971 - a decade after Nigeria gained its independence from the British Empire. Relations between Nigeria and China have expanded on growing bilateral trade and strategic cooperation. China is also one of Nigeria's important trading and export partners.

Although Nigeria maintains trade relations with Taiwan, and has a representative office in Taipei, it issued a joint communiqué with China in 2005, reaffirming that Beijing was "the only legitimate government representing the whole of China and Taiwan is an unalienable part of its territory".[1]

Nigeria has an embassy in Beijing, a consulate in Guangzhou, and consulates-general in Shanghai and Hong Kong.[2] China has an embassy in Abuja and a consulate-general in Lagos.[3]

History

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Nigeria and the People's Republic of China established formal diplomatic relations on February 10, 1971.[4][5][6] Relations between the two nations grew closer as a result of the international isolation and Western condemnation of Nigeria's military dictatorships (1970s-1998). Nigeria has since become an important source of oil and petroleum for China's rapidly growing economy and Nigeria is looking to China for help in achieving high economic growth; China has provided extensive economic, military, and political support.[7][8]

In 1996, as the Clinton administration lobbied in favor of sanctions against Nigeria. China, along with West-European countries, were unfavorable to a global freeze of Nigerian assets.[9]

In 2004 and again in 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao made state visits to Nigeria and addressed a joint session of the National Assembly of Nigeria. Both nations signed a memorandum of understanding on establishing a strategic partnership.[10] China has supported Nigeria's bid for a seat in the U.N. Security Council.[4] As of February 2013, the Chinese Ambassador in Nigeria was Deng Boqing.[11]

In response to the hesitation of the United States and other Western countries to aid Nigeria in their efforts to combat insurgents in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, the Nigerian government has developed close military cooperation with China, which has supplied arms, equipment, training, and technology to the Nigerian armed forces.[12] Both nations also signed a US$311 million agreement to develop cooperation in communications and space programs;[13] China helped develop and launch the Nigerian communications satellite (NigComSat-1) by 2007 to expand cellular and internet networks in Central Africa.[13][14][15]

In January 2017, the Nigerian government ordered Taiwan to move its unofficial embassy out of Abuja and into Lagos (Nigeria's economic center), stating that the African country was a defender of the One-China vision.[16][17] This order came after Nigeria obtained a $40 billion investment pledge from China.[16] Taiwan was required to rename the unofficial embassy (the "Business Delegation of the ROC in the Federal Republic of Nigeria") to the "Trade Representative Office of Taipei in Lagos").[17]

In July 2019, UN ambassadors of 37 countries, including Nigeria, signed a joint letter to the United Nations Human Rights Council defending China's persecution of Uyghurs.[18][19] Nigeria was one of 16 countries that defended China in 2019 but did not do so in 2020.[20]

In 2021, the two countries celebrated their 50 years of official relations.[21]

Treatment of Nigerians in China

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In April 2020, the foreign minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, condemned China's discriminatory attitude towards Nigerians, after a video emerged on the web showing Nigerian residents in China being discriminated against by locals. While Chinese officials said they took the issue very seriously,[22] they also blamed Western media for emphasizing isolated events to feed a PR smear campaign over its Nigerian interests.[23]

In November 2020, the Chinese government blocked entry to China for all foreigners, including Nigerians, over COVID-19 concerns, except for "essential services" including diplomatic service.[24]

It was reported that Nigerians in China were placed on lockdown for more than the average 2-week quarantine a Chinese citizen would experience.[25]

Economic relations

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Countries which signed cooperation documents related to the Belt and Road Initiative

Bilateral trade reached US$3 billion in 2006 – up from $384 million in 1998.[5][10] During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit in 2006, China secured four oil drilling licenses and agreed to invest $4 billion in oil and infrastructure development projects in Nigeria,[8] and both nations agreed to a four-point plan to improve bilateral relations – a key component of which was to expand trade and investments in agriculture, telecommunications, energy, and infrastructure development.[5] Furthermore, China agreed to buy a controlling stake in the Kaduna oil refinery that would produce 110,000 barrels per day (17,000 m3/d).[8] Nigeria also promised to give preference to Chinese oil firms for contracts for oil exploration in the Niger Delta and Chad Basin.[8] In 2006, China also agreed to grant a loan of $1 billion to Nigeria to help it upgrade and modernize its railway networks.[7] In 2005, Nigeria agreed to supply PetroChina with 30,000 barrels per day (4,800 m3/d) of oil for $800 million.[12] In 2006, the CNOOC purchased a share for $2.3 billion in an oil exploration block owned by a former defence minister. China has also pledged to invest $267 million to build the Lekki free trade zone near Lagos. However, the "flooding" of Nigerian markets with cheap Chinese goods has become a sensitive political issue, as – combined with the importation of second-hand European products – it has adversely affected domestic industries, especially in textiles, and led to the closure of 65 textile mills and the laying-off of 150,000 textile workers over the course of a decade.[10] Nigerian militants have also threatened to attack Chinese workers and projects in the Niger Delta.[10] In 2010, trade between the two countries was worth US$7.8 billion.[26] In 2011, Nigeria was the 4th largest trading partner of China in Africa and in the first 8 months of 2012, it was the 3rd.[27]

In April 2018, Nigeria signed a $2.4-billion currency swap deal valid for 3 years.[28] In 2019, bilateral trade between China and Nigeria reached $19.27 billion.[21]

Chinese development finance to Nigeria

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From 2000 to 2011, there were approximately 40 Chinese official development finance projects identified in Nigeria through various media reports.[29] These projects ranged from a $2.5 billion loan for Nigerian rail, power, or telecommunications projects in 2008, to an MoU for $1 billion for the construction of houses and water supply in Abuja in 2009, and several rail networks.[30]

Since 2000, trade relations have risen exponentially. There has been an increase in total trade of over 10,384 million dollars between the two nations from 2000 to 2016.[31] However, the structure of the China-Nigerian trade relationship has become a major political issue because Chinese exports accounted for around 80 percent of total bilateral trade volumes. This has resulted in a serious trade imbalance with Nigeria importing ten times more than it exports to China. Nigeria's economy is becoming over-reliant on cheap foreign imports to sustain itself, resulting in a clear decline in Nigerian Industry under such arrangements.[32] In September 2018, Nigeria signed a $328 million loan with China to heavily boost the development of telecommunication infrastructures in Nigeria.[33]

China provided the financing for the following projects in Nigeria:[21]

In exchange, Nigeria often/systematically hires a Chinese firm to oversee its development projects, such as the 3,050 MW Mambilla hydroelectric Power Station.[34]

Chinese military equipment sales

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In 2015, a China-made drone crashed in the countryside of Nigeria.[35] It is believed the drone was involved in Nigeria's struggle against the Islamic militant group, Boko Haram.[36] China supplied the CH-3 to Nigeria's government prior to 2014, along with YC-200 guided bombs and AR-1 air-to-ground missiles.[37]

In 2020, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) Chief, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, disclosed that the NAF has concluded the acquisition of eight Wing Loong II, CH-4, and CH-3 drones.[38]

Space cooperation

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In 2006, Nigeria obtained $200 million in preferential buyer's credit from the Export-Import Bank of China to help fund its first communication satellite.[39]: 303  Nigerian scientists received training in China regarding satellite construction and design.[39]: 303  The satellite was manufactured by China Great Wall Industry Corporation.[39]: 303  The satellite successfully launched in 2007, but failed the next year due to problems with its solar arrays.[39]: 303  Funded by insurance proceeds, a replacement was launched from China in 2011.[39]: 302–303 

In 2018, Nigeria signed an agreement with China to purchase two communications satellites with funds provided the Export-Import Bank of China.[39]: 303–304  In exchange, China will receive part ownership of Nigerian Communications Satellite, a Nigerian government-owned company that manages satellite communications.[39]: 304 

As of mid-2019, China had provided 500 Nigerian students with scholarships for training as space engineers.[39]: 303 

See also

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References

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  1. ^ Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2012-07-10). China and Africa: A Century of Engagement. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 87. ISBN 978-0-8122-0800-9. Archived from the original on 2024-05-13. Retrieved 2023-03-13.
  2. ^ "Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, China". beijing.ngembassy.org. Archived from the original on 20 October 2020. Retrieved 18 March 2021.
  3. ^ "Consular District". ng.china-embassy.org. Archived from the original on 17 July 2020. Retrieved 18 March 2021.
  4. ^ a b "China launches satellite for Nigeria". OnlineNigeria.com. 2004-10-28. Archived from the original on 2006-06-30. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  5. ^ a b c "Chinese, Nigerian presidents agree to promote strategic partnership". NEWSGD.com. 2006-04-27. Archived from the original on 2008-09-07. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  6. ^ Milutin Tomanović, ed. (1972). Hronika međunarodnih događaja 1971 [The Chronicle of International Events in 1971] (in Serbo-Croatian). Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics. p. 2598.
  7. ^ a b "Nigeria gets $1bn China rail loan". BBC News. 2006-05-22. Archived from the original on 2009-09-30. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  8. ^ a b c d "China and Nigeria agree oil deal". BBC News. 2006-04-26. Archived from the original on 2007-10-30. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  9. ^ Lewis, Paul (1996-03-12). "U.S. Seeking Tougher Sanctions To Press Nigeria for Democracy (Published 1996)". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 2021-08-20. Retrieved 2020-11-25.
  10. ^ a b c d Taylor, Ian (May 2007). "Sino-Nigerian Relations: FTZs, Textiles and Oil". China Brief - Jamestown Foundation. 7 (11). Archived from the original on April 2, 2015. Retrieved 2008-06-22.
  11. ^ Victoria Ojeme (Vanguard) (2013-01-29). "Nigeria: Chinese Govt Hands Over U.S.$12.5 Million Hospital to Nigeria". allafrica.com. Retrieved 2013-02-03.
  12. ^ a b "Nigeria turns to China for defence aid". Financial Times. 2006-02-27. Archived from the original on 2014-11-17. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  13. ^ a b "China launches satellite for Nigeria". MSNBC. 2007-05-14. Archived from the original on 2007-05-16. Retrieved 2008-06-21.
  14. ^ "China launches Nigerian satellite". BBC News. 2007-05-14. Archived from the original on 2008-03-17. Retrieved 2008-06-27.
  15. ^ Cody, Edward (2007-05-14). "China Builds and Launches a Satellite for Nigeria". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 2008-08-20. Retrieved 2008-06-27.
  16. ^ a b Kuo, Lily (12 January 2017). "After getting a $40 billion pledge from China, Nigeria ordered Taiwan's unofficial embassy to move out". Quartz Africa. Archived from the original on 2020-11-11. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  17. ^ a b Xin, Qiang (2024). "Selective Engagement: Mainland China's Dual-Track Taiwan Policy". In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping's Era: Beijing's Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan's Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. p. 70. ISBN 9781032861661.
  18. ^ "Which Countries Are For or Against China's Xinjiang Policies?". The Diplomat. 15 July 2019. Archived from the original on 16 July 2019. Retrieved 13 May 2024.
  19. ^ "Saudi Arabia and Russia among 37 states backing China's Xinjiang policy". Reuters. 12 July 2019. Archived from the original on 2019-12-10. Retrieved 2019-07-13.
  20. ^ Basu, Zachary (8 October 2020). "Mapped: More countries sign UN statement condemning China's mass detentions in Xinjiang". Axios. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 18 December 2020.
  21. ^ a b c "Nigeria-China Relations And 20 Years Of FOCAC". Leadership Newspaper. 2020-11-08. Archived from the original on 2020-11-08. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  22. ^ "'Unacceptable': Nigeria condemns treatment of citizens in China". www.aljazeera.com. Archived from the original on 2020-11-08. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  23. ^ Asiedu, Kwasi Gyamfi (14 April 2020). "China has failed to convince anyone videos of Africans being evicted is just a "misunderstanding"". Quartz. Archived from the original on 2020-11-01. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  24. ^ Olisah, Chike (2020-11-05). "China bars Nigerians, others from entry due to Covid-19". Nairametrics. Archived from the original on 2020-11-06. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  25. ^ "The maltreatment of Nigerians in China isn't likely to end anytime soon". Quartz. 2020-05-31. Archived from the original on 2023-02-01. Retrieved 2023-02-01.
  26. ^ "China pledges $20bn in credit for Africa at summit". BBC News Online. BBC. 2012-07-19. Archived from the original on 2012-07-19. Retrieved 2012-07-19.
  27. ^ "Mozambique-China Trade Continues to Grow". allafrica.com. 2012-12-09. Archived from the original on 2013-01-18. Retrieved 2012-12-09.
  28. ^ Chris Giles (4 May 2018). "Nigeria secures $2.4 billion currency deal with China". CNN. Archived from the original on 2020-11-13. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  29. ^ Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.[1]
  30. ^ Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection.http://aiddatachina.org/projects/1851 Archived 2013-06-23 at the Wayback Machine
  31. ^ LeVan, Carl; Ukata, Patrick (2018). The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 751.
  32. ^ LeVan, p. 754-756.
  33. ^ "China loans Nigeria $328 million to boost telecoms: Nigeria presidency". Reuters. 2018-09-01. Archived from the original on 2021-10-26. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  34. ^ "Nigeria awards dam power plant contract to Chinese state firm again". Reuters. 2017-08-30. Archived from the original on 2022-01-22. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  35. ^ Singer, Jeffrey Lin and P. W. "It Looks Like An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Crashed In Nigeria". Business Insider. Archived from the original on 2020-11-13. Retrieved 2020-11-08.
  36. ^ "Did An Armed Chinese-Made Drone Just Crash in Nigeria?". Popular Science. 28 January 2015. Archived from the original on 30 August 2017. Retrieved 3 December 2020.
  37. ^ "CH-3 fighting in Nigeria". Archived from the original on 2018-10-08. Retrieved 2014-12-29.
  38. ^ "Nigerian Air Force getting Wing Loong, CH-3 and CH-4 UAVs". defenceWeb. 2020-11-12. Archived from the original on 2020-11-26. Retrieved 2020-12-03.
  39. ^ a b c d e f g h Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023). China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-21001-0.

Further reading

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