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PL-15

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(Redirected from CH-AA-10 Abaddon)

PL-15
A Chengdu J-20 with four PL-15 inside the weapons bay
TypeBeyond-visual-range air-to-air missile
Place of originPeople's Republic of China
Service history
In service2016–present
Production history
ManufacturerChina Airborne Missile Academy (CAMA)
Specifications
Mass200–230 kg (PL-15)[1]
≤210 kg (PL-15E)
Length399.6 cm (PL-15E)
Diameter20.3 cm (PL-15E)

EngineDual pulsed solid-propellant rocket[2]
Operational
range
200–300 km (120–190 mi) (PL-15) [3][4][2][5]
145 km (90 mi) (PL-15E) [4]
Maximum speed Mach 5+[6]
Guidance
system
Active radar homing
Launch
platform
J-20, J-35, J-10C, J-15, J-16, J-11B, JF-17 Block-3

The PL-15 (Chinese: 霹雳-15; pinyin: Pī Lì-Yāo Wǔ; lit. 'Thunderbolt-15', NATO reporting name: CH-AA-10 Abaddon[7]) is an active radar-guided long-range air-to-air missile developed by the People's Republic of China.

History

[edit]

The PL-15 is developed by Luoyang-based China Airborne Missile Academy (CAMA).[8] The missile was test fired in 2011 and referenced by Chinese state media in 2015.[3] It was spotted in 2013 mounted on a prototype of Chengdu J-20.[9]

The PL-15 entered People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) military service around 2015[10] to 2017.[3] The carrying platforms include the Chengdu J-10C, the Shenyang J-16 and the Chengdu J-20. It has also been spotted on the Shenyang J-11B.[9] The PL-15 has begun to replace the earlier PL-12 as the standard beyond-visual-range missile for both PLAAF and People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force (PLANAF) fighters.[5][9]

In 2017, the United States began developing the AIM-260 JATM to replace the currently in-service AIM-120 AMRAAM in order to better counter the PL-15. The AIM-260 JATM is planned to enter service by 2024, with advanced variants of the AIM-120 (such as the AIM-120D) serving as a stop-gap until the AIM-260 can be fielded.[11][12]

The PL-15E, the export variant, was presented at the at the 2021 Zhuhai Airshow. The PL-15E has less range than the PL-15, possibly due to changes in propellant or rocket motor.[9] This is similar to the situation between SD-10 and its domestic counterpart PL-12.[9]

There were constant rumors about a variant or derivate of the PL-15 designed for compressed carriage.[13] In 2020, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported the development of the PL-16 missile, a thinner version of the PL-15, to allow J-20 to carry six missiles inside its internal carriage.[14] In January 2024, the PL-16 missile was confirmed to have a smaller airframe design with folded fins and a high-performance dual-pulse motor to maintain a performance level similar to the regular PL-15.[8] At the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow, the export variant PL-15E was shown to have folding rear fins, increasing the internal payload of the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-35.[15][16] The PL15 and PL-15E with folding fins could supplement or replace the regular PL-15 in the future.[13]

Design

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The missile is measured between 3.8 and 4 metres (12 and 13 ft),[5] longer and wider than other contemporary radar missiles. The cropped control fins are designed for internal carriage by stealth aircraft.[9] A later redesign incorporated folding tail fins and smaller central fins, further decreasing its footprint.[15] It incorporates a dual-pulsed solid-fuel rocket motor,[1][3] capable of a speed of Mach 4+ and a range of more than 200 kilometres (120 mi) – comparable to that of the Anglo-French MBDA Meteor.[5] Compared to the ramjet-powered Meteor, which has advantages in sustained flight profile with a fly-out speed between Mach 3 and 3.5, the dual-pulsed solid propellant rocket motor of PL-15 offers higher burn-out speed excess of Mach 5, then gradually loses its velocity at the terminal phase.[17] Meteor is likely to retain a larger NEZ (No Escape Zone) and higher long-range kill probability due to its ramjet propulsion.[18][5] However, PL-15 can also sustain the Mach 5 speed longer if launched at supersonic speed.[6]

The missile is guided by a miniature active electronically scanned array radar seeker,[19] sporting both active and passive modes for the different mission set. It also features improved resistance to countermeasures.[9] The hybrid guidance system supports a mid-course two-way datalink led by AEW&C aircraft and autonomous terminal radar homing.[3]

Variants

[edit]
PL-15
PLAAF domestic version with an estimated range of 200–300 km (120–190 mi).[3][5][2]
PL-15E
Export version of PL-15 with a reduced maximum launch range of 145 km[20]
PL-15/E Folding Fins
PL-15 and PL-15E with folded tail fins that allows J-20 and J-35 internal weapons bay to carry six missiles [13][15]
PL-16 (CH-AA-X-13)[6]
A further development of PL-15 that allows J-20's internal weapons bay to carry six missiles simultaneously (whereas PL-15 is quad-packed). The PL-16 missile, while smaller in dimension, features a compressed airframe, folded fins, and a high-performance dual-pulse motor to deliver the same performance as the regular PL-15.[8]

Operators

[edit]
 People's Republic of China
 Pakistan

See also

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Comparable missiles

[edit]

References

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  1. ^ a b Wood, Yang & Cliff 2020, p. 41.
  2. ^ a b c Chen, Chuanren (20 July 2017). "New Chinese Weapons Seen On J-10C Fighter". Aviation International News. Retrieved 25 August 2019.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Wood, Yang & Cliff 2020, pp. 38–39.
  4. ^ a b "PL-15 air-to-air missile". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 10 November 2018.
  5. ^ a b c d e f Bronk 2020, p. 36.
  6. ^ a b c "6: Waiting in the Wings: The Asia-Pacific Air-to-Air Challenge". Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2024 (Report). The International Institute for Strategic Studies. May 2024.
  7. ^ Barrie, Douglas (21 February 2023). "China's air force modernisation: gaining pace". International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  8. ^ a b c Barrie, Douglas (20 January 2024). "Air-to-air missiles push the performance, payload envelope". International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  9. ^ a b c d e f g h Newdick, Thomas (1 September 2022). "A Guide To China's Increasingly Impressive Air-To-Air Missile Inventory". The Drive. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
  10. ^ Barrie, Douglas (21 February 2018). "It's Not Your Father's PLAAF: China's Push to Develop Domestic Air-to-Air Missiles". War on the Rocks. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
  11. ^ Cohen, Rachel S. (20 June 2019). "Air Force Developing AMRAAM Replacement to Counter China". Air Force Magazine. Archived from the original on 1 July 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2019.
  12. ^ Tirpak, John (2 May 2023). "Kendall and Brown: JATM Will Start Production This Year, Equip Collaborative Combat Aircraft". Air & Space Forces Magazine. Retrieved 26 October 2023.
  13. ^ a b c Joe, Rick (30 November 2024). "Assessing the J-35A: The Chinese Air Force's New Stealth Fighter". The Diplomat.
  14. ^ Barrie, Douglas (24 April 2020). "Air-launched missiles: a low-observable numbers game". International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  15. ^ a b c Newdick, Thomas (11 November 2024). "New Version Of Chinese PL-15 Air-To-Air Missile Tailored For Stealth Fighters Revealed". The War Zone.
  16. ^ Waldron, Greg (15 November 2024). "PL-15E at Zhuhai suggests China squeezing more missiles into stealth jets". FlightGlobal. Archived from the original on 15 November 2024.
  17. ^ Barrie, Douglas (9 September 2022). "Air-to-air warfare: speed kills". Military Balance Blog. International Institute for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
  18. ^ Newdick, Thomas (1 September 2022). "A Guide To China's Increasingly Impressive Air-To-Air Missile Inventory". The Drive. Retrieved 27 January 2024.
  19. ^ Champion, Marc (7 May 2018). "Chinese Missiles Are Transforming Balance of Power in the Skies". Bloomberg. Retrieved 6 November 2022.
  20. ^ "China's most advanced air-to-air missile destined for export market". South China Morning Post. 30 September 2021. Retrieved 18 April 2023.
  21. ^ Huang, Kristin (30 September 2021). "New version of China's most advanced air-to-air missile the PL-15 is destined for export market". South China Morning Post.
Bibliography