Rovno–Lutsk offensive
| Rovno-Lutsk operation | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Eastern Front (World War II) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Germany |
 Soviet Union | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Erich von Manstein |
Nikolai Vatutin | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
The Rovno-Lutsk operation (Russian: Ровно-Луцкая операция),[2] was an offensive operation in the Western Ukraine, carried out by the far right-wing of the Red Army's 1st Ukrainian Front against the elements of the 4th Panzer Army of Army Group South, with the aim of enveloping the left wing of this army group.[3] This operation was part of the greater Dnieper–Carpathian strategic offensive, carried out on the right-bank Ukraine.
The offensive, spearheaded by the 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps in the wooded marshland, succeeded in capturing important communication centers of Rovno and Lutsk.[4] As a result of this offensive, the Soviets deeply enveloped the left flank of Army Group South.[5] This allowed the Red Army to strike southwards, deep in the rear of the Army Group South, which was accomplished a month later during the "Proskurov–Chernvotsy operation" that led to the encirclement of the 1st Panzer Army, in what is known as the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket.
In addition, a new westward strategic direction emerged for the Red Army, with the possibility of striking in the Kovel-Lublin-Brest direction, which allowed the Red Army to come to the flank and the rear of Army Group Center.[6] This offensive also created the so-called "Belorussian Balcony" – a German-occupied salient that protruded to the east and was over three hundred kilometers away from the front of Army Group South in the west.
This offensive was carried out around the same time that the Soviet Korsun–Schevchenkovsky offensive (also known as the Battle of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket). Although precious German armored divisions were being dispatched there to rescue two encircled German corps, the Soviet Rovno–Lutsk operation tied down the forces of the 4th Panzer Army that could otherwise be used in the relief operation of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket.[7]
The battle
[edit]Army Group South had instructed XIII Corps (Arthur Hauffe) to establish new defensive positions on the Sdolbuno-Uscie-Rovno-Zolotyov line to close the open left flank of the army group and delay the advancing Red Army. The Soviet advance was part of the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky offensive.[8]
The Soviet 13th (Nikolai Pukhov) and 60th (Ivan Chernyakhovsky) Armies moved through gaps in the defensive line, surrounding the city.[9] The remaining German forces capitulated on 5 February 1944.[10]
References
[edit]- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 265.
- ^ Алексей Исаев. "Котёл" Хубе. Проскуровско-Черновицкая Операция 1944 года. Яуза, 2017, p. 9.
- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 102.
- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 100.
- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 102.
- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 102.
- ^ Грылев А.Н. Днепр-Карпаты-Крым. Освобождение Правобережной Украины и Крыма в 1944 году. Москва: Наука, 1970, p. 102.
- ^ Bellamy, Chris (2007). Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War. Alfred A. Knopf. pp. 604–605. ISBN 978-0-375-41086-4.
- ^ Stone & Stone Books. "Second World War Books". War Diary for Wednesday, 2 February 1944.
- ^ Yivo Institute for Jewish Research. "Jews in Eastern Europe". Rivne. Retrieved 6 August 2012.
External links
[edit]- Ziemke, Earl F. (1968). Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East. p. 246. ISBN 9780160882746.