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Xi'an Incident

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(Redirected from 西安事變)
For the 1981 film based on the incident, see The Xi'an Incident (film).

Zhang Xueliang, Yang Hucheng, and Chiang Kai-shek two months before the incident
Xi'an Incident
Traditional Chinese西安事變
Simplified Chinese西安事变
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXī'ān Shìbiàn
Wade–GilesHsi-an Shih-pian

The Xi'an Incident[a] was a major Chinese political crisis from 12 to 26 December 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist government of China, was placed under house arrest in the city of Xi'an by a Nationalist army he was there to review. Chiang's captors hoped to end the Chinese Civil War and confront Japanese imperial expansion into Chinese territory. After two weeks of intense negotiations between Chiang, his captors, and representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chiang was released with a verbal promise to end the civil war and put up a firmer resistance to Japan.

Before the incident, Chiang Kai-shek had followed a strategy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" that entailed eliminating the CCP before confronting Japanese aggression. This strategy was deeply unpopular among many groups in China, including the Northeastern Army tasked with suppressing the main Communist base in Yan'an. The Northeastern Army was mainly composed of troops exiled from Manchuria after that region was invaded by Japan in 1931. Northeastern Army soldiers and officers had also begun to fraternize with the Communists and were convinced of the need for a united Nationalist-Communist front against Japan.

The commanders of the Northeastern Army, Generals Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, decided to kidnap Chiang after the latter refused repeated entreaties to change his policies. Zhang invited Chiang to come review the Northeastern Army, and after Chiang arrived, had him placed under house arrest at the Huaqing Pool complex. Some radical army officers wanted Chiang executed, but both Zhang and the CCP strongly opposed such a move. They wanted to pressure Chiang into changing his policies instead. Zhou Enlai led the Communist negotiating team, which after two weeks agreed to release Chiang. Although Chiang publicly repudiated the verbal promises he made in Xi'an, a ceasefire was declared and talks with Zhou continued. The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War. The full-scale Japanese invasion hastened the formal joining of the two Chinese factions in the Second United Front.

Background

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Map showing the situation of China during the Xi'an Incident in December 1936

In the late 1930s, the Nationalist Chinese government faced a number of overlapping problems. Since Chiang Kai-shek had purged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1927, the Communists had led a widespread rural insurgency.[1] The Nationalists found it difficult to organize an effective suppression campaign, in part because many of their armies answered to a local warlord rather than to the central government. The central government had to fight several wars during the early 1930s to keep these warlords in line (for example, see Central Plains War). When the Empire of Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, the Nationalist government decided it was not ready to confront Japan directly and instead focused on consolidating their control of the country.[2] This policy was known as "first internal pacification, then external resistance."[b] [3] Chiang launched on a series of encirclement campaigns against the CCP, which forced the Communists onto the Long March and almost destroyed the party. The survivors arrived in Yan'an on 15 October 1935, where they began to establish the Yan'an Soviet. They were besieged by a number of Nationalist armies, including the Northwestern Army under Yang Hucheng and the Northeastern Army under Zhang Xueliang.[4][5]

Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng in 1936

Despite its success against the Communists, the policy of "first internal pacification, then external resistance" faced strong public criticism.[6][7] Leftists opposed the civil war against the Communists and right-wing nationalists desired greater resistance to Japan.[8] Zhang Xueliang was one of the regime's critics.[9] He had governed Manchuria before it was overrun by the Japanese, and strongly wished to retake his homeland. He opposed the concessions that Chiang made to Japan in the He–Umezu and Qin–Doihara Agreements.[10] Chiang had slighted Zhang by refusing to let him resume his leadership of the Northeastern Army after a year-long absence.[11] When Chiang did re-appoint Zhang to the post, he ordered him to focus on fighting the Communists rather than the Japanese.[10]

The Communists took advantage of dissent in the Nationalist camp. They made repeated exhortations for Chinese unity against Japan. In February 1936, they announced that they were sending a detachment through Shanxi to fight the Japanese in Rehe and Hubei. Letting the Red Army through would have broken the encirclement, so Yan Xishan stopped them by force. Although defeated militarily, the Red Army convinced the Shanxi peasantry of their patriotism and gained 8,000 new recruits on their retreat. Zhang Xueliang was impressed, and began to see them as potential allies rather than foes. When Mao announced on March 14 that the Communists were willing to conclude a truce, Zhang covertly agreed.[12] He proposed to Chiang Kai-shek that he reverse the Nationalist policy of prioritizing the purge of Communists, and instead focusing on military preparation against Japanese aggression.[13] After Chiang refused, Zhang began to plot a coup in "great secrecy".[14] By June 1936, the secret agreement between Zhang and the CCP had been successfully settled.[15]

Events

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Arrest of Chiang

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Bullet hole made while Northeastern Army soldiers stormed the Huaqing Pool complex

In November 1936, Zhang asked Chiang to come to Xi'an to raise the morale of troops unwilling to fight the Communists.[16] After Chiang agreed, Zhang informed Mao Zedong, who called the plan "a masterpiece". At Xi'an, Chiang stayed in his resort headquarters at the Huaqing Pool complex.[17] On 12 December 1936, bodyguards of Zhang and Yang stormed the cabin where Chiang was sleeping. Chiang was able to escape but suffered an injury in the process. He was eventually detained by Zhang's troops in the morning.[16][18]

As conflicting reports of the events reached the capital, the Nationalist government was sent into disarray.[13] The response to the coup from high-level officials was divided. The Military Affairs Commission led by He Yingqin recommended a military campaign against Xi'an, and immediately sent a regiment to capture Tongguan.[19] Soong Mei-ling and Kong Xiangxi were strongly in favor of negotiating a settlement to ensure the safety of Chiang.[20]

Negotiations and release

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Negotiating room where Chiang Kai-shek met with Zhou Enlai and Lin Boqu

A faction of the army led by Yang Hucheng and the radical young officers of the "Anti-Japanese Comrade Society" wanted to execute Chiang, but Zhang and the Communists insisted that he be kept alive in order to maintain the possibility of a united front.[21][22] They argued that an alliance with Chiang was their best chance to combat the Japanese, while killing him would only provoke retaliation from the Nanjing Government.[14] The Northeastern Army sent a telegram to Nanjing explaining to the Chinese public why they had arrested Chiang and the 8 demands they had for his release. These included an immediate end to civil war against the CCP, expulsion of pro-Japanese factions from the Nationalist government, and the adoption of an active anti-Japanese military stance. They attempted to broadcast these demands publicly, but Nationalist censorship prevented their publication outside the Communist-held areas.[23][24]

On 16 December, Zhou Enlai and Lin Boqu arrived in Xi'an to represent the CCP in negotiations. At first, Chiang was opposed to negotiating with a CCP delegate, but withdrew his opposition when it became clear that his life and freedom were largely dependent on Communist goodwill towards him.[23][24] Influencing his decision was also the arrival of Madame Chiang on 22 December, who had travelled to Xi'an hoping to secure his speedy release, fearing military intervention from factions within the Kuomintang. On 24 December, Chiang received Zhou for a meeting, the first time the two had seen each other since Zhou had left Whampoa Military Academy over ten years earlier. Zhou began the conversation by saying: "In the ten years since we have met, you seem to have aged very little." Chiang nodded and said: "Enlai, you were my subordinate. You should do what I say." Zhou replied that if Chiang would halt the civil war and resist the Japanese instead, the Red Army would willingly accept Chiang's command. By the end of the meeting, Chiang promised to end the civil war, to resist the Japanese together, and to invite Zhou to Nanjing for further talks.[23] Chiang was released on 26 December and returned to Nanjing with Zhang Xueliang.[25]

Aftermath

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Lin Sen receives Chiang Kai-shek at the Nanjing Airport after the Xi'an Incident.

After Chiang returned to Nanjing, he announced a cease fire in the civil war. However, he also repudiated any promises that he had made in Xi'an. He had Zhang imprisoned and charged with treason.[26] Chiang then sent 37 army divisions north to surround the Northeastern Army and force them to stand down. The army was deeply divided on the appropriate response. Yang Hucheng and the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society wanted to stand and fight if the KMT army attacked, and refuse to negotiate until Zhang was released. The Communist representatives strongly disagreed and cautioned that civil war would, in the words of Zhou Enlai, "make China into another Spain".[25] Negotiations between the CCP and Nanjing continued. However, when a conference of Northeastern officers in January 1937 overwhelmingly resolved not to surrender peacefully, the CCP reluctantly decided that they could not abandon their allies and pledged to fight alongside them if the KMT attacked. The situation was again reversed when the five most senior Northeastern generals met separately and decided to surrender. The radical officers were enraged and assassinated one of the generals on 2 February, but this only turned the majority of the soldiers against the plan to stand and fight.[27] The Northeastern Army peacefully surrendered to advancing KMT forces and was divided into new units, which were sent to Hebei, Hunan, and Anhui.[28] Yang Hucheng, however, was arrested and eventually executed,[29] while the leaders of the Anti-Japanese Comrade Society defected to the Red Army. Zhang was kept under house arrest for over 50 years before emigrating to Hawaii in 1993.[30]

The rapprochement between the Communists and Nationalists outraged the Japanese, and eventually helped lead to the Second Sino-Japanese War.[31] This in turn hastened the two Chinese factions into formalizing their alliance as the Second United Front.[30]

The Xi'an Incident was a turning point for the CCP. Chiang's leadership over political and military affairs in China was affirmed, while the CCP was able to expand its own strength under the new united front, which played a role in the Chinese Communist Revolution.[32]

See also

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Wikisource has original text related to this article:

References

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Notes

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  1. ^ Also romanized as the Sian Incident
  2. ^ Chinese: 先安內，後讓外。; pinyin: Xiān ānnèi, hòu ràngwài.

Citations

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  1. ^ Taylor 2009, p. 68.
  2. ^ Taylor 2009, p. 100: "When the Japanese overran Jehol, Zhang Xueliang resigned all his posts and entered a missionary hospital in Shanghai where a 'cold turkey' treatment cured him of his opium addiction ... In April, the Young Marshal and a large entourage ... sailed for Europe."
  3. ^ Coble 1991, p. 76.
  4. ^ Ch'en 1991, p. 105.
  5. ^ Taylor 2009, p. 116.
  6. ^ Coble 1991, pp. 76–77.
  7. ^ Garver 1988, p. 5.
  8. ^ Coble 1991, p. 78.
  9. ^ Hammond 2023, p. 32.
  10. ^ a b Coble 1991, pp. 224–225.
  11. ^ Coble 1991, pp. 150–151.
  12. ^ Ch'en 1991, p. 109.
  13. ^ a b Worthing 2017, p. 168.
  14. ^ a b Ch'en 1991, p. 111.
  15. ^ Taylor 2009, p. 119.
  16. ^ a b Taylor 2009, p. 127.
  17. ^ Huang 1997, p. 4.
  18. ^ Bernstein 2014, p. 29.
  19. ^ Taylor 2009, p. 128.
  20. ^ Worthing 2017, p. 169.
  21. ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 176–178.
  22. ^ Eastman 1991, p. 48.
  23. ^ a b c Barnouin & Yu 2006, p. 67.
  24. ^ a b Worthing 2016, p. 168.
  25. ^ a b Itoh 2016, pp. 176–180.
  26. ^ Coble 2023, p. 53.
  27. ^ Itoh 2016, pp. 180–185.
  28. ^ Itoh 2016, p. 191.
  29. ^ Wakeman 2003, p. 234.
  30. ^ a b Eastman 1991, p. 48-49.
  31. ^ Paine 2012, pp. 102–103.
  32. ^ Garver 1988, p. 78.

Sources

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Library resources about
Xi'an Incident
  • Barnouin, Barbara; Yu, Changgen (2006). Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Retrieved 28 January 2023.
  • Bernstein, Richard (2014). China 1945 : Mao's revolution and America's fateful choice (First ed.). New York: Alfred A. Knopf. p. 29. ISBN 9780307595881.
  • Ch'en, Jerome (1991). "The Communist movement, 1927-1937". In Eastman, Lloyd E. (ed.). The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521385911.
  • Chor, So Wai (2002). "The Making of the Guomindang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei". Modern China. 28 (2): 213–252. doi:10.1177/009770040202800203.
  • Coble, Parks M. (1991). Facing Japan: Chinese politics and Japanese imperialism; 1931 - 1937. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard Univ. ISBN 9780674290112.
  • Coble, Parks M. (2023). The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War. Cambridge New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-009-29761-5.
  • Cohen, Paul A (2014). History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231166362.
  • Eastman, Lloyd E. (1991). "Nationalist China during the Nanking decade, 1927-1937". In Eastman, Lloyd E. (ed.). The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521385911.
  • Garver, John W. (1988). Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195363744.
  • Hammond, Ken (2023). China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future. New York, NY: 1804 Books. ISBN 9781736850084.
  • Huang, Ray (1997). China - A Macro History (Rev. ed.). Armonk, NY: Sharpe. ISBN 978-1563247316.
  • Itoh, Mayumi (3 October 2016). The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang. Springer. ISBN 978-981-10-0494-0.
  • Paine, Sarah C. (2012). The Wars for Asia 1911–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107020696.
  • Taylor, Jay (2009). The Generalissimo. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674033382.
  • Wakeman, Frederic (2003). Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service. Berkeley: University of California Press. ISBN 0520234073.
  • Worthing, Peter (2017). General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1107144637.
  • Worthing, Peter (2016). General He Yingqin: The Rise and Fall of Nationalist China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107144637.
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